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ABSTRACT
The Experience of Feelings in Depression
by
Noelle L. Lefforge
Dr. Christopher Heavey, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Emotions, such as sadness, guilt, and irritability, are at the core of depressive symptoms
and suggest a need for an in-depth understanding of feelings, the experiential component
of emotion, during depression. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to describe the
experience of emotion in depressed participants and find out if these experiences are
similar to those of nondepressed participants. Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)
was used to sample five depressed and four nondepressed participants for four days and
then in a controlled setting while watching positive, negative, and neutral film clips. Due
to the limited sample size, this study was largely exploratory. The primary findings were
that depressed participants experienced more feelings than nondepressed participants.
They also experienced a higher ratio of negative to positive feelings and more sadness in
response to the negative film clip. In addition, depressed participants experienced more
secondary depressive symptoms in momentary awareness. However, differences
between the groups in overall experience of depression in momentary experience were
much smaller than was expected based upon their differences on a depression
questionnaire. Additionally, depressed participants’ feelings included the types of
phenomena that have been found in previous studies of nondepressed participants. The
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depressed participants also demonstrated a significant decline in self-reported depression
over the course of the study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There can be no doubt about the prominent role of emotions in depression. Emotions
such as sadness, guilt, and irritability, as well as emotion related experience, such as
anhedonia, are core symptoms of depression, but little is known about the actual
experience of these and other emotions in people with depression. This lack of
understanding, in combination with a widening focus on understanding emotions in
depression as more than just symptoms (Goldston, Gara, & Woolfolk, 1992), highlight
the need for a study that directly examines the experience of emotion in depression. The
aspect of emotion that occurs before the footlights of consciousness is referred to as
feelings or emotion experience. In accordance with modern research convention (Kagan,
2007; Kalat & Shiota, 2007), I will use “feelings” and “emotion experience”
interchangeably to refer to this aspect of emotion, and it is this aspect that is the primary
target of interest for the present study.
Given the potential value of understanding emotion experience in depression, it is
surprising that there are limited studies that provide descriptions of feelings in depression
and there is extremely limited empirical knowledge on how these experiences differ from
emotion experiences of nondepressed individuals. A primary reason for this void in our
understanding may be psychology’s avoidance of phenomenological studies. Hurlburt
(1997) stated three reasons why psychology has not addressed characteristics of thoughts
which likely are equally applicable to explain the field’s avoidance of descriptions of
feelings: the belief that subjective reports are inaccurate, that the experience is already
well understood, and that experience does not vary between individuals. Most studies
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that do exist on emotion in depression have partially acknowledged these potential issues
and addressed at least one of these issues, often while ignoring the others.
For example, the questionable accuracy of reports of experience has been widely
acknowledged. This problem is compounded in research on depression by the well
documented memory biases associated with depression. Specifically, people with
depression have consistently demonstrated a mood-congruency effect in which they have
enhanced encoding and retrieval for material consistent with their current affective state
(Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Matt, Vázquez, & Campbell, 1992). Emotion-related
literature, particularly from a cognitive perspective, has attempted to overcome
limitations that memory bias exerts on subjective reports of experience by implementing
methods that do not rely on self-report. In particular, emotion-related attention studies
have examined only underlying, largely automatic processes. These studies have used
experimental paradigms, such as the Stroop task or dot-probe task, that use measures of
reaction time and accuracy that are unaffected by memory bias. These studies revealed
that depression is associated with increased attention toward negative stimuli and
decreased attention (avoidance) toward positive stimuli as well as an impaired ability to
disengage attention from negative stimuli (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Gotlib,
Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996;
Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). While these are important findings, these studies are
conducted in controlled laboratory settings and therefore the extent to which these
findings generalize to real life situations may be limited. In addition, the focus of these
types of studies is on processes that occur mostly, if not entirely, outside of awareness.
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Other information-processing based studies have addressed limitations imposed by
memory bias by decreasing the time interval between experience and report of emotionrelated experience. These studies have examined emotion-related perceptions and
responses by having participants report their reactions after presentation of affective
stimuli. These studies have found that depressed persons have a negative perceptual bias
in which, for example, they are likely to perceive neutral-expression faces as negative
and happy-expression faces as neutral (Gur, Erwin, Gur, & Zwil, 1992). Depression is
also associated with decreased responsiveness to both positive and negative stimuli, a
phenomenon referred to as emotion context insensitivity (Rottenberg, 2005; Rottenberg,
Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). Like emotion-related attention studies, these studies were
conducted in controlled environments and their relevance to real-life situations has not
been fully explored. Another potential problem with this research is that it is based on
participants’ response to measures that typically consist of a list of emotions. The extent
to which these forced choice measures may contribute to inaccurate recall or reporting of
actual experience is unknown; but this should be carefully considered in light of findings
that memory biases have been shown to exert significant influence on subjective reports
in depression.
Although information-processing studies have contributed to our understanding of
emotion-related processes in depression, they have not produced descriptions of actual
emotion experiences. It is reasonable to expect that such descriptions could be obtained.
One source of such descriptions is memoirs of depression; they do not, however, address
the important limitations of memory bias in reports of subjective experience. Other
experience-based studies have attempted to address memory limitations by obtaining
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reports of experience as it is occurring or shortly after it has occurred. These studies have
typically shown that depressed persons experience more negative feelings and fewer
positive feelings than do nondepressed persons (Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, Berkof, &
deVries, 1999; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters, Berkhof, Delespaul, Rottenberg, &
Nicolson, 2006). Although these studies have increased ecological validity in
comparison to information-processing studies, they still have typically obtained results
from forced-choice items which may influence responses and miss dimensions or aspects
of experience not anticipated by researchers in advance. Perhaps more importantly, the
purposes of these studies have not been to obtain accurate descriptions of emotion
experiences.
The second reason Hurlburt (1997) provided for psychology’s disinterest in
describing characteristics of inner experience was the assumption that inner experience is
already understood. This idea is reflected in the reviewed studies that use emotion labels
in a way that assumes they are understood in the same way by everyone. These studies
do not provide descriptions of emotion experience in their directions to participants or in
their reported findings, likely because these details are not considered important.
However, findings using Descriptive Experience Sampling have shown that people’s
inner experience differs in potentially significant and unexpected ways (Hurlburt, 1993).
These findings suggest the need for careful observation of inner experience that can
provide detailed reports on the characteristics of inner experience, including descriptions
of emotion experience.
The third reason provided by Hurlburt (1997) for psychology’s disinterest in
describing inner experience is the assumption that experience does not vary between
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individuals. Accordingly, studies that lack details on feelings are working under the
assumption that experiences of a particular feeling are uniform. However, a recent study
that carefully examined inner experience revealed that individuals exhibited extensive
variations in inner experience, including variability in the experience of feelings (Heavey
& Hurlburt, 2008). Other methods have also found significant variations in the
experience of depressed individuals, such as patterns of diurnal mood, when within-group
analyses have been conducted (Robbins & Tanck, 1987). These studies highlight the
importance of thorough examination of the details of individuals’ experience in
understanding feelings in depression.
The purpose of the current study was to provide descriptions of feelings in depression
and explore whether or not these experiences differ from the feelings of nondepressed
individuals. To investigate these issues, samples of inner experience were collected from
both depressed and nondepressed participants over the course of several days as they
engaged in their typical daily activities. The participants were interviewed regarding
their randomly selected experience in accordance with the guidelines of Descriptive
Experience Sampling (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). I was
particularly interested in what would emerge in their experience related to feelings and
depression. Further exploration of inner experience was also conducted by analyzing
form, content, and time orientation in inner experience. These additional analyses were
important for providing the detailed idiographic profiles of each participant which is
consistent with the goals of Descriptive Experience Sampling. The relationship between
feeling experience and questionnaire data collected from depressed participants was
considered as well.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Depression is a disorder with high prevalence rates (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) and serious consequences which include reduced quality of life
(Simon, 2003), functional impairment (Kessler et al., 2003), economic burden (Wang,
Simon, & Kessler, 2003), and risk of suicide (Isometsä & Lönnqvist, 1998). To be
diagnosed with depression a person must exhibit a depressed mood, which typically
consists of experiences of sadness or anhedonia (American Psychiatric Association,
1994), an inability to experience pleasure. The prominent role of emotion in these core
symptoms of depression indicates a need for a thorough understanding of the role of
emotions in depression. Although emotions have traditionally been considered only as
symptoms of depression, researchers have encouraged examination of emotion in the
development and maintenance of depression as well (Goldston et al., 1992).
Emotion Processing
Emotion Response
The experience of negative emotions has been implicated as a core aspect of
depression in foundational depression theories (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).
Given the weight of negative emotions in depression theory and the prominence of
negative emotion in the diagnostic criterion of depression (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994), researchers have assumed that depression facilitates negative
emotions, particularly sadness (Rottenberg, 2005). To investigate this assumption,
researchers have examined the response to emotion-eliciting stimuli among people
suffering from depression (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence,
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Cusack, & Ogilvie, 2004; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Rottenberg, 2005; Sloan, Strauss,
Quirk, & Sajatovic, 1997; Sloan, Strauss, & Wisner, 2001). In these studies, participants
are typically presented with positive and negative stimuli such as pictures (Dunn et al.,
2004; Sloan et al., 1997; Sloan et al., 2001) or video clips (Berenbaum & Oltmanns,
1992; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Rottenberg, 2005) to elicit an emotional response.
Dependent measures include observations of facial expressions (Berenbaum & Oltmanns,
1992; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Sloan et al., 1997; Sloan et al., 2001), participants’ ratings
of arousal (Dunn et al., 2004; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Sloan et al., 1997; Sloan et al.,
2001), emotional valence (Dunn et al., 2004; Rottenberg et al., 2005; Sloan et al., 1997;
Sloan et al., 2001), emotional category (Dunn et al., 2004; Dunn et al., 2004; Rottenberg
et al., 2005), and emotion-related physiological measurements (Rottenberg et al., 2005).
Together these studies have consistently shown that people with depression display
decreased responsiveness to positive stimuli rather than increased responsiveness to
negative stimuli.
Additionally, Wexler et al. (1994) found that flattened automatic affective
responsiveness (as measured by electromyography of facial muscles) was observed even
when depressed participants subjectively reported similar levels of emotional response as
did nondepressed participants. However, Sloan et al. (1997) found that depressed
participants displayed more negative facial expressions in response to negative stimuli
despite an absence of self-reported experience of negative affect. Although this may be
attributable to the tendency of those who are depressed to have a higher baseline of
negative expression (Segrin & Abramson, 1994), these results indicate dissociation
between subjective experience and observable emotional responsiveness. It is possible

7

that some elements of affective responsiveness during depression may occur outside of
awareness, supporting theories of unconscious emotion.
Emotional flattening has been observed across tasks regardless of the level of
difficulty of the task. For example, Berenbaum and Oltmanns (1992) presented
participants with two types of affect-eliciting stimuli which varied in cognitive demand.
The low cognitive demand trial consisted of tasting drinks whereas the higher cognitive
demand trial consisted of watching brief film clips. Affective responsiveness did not
vary based upon cognitive demand of the task. Furthermore, the emotional flattening
does not seem to be a product of medication as the effect has been demonstrated by
medicated and nonmedicated depressed participants (e.g., Berenbaum & Oltmanns,
1992).
At least one of these studies (Dunn et al., 2004) has also shown that depressed
participants showed an increase in sadness toward positive images relative to neutral
images. Dunn et al. (2004) noted that although this was a significant finding, the degree
of sadness in response to positive images was much less than the degree of sadness in
response to negative images; therefore it is difficult to state that the depressed
participants truly felt sad in response to positive images. The authors speculate that a
minor increase in sadness in response to positive images may be related to awareness that
the images are not inducing pleasure as they typically should. Also, some of the studies
(e.g., Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Sloan et al., 1997) have focused on negative
emotions of fear and disgust rather than sadness, which is more central to depression.
However, even when sad stimuli were used, no differences were found in responsiveness
of depressed and nondepressed participants (Sloan et al., 2001).
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The general flattening of affective responding has been referred to as emotional
context insensitivity (Rottenberg, 2005). Researchers were concerned that emotionalcontext-insensitive patterns of responses may have actually been a result of
disengagement from the task. It would be reasonable to believe that traits of depression,
such as inattention and lack of motivation, could cause depressed participants not to
engage with the emotional stimuli and thereby produce diminished emotional responses.
To examine this possibility, reanalysis (Rottenberg, 2005) of a previous study which
compared healthy and depressed criers was conducted to determine if disengagement
from the task is responsible for decreased emotional response in depression (Rottenberg,
Gross, Wilhelm, Najmi, & Gotlib, 2002). Participants who cried in response to the sad
film were chosen because it was assumed that the crying signified engagement in the
task. This study found that even when depressed persons are equally engaged with the
stimuli as nondepressed persons (as revealed by comparison of depressed and
nondepressed criers), an emotional-context-insensitive pattern of response still occurred
in which depressed participants reported less change in their emotional experience and
fewer physiological changes were observed during presentation of sad stimuli.
Researchers were still concerned that the sad stimuli used may have been ineffective
with depressed participants. To investigate this concern, participants’ responses to
viewing interviews of themselves discussing their saddest moments were observed.
Again, depressed participants exhibited an emotional-contex- insensitive pattern of
response to the personally relevant emotion eliciting stimuli (Rottenberg et al., 2005).
The overall flattening of affective responsiveness that defines emotion context
insensitivity suggests a problem with emotional regulation in depression (Dunn et al.,
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2004; Rottenberg et al., 2002; Rottenberg et al., 2005). An inability to react to various
emotion contexts likely interferes with the ability to adapt to the environment (Rottenberg
et al., 2005). Rottenberg et al. (2005) reviewed preliminary evidence that emotion
context insensitivity is related to psychosocial dysfunction, potentially including
depression. For example, Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, and Gotlib (2002) found that
emotional-context-insensitive responses to sad and neutral stimuli were associated with
increased depression severity and duration as well as decreased psychosocial functioning.
However, it is unclear if this pattern of emotional responsiveness directly contributes
to observable features of depression. Although Berenbaum and Oltamanns (1992)
reported a previous finding that participants with schizophrenia who exhibited the least
emotional responsiveness to presented stimuli were also judged as the most emotionally
blunted during a clinical interview, the initial clinical interview of depressed participants
in their study did not rate restrictive responders as emotionally blunted. Studies assessing
other corollary characteristics of depressed participants who exhibit emotional context
insensitivity, such as observable affect or interpersonal style, have not been conducted.
Research that has attempted to establish whether emotional dysregulation, such as
emotional context insensitivity, is a symptom or causal factor of depression is also
limited. Rottenberg et al. (2005) hypothesized that if emotional context insensitivity is a
causal factor of depression, then it should be observed to be a trait-like characteristic and
observable in previously depressed participants during euthymic periods. However, their
results did not support this hypothesis, indicating that depression produces mood-state
dependent changes in emotional reactivity, rather than being a trait-like feature of people
with depression. An alternative explanation of these results is that emotional regulation
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skills were acquired by the formerly depressed participants which resulted in symptom
improvement indicated by euthymia.
Gehrick and Shapiro (2000) presented participants with happy or sad scenarios and
asked participants to engage in imagery. Although depressed participants’ reports of
emotion were similar to controls during imagery, they showed reduced facial muscle
activity. Depressed participants also had reduced facial muscle activity at baseline. In
contrast to the previously reviewed study by Langenecker et al. (2005), these findings
possibly indicate that lack of expressiveness in response to emotional stimuli may result
from psychomotor retardation. The imagery scenarios that were presented to participants
were also varied between solitary and social scenes. Depressed participants’ frowning
did not vary between sad-solitary and sad-social imagery. The investigators attribute this
lack of response to social disengagement, a tendency to hide one’s emotion in the
presence of others.
Emotion Perception
The pattern of emotional responsiveness observed in depressed persons may be
related to differences in perception of emotional stimuli. Prominent cognitive theories of
depression (Beck et al., 1979) attribute the tendency to perceive ambiguous stimuli
negatively as a key component of depression. Researchers have been particularly
interested in how depressed persons perceive emotional stimuli. Therefore, many studies
have been done on perception of emotion in depression.
To investigate emotion perception in depression, researchers typically present
depressed and nondepressed participants with emotional stimuli. In most studies, the
emotional stimuli consist of facial expressions. For example, the study may use

11

photographs of faces (Gur et al., 1992; Hale, 1998; Langenecker et al., 2005; Mikhailova,
Vladimirova, Iznak, & Tsusulkovskaya, 1996; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Rubinow & Post,
1992) or line drawings that approximate real faces (Mikhailova et al., 1996) expressing
various subsets of prototypical emotions such as happiness, sadness, fearfulness, anger,
surprise, contempt/disgust, and no emotion/indifference and participants rate their
perception of the emotions. All of these studies have found that depressed participants
are less accurate in perceiving the emotion of the facial expression than are nondepressed
participants.
This effect has been shown in both men and women. Whereas most of the studies
either consist exclusively (Langenecker et al., 2005; Persad & Polivy, 1993) or
predominantly (Gur et al., 1992; Rubinow & Post, 1992) of women, one study consisted
exclusively of men (Mikhailova et al., 1996). The samples also consisted of both
outpatient (Langenecker et al., 2005), inpatient (Mikhailova et al., 1996; Rubinow &
Post, 1992), and mixed inpatient/outpatient (Gur et al., 1992; Persad & Polivy, 1993)
samples. Of the two studies that reported medication status of their samples, one study
reported some of the participants were on medication whereas others were not
(Langenecker et al., 2005) and one study reported participants were medication free for
their first assessment and all participants were on medication by the second assessment
(Mikhailova et al., 1996). All of the studies included depressed participants (Gur et al.,
1992; Langenecker et al., 2005; Mikhailova et al., 1996; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Rubinow
& Post, 1992). Gur, Erwin, Gur, Zwil, Heimberg, and Kraemer (1992) specified that
depressed participants were currently experiencing either major depression or bipolar
disorder (depressed phase) and Mikhailova, Vladimirova, Iznak, Tsusulkovskaya, and
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Sushko (1996) specified major depression or schizotypal personality disorder with
depressive symptomotology.
Impaired processing of emotional faces does not seem to be result of general visual
processing difficulties. Langenecker, Bieliauskas, Rapport, Zubieta, Wilde, and Berent
(2005) found that there were no differences in response time to stimuli between
depressed and non depressed participants. In this study, participants were also presented
with pictures of animals and asked to categorize them. Results showed that depressed
participants performed this task as well as did controls. Comparison of efficiency
(reaction time/accuracy) of emotional processing to visual processing led the
investigators to conclude that depressed participants were less efficient processors of
emotional information.
Impaired emotional processing may be particular to visual stimuli. To measure
verbal affective expression, Rubinow and Post (1992) administered a sentence-word
matching task in addition to the facial expression task. They found there were no
differences between depressed and nondepressed participants in the accuracy of affective
verbal matching. Furthermore, Langenecker et al. (2005) demonstrated that despite
differences in emotional processing, depressed participants did not exhibit impairment in
attention, memory, visuo-spatial, or motor skills.
Analysis of the types of errors depressed participants made in response to facial
expressions provide more information. One study (Persad & Polivy, 1993) found that
negative reactions in response to negative and ambivalent facial expressions were
elevated in depressed participants compared to controls. In particular, depressed
participants responded with more fear than did controls to the fearful expression. Gur et
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al. (1992) found that depressed participants had impaired sensitivity for happiness in that
they incorrectly identified happy faces as neutral. Depressed participants also had an
impaired specificity for sadness in that they incorrectly identified neutral faces as sad.
These impairments indicate an overall negative bias in the perception of emotion among
people with depression. However, another study found that errors occurred only in
response to happy and sad faces, but not to neutral faces (Mikhailova et al., 1996).
Langenecker et al. (2005) found that controls were more likely to err by over-identifying
happiness, whereas depressed participants were more likely to err by not identifying any
of the emotions to an expression, referred to as a “no response” error. Lastly, Rubinow
and Post (1992) found that depressed participants made the most errors in response to
faces exhibiting sadness, happiness, and interest.
Differences in perception of emotion may be accompanied by differences in behavior
and subjective experience. Persad and Polivy (1993) observed that depressed participants
had an increased tendency to freeze in response to facial emotions and had less tolerance
for facial expressions. Depressed participants were also more likely to report that they
would avoid facial expressions. They also reported less comfort with their own
emotional reaction and had more desire to change their reaction than controls.
Some of these studies have attempted to identify regions of the brain that may
contribute to emotion perception impairment in depression. Langenecker et al. (2005)
included an inhibitory task in their study. Depressed participants had impaired
performance on the difficult inhibitory task in comparison to controls which indicated
problems with executive functioning and implicated the role of the limbic areas in
perceptual difficulties. Performance of depressed participants is similar to the pattern of
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performance exhibited by patients with right hemisphere lesions (Rubinow & Post,
1992), which is dominant in facial processing, particularly in processing of positive facial
expressions (Mikhailova et al., 1996). However, Mikhailova et al. (1996) found that
depressed participants were deficient in recognizing sad affect in both the right and left
hemispheres of the brain but were deficient in recognizing happy affect in only the left
hemisphere.
Several of the studies reviewed have provided evidence that impaired recognition of
emotion may be a state-like feature of depression. Recognition of emotions in facial
expression has been shown to improve after recovery from depression (Mikhailova et al.,
1996) and the performance of formerly depressed participants that are currently euthymic
is consistent with controls (Rubinow & Post, 1992). Furthermore, Gur et al.’s (1992)
findings were more pronounced with increased severity of depression.
The relationship between depression severity and persistence has been thoroughly
examined by a line of research that used schematic faces as emotion perception stimuli
(Bouhuys, Geerts, & Mersch, 1997; Bouhuys, Bloem, & Groothuis, 1995; Bouhuys,
Geerts, Mersch, & Jenner, 1996; Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999a; Bouhuys, Geerts, &
Gordijn, 1999b; Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998; Hale, 1998). The schematic faces are line
drawings of 12 faces that consist of the same eye and nose types and vary by
combinations of four eyebrow types and three mouth types to depict positive, negative, or
ambiguous emotions. Ambiguous faces are those in which there are equal amounts of
positive and negative features represented on a single face. Typically, each face was
rated on a 5 point scale for six basic emotions (fear, happiness, anger, sadness, disgust,
and surprise) and two self-referent emotions (invitation and rejection). These judgments
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can be categorized as either positive (happy and invitation) or negative (fear, anger,
sadness, disgust, and rejection). Bouhuys, Bloem, and Groothuis (1995) established that
the faces did include representations of the target emotions which could be agreed upon
by independent judges. Furthermore, they found that some of the faces depicted various
emotions within one face. They also found that women tended to perceive more anger,
fear, and disgust than men.
Consistent with previously reviewed studies that used pictures of facial expressions,
Hale (1998) found differences between depressed and nondepressed participants’
perception of emotion in the schematic faces. Specifically, he found that compared to
controls, depressed participants perceived more sadness in both ambiguous and general
faces. Overall, depressed participants judged ambiguous faces more negatively than did
controls.
Bouhuys, Bloem, and Groothuis (1995) conducted a study in which participants rated
the schematic faces after listening to either depressing or elating music. Results indicated
that inducing a depressed mood led participants to perceive ambiguous faces as more
rejecting and sad than when a euphoric mood was induced. The participants who were
induced with a depressed mood also judged ambiguous faces as less happy and inviting.
Subsequent studies that examined depressed participants’ perception of emotion in
the schematic faces found a relationship between perception of emotion and persistence
and/or severity of depression (Bouhuys et al., 1997; Bouhuys et al., 1995; Bouhuys et al.,
1996; Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999a; Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999b; Geerts &
Bouhuys, 1998; Hale, 1998). For example, Bouhuys, Geers, and Gordijn (1999) found
that ambiguous faces were perceived more negatively during periods of depression than
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during periods of remission. In addition, participants who relapsed had higher levels of
negative perception of ambiguous faces than participants who did not. This finding was
consistent with a previous study that indicated that negative judgment of faces was
related to higher severity and persistence of depression (Hale, 1998). This study found
that judgment of sadness in all faces (general and ambiguous) predicted depression
persistence with judgment of sadness in ambiguous faces being the best predictor. It has
been consistently shown that ambiguous faces are particularly susceptible to negative
judgment during depression (Bouhuys et al., 1995; Bouhuys et al., 1996; Bouhuys,
Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999a; Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999b; Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998;
Gur et al., 1992). This is consistent with Beck et al.’s (1979) cognitive theory of
depression which implicates negative interpretation of ambiguous situations in the
development and maintenance of depression.
Geerts and Bouhuys (1998) examined the role of personality variables in the
relationship between emotion perception and depression. They found that higher levels
of neuroticism were associated with more persistent depression. Notably, the tendency to
perceive ambiguous faces negatively mediated the relationship between neuroticism and
depression persistence.
Gender also appears to play a significant role in the relationship between perception
of emotion and depression. Women, but not men, who perceived more negative emotion
of ambiguous faces had poorer outcomes six weeks after treatment than did women who
perceived lower levels of negative emotion (Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999b). It
should be noted that the men in this sample were significantly less depressed than the
women. There was one study (Bouhuys et al., 1996) that was inconsistent with all other
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studies in that perception of less sadness, rejection, and anger were associated with
poorer outcomes at 6 and 30 weeks after treatment. Contrary to current speculation, the
investigators posited that negative perception of emotion was a trait-like characteristic
and indicated a hyposensitivity to emotion among people with depression. After
subsequent studies contradicted these findings, the investigators conducted further
analyses. They found that gender differences likely accounted for their findings, in that
only females that initially reported negative perception had poorer outcomes whereas
men exhibited the opposite relationship. Furthermore, high levels of negative perception
of emotion were related to poorer outcomes only among female inpatients, but not among
female outpatients.
Only one study directly analyzed the potential influence of medication on the
relationship between emotion perception and depression (Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn,
1999b). It was not significant. This study also showed that the relationship between
negative emotion perception and depression persistence could not be explained by the
initial level of depression.
A negative perceptual bias of emotion has also been demonstrated in a real world
setting. Hokanson, Hummer, and Butler (1991) studied depressed college students’
perceptions of their roommates. Depressed participants rated their roommates’ behaviors
toward them which produced an estimate of perceived hostility. The roommates rated
their own behavior toward the depressed participants. It was found that the discrepancy
between the participant’s and the roommate’s ratings of hostility was larger among
depressed college students than nondepressed college students. Also, depressed
participants underestimated their roommates’ friendliness compared to nondepressed
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participants. It is interesting to note that roommates of depressed participants did report
higher levels of hostile responding than did roommates of nondepressed participants.
This indicates that the depressed participants were exaggerating already elevated
hostility.
Inaccuracy, particularly a negative bias, in perception of emotion has major
implications for interpersonal functioning. Overall, depressed persons have been shown
to have atypical social perceptions (Alloy & Abramson, 1988), and it is likely that
inaccurate perception of emotion is an important aspect of impaired social perception.
Evidence supporting a relationship between social factors and negative bias in emotion
perception exists. For example, higher levels of extraversion were associated with less
negative perception of ambiguous faces (Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998). Hokanson, Hummer,
and Butler (1991) commented on depressed college students’ perceptions of hostility in
their roommates by writing “logic dictates that they probably contribute to problems in
interpersonal relationships” (p. 454). Their finding that depressed college students’
roommates respond with elevated hostility compared to nondepressed college students’
roommates may provide evidence that negative perceptions interact with negative
emotional responses to create unfavorable interpersonal relations. Whereas negative bias
and interpersonal variables likely interact in some ways, it should be noted that studies
have also found that personality variables, cognitions, and interpersonal variables all
independently contribute to depression. Geerts & Bouhuys (1998) and Bouyhuys, Geerts,
and Gordijn (1999) found that among women, social distress related to poorer outcome
after 6 weeks of treatment independently of perception of negative emotion.
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Although diagnostic features of depression include socially relevant symptoms (e.g.,
social withdrawal; APA, 2000), social phobia is the psychological diagnosis most closely
associated with interpersonal problems. Some research has been done to evaluate the role
that anxiety may play in the socially relevant area of emotional perception in people with
depression (Bouhuys et al., 1997; Suslow et al., 2004).
For example, Suslow et al. (2004) administered a face-in-the-crowd task to depressed
patients with and without comorbid anxiety disorders, as well as to controls. Participants
had to identify a single positive face among a series of neutral faces or a single negative
face among a series of neutral faces. Trials in which only neutral faces were presented
were also included. Participants’ response times and error rates were analyzed. Results
indicated that only depressed participants with comorbid anxiety disorders responded to
positive faces slower than did controls. In addition, these participants’ performance did
not improve during periods of remission. However, all depressed participants responded
slower to neutral faces. The investigators concluded that “automatic processes of facial
emotion detection are intact in depression” (p. 63). An alternative approach to these
findings might suggest that depressed participants’ slowed response toward neutral faces
is further evidence of impairment in processing of ambiguous emotional stimuli.
Also, Bouhyus, Geerts, and Mersch (1997) repeated a previously detailed procedure
in which depressed participants rated schematic faces at admission, after six weeks of
treatment, and after 30 weeks of treatment. They found that both anxiety and depression
were related to negative perception of faces. However, when anxiety was controlled for
the relationship between negative perception and depression disappeared. On the other
hand, when depression was controlled for, the relationship between negative perception
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and anxiety remained. These findings suggest that negative perceptual bias in depression
may be a result of comorbid anxiety. Given the high degree of comorbidity between
anxiety and depression, these results still implicate perception of emotion as a significant
impairment among people with depression that may mediate negative interpersonal
experiences.
Emotion-Related Attention & Memory
Various studies have examined attention-related processes in depression,
predominantly by using the emotional Stroop task paradigm (Williams, Mathews, &
MacLeod, 1996). The emotional Stroop task is a measure of selective attention toward
emotion-related stimuli, and more specifically measures bias in preattentive processes.
Although preattentive processes are largely considered automatic, it is unlikely that most
automatic processes are entirely independent of attention control (Cohen, Dunbar, &
McClelland, 1990).
In the original Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), participants were presented with words
printed in various colors and asked to name the color of each word. To successfully
complete the task, the participant must ignore the printed word and attend only to the
word color. Participants identified the color of non-color words in less time than the
color-words printed in incongruent colors, thereby indicating the prominent role of
attentional processes in this task. More recently, researchers have become interested in
variants of the Stroop task including examination of attention for disorder-related stimuli
among people with anxiety and depression disorders (Williams et al., 1996).
Researchers have used variants of the Stroop task that included affect-related stimuli
to investigate negative pre-attentive bias in depression (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib
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& Cane, 1987; Hill & Knowles, 1991; Hill & Knowles, 1991; Kerr, Scott, & Phillips,
2005; Klieger & Cordner, 1990; McNeil, Tucker, Miranda Jr, Lewin, & Nordgren, 1999;
Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993; Williams & Nulty, 1986). Stroop stimuli
were presented on either a tachistoscope (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987),
cards (Hill & Knowles, 1991; Kerr et al., 2005; Williams & Nulty, 1986), slides similar
to cards (Klieger & Cordner, 1990), or a computer (McNeil et al., 1999; Mogg et al.,
1993). Although differences exist among these methods (e.g., larger interference effects
with cards than with tachistoscope or computer), they have all been shown to produce
reliable results (Williams et al., 1996).
All reviewed studies’ stimuli consisted at least partially of affect/emotion related
words (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Kerr et al., 2005; McNeil et al.,
1999; Mogg et al., 1993; Williams & Nulty, 1986) or specified that all words were
emotional/affective (Hill & Knowles, 1991; Klieger & Cordner, 1990). Two studies that
were included in a review paper by Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod (1996) of Stroop
effects in depression (Williams et al., 1996), were excluded from this review because
affect-related stimuli were purposefully excluded (Segal & Vella, 1990; Segal, Gemar,
Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995). The negative stimuli used in the reviewed
studies included depression-related words (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane,
1987; McNeil et al., 1999; Mogg et al., 1993), negative words (Hill & Knowles, 1991;
Kerr et al., 2005; Klieger & Cordner, 1990; Williams & Nulty, 1986), anxiety-related
words (McNeil et al., 1999; Mogg et al., 1993), and self-esteem threatening nouns (Hill
& Knowles, 1991). Two of the studies using depression-related words used only selfdescriptive depression-related words (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987).
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One of the studies using negative words specified using only negative nouns (Hill &
Knowles, 1991). In addition to negative stimuli, studies included self-descriptive manic
words (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987) and positive nouns (Hill &
Knowles, 1991; Kerr et al., 2005; Mogg et al., 1993). All reviewed studies included
neutral stimuli, which were typically matched for length and language frequency with
other stimuli. In addition, some studies included components of the standard Stroop task
(Kerr et al., 2005; Klieger & Cordner, 1990; Mogg et al., 1993).
The majority of these studies have shown that depressed participants respond more
slowly to negative words than to neutral words (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane,
1987; Hill & Knowles, 1991; Klieger & Cordner, 1990; McNeil et al., 1999; Williams &
Nulty, 1986). Nondepressed participants do not show greater interference based on
stimuli negativity (Gotlib & McCann, 1984). These findings indicate that depressed
participants may have a pre-attentional bias towards negative affective stimuli.
Furthermore, Gotlib and McCann (1984) found that induction of a depressed mood in
normal participants did not result in a negative bias, indicating that mood alone is not
sufficient to promote a negative bias. However, there is disagreement on whether the
negative bias is a state-like or trait-like feature of depression. Williams and Nulty (1986)
had participants perform the Stroop task during two sessions that were separated by one
year. The largest Stroop effects were found for patients who were depressed during both
sessions. Although participants with ‘unstable’ depression (depressed one of the two
testing sessions) showed Stroop effects, they were less consistent than for the ‘stable’
depressed participants. In addition, they found that past depression was a stronger
predictor of Stroop performance than was current depression. These results suggest that
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Stroop interference of negative stimuli is a trait-like characteristic of depression. On the
other hand, the study by Gotlib and Cane (1987) found greater interference for negative
words compared to neutral words among depressive participants only at the time of
hospital admission but not at discharge, indicating Stroop performance as a state-like
characteristic of depression.
Stroop effects may also vary by depression severity. The first study to demonstrate
that depressed participants had longer response times to depressed-content words but not
other words defined their participants as depressed if they scored 9 or above on the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI). Similar results were found in a later study (Klieger &
Cordner, 1990), but only among mildly dysphoric participants, those scoring between 9
and 16 on the BDI. Although moderately dysphoric (BDI≥16) participants’ average
response time to negative words was longer than to neutral words, this difference was
insignificant.
Furthermore, initial analysis in a study that used participants with subclinical
depression did not find greater interference from negative words compared to other types
of words (Hill & Knowles, 1991). In addition, this study showed that there were no
differences between depressed and nondepressed participants’ average response time to
any of the stimuli. However, a difference did emerge when anxiety was controlled for, in
which case depressed participants were slower naming the colors of all types of words
than were nondepressed participants. This finding suggests that anxiety may influence
Stroop performance. Anxiety’s influence is further supported by other studies of
participants who were both depressed and anxious and failed to find a negative bias in
depression (Kerr et al., 2005; Mogg et al., 1993). For example, the depressed participants
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in Mogg et al’s (1993) study did not differ in anxiety level from the anxious participants.
Interestingly, the anxious participants did have longer latencies toward negative words
(but not other word types) when the words were presented both supraliminally and
subliminally. Also, Kerr, Scott, and Phillips (2005) found no interaction between group
(depressed, bipolar, and control) and condition (negative, positive, or neutral word type).
They reported that their depressed participants were more anxious than were both control
and bipolar participants. Although they did not find a correlation between anxiety and
Stroop performance, the authors suggested that anxiety may influence performance in a
subtle manner that was not detected. Lastly, McNeil et al. (1999) conducted a Stroop
study with participants with major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. They found that all
patients showed slower responses to anxiety and depression words than to neutral words.
The authors acknowledged that demonstration of a negative bias among the patients may
be indicative of comparable levels of anxiety and depression across disorders.
Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod (1996) list three potential explanations, other than
negative attentional bias, that may account for Stroop effects. The first of these
explanations was that interference may be caused by priming effects. Their review of all
studies that investigated psychopathology using the emotional Stroop led them to
conclude that priming is not responsible for the interference observed on the Stroop task.
It should be further noted that one of the reviewed studies (Gotlib & Cane, 1987) failed to
find an effect from priming with negative words. The authors suggested that accessibility
of negative constructs may not be susceptible to the influence of priming.
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The second possible explanation provided by Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod
(1996) implicated the influence of repetition of stimuli promoting Stroop effects. Their
review of studies, which included two studies reviewed here (Gotlib & McCann, 1984;
Gotlib & Cane, 1987) in which stimuli were not repeated, led them to their “provisional
conclusion” that “repetition of items is not the critical factor causing the interference” (p.
7). In addition, one of the reviewed studies (Klieger & Cordner, 1990) directly compared
repetition of stimuli with non-repetition and found no effect.
The last criticism of interpreting Stroop effects reported by Williams, Mathews, and
MacLeod (1996) was that interference was caused by conscious attention to particular
words. Although they reviewed studies that had found Stroop interference in
subliminally presented material, only one of the reviewed studies included subliminally
presented stimuli (Mogg et al., 1993). This study failed to find increased latency toward
negative words among depressed participants.
Attentional processes, particularly visual attention, in depression have also been
investigated using the dot-probe paradigm (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998;
Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Hill & Dutton,
1989; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1995; Mogg,
Millar, & Bradley, 2000) and its variants (Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; McCabe &
Gotlib, 1995; Mogg, Mathews, May, & Grove, 1991). During the dot-probe task,
emotion-related stimuli and neutral related stimuli are presented on two parts of the
screen; either in the top half and bottom half (Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 1997;
Hill & Dutton, 1989; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews et al., 1996; McCabe & Gotlib,
1995; Mogg et al., 1995), or in the left and right (Bradley et al., 2000; Gotlib et al., 1988;
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Gotlib et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 1991; Mogg et al., 2000). A dot then appears in place of
one of the stimuli and the participant must respond when the dot is perceived. It is
assumed that when attention is on the stimuli in the same part of the screen preceding the
dot probe that reaction times are faster than when attention is on stimuli in the opposite
side of the screen. The dot probe paradigm has two advantages over the Stroop paradigm
(MacLeod et al., 1986). First, it is thought to reduce potential response bias because
participants respond to a neutral stimulus, the dot probe, rather than directly to affective
related stimuli. Secondly, it measures attendance to as well as aversion from the same
stimuli depending on where the subsequent dot appears.
The stimuli used in the dot probe task typically consists of affective words (Bradley et
al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 1988; Hill & Dutton, 1989; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews et al.,
1996; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Mogg et al., 1991; Mogg et al., 1995); however affective
faces have also been used (Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 2000; Gotlib et al., 2004;
Mogg et al., 2000). This is an important distinction, as there is evidence that processing
of affective faces is superior to processing of affective words (Gotlib et al., 2004). When
faces were used, they consisted of neutral, happy, sad, threatening and/or angry faces.
When words were used they included physically and social threatening (MacLeod et al.,
1986; Mathews et al., 1996), self-esteem threatening (Hill & Dutton, 1989), depression
and anxiety related (Bradley et al., 1997; Mogg et al., 1995), or negative and positive
words (Gotlib et al., 1988; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Mogg et al., 1991). Some of the
studies matched positive and negative words on emotionality (Gotlib et al., 1988;
McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Mogg et al., 1991; Mogg et al., 1995). All studies also used
neutral words which were matched with affective words for length and frequency.
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Although there were some inconsistencies between studies, the majority of the studies
found that depression was associated with increased vigilance for negative stimuli
(Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1995) or
avoidance of positive stimuli (Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 1997). Greater
vigilance for negative stimuli was found in studies that included participants with major
depressive disorder (Gotlib et al., 2004; Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1995) and
dysthymia (Mathews et al., 1996), as well as participants who were considered dysphoric
(Bradley et al., 1997). In addition, one study found that induction of depressed mood was
sufficient to provide a greater vigilance for depression-related words compared to
induction of a neutral mood (Bradley et al., 1997). Mogg, Bradley, and Williams (1995)
found that both anxious and depressed participants showed greater attention toward
negative words than did controls when stimuli were presented supraliminally. However,
when stimuli were presented subliminally, only anxious participants showed greater
attention to negative words. Both of the studies found an avoidance of positive stimuli
rather than vigilance for negative stimuli (Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 2000). In
these studies, anxiety was the primary variable of interest, and dysphoria was simply
measured. In addition, one of the studies (Bradley et al., 1998) used threatening and
happy faces but did not include sad faces.
Several other studies found that depressed participants attended equally to all stimuli
(positive, neutral, negative) whereas nondepressed participants avoided negative stimuli
in the presence of positive or neutral stimuli (Gotlib et al., 1988; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995;
Mogg et al., 1991). These studies used a variant of the dot-probe paradigm in which
negative-neutral, positive-neutral and negative-positive word pairs were presented to the
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left and right side of the screen. Red and green colored bars then appeared
simultaneously in place of the stimuli. Participants were told that presentation of one bar
slightly proceeded presentation of the other and were asked to indicate which bar
appeared first. McCabe and Gotlib (1995) suggested that depressed participants lack a
protective bias to avert attention away from negative stimuli.
There were three studies that failed to find selective attention for negative stimuli
(Hill & Dutton, 1989; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg et al., 2000). Analysis of these
studies in conjunction with the others has led researchers to conclude that different
attentional biases exist in depression and anxiety. An important aspect for identifying
this difference is analysis of exposure times. When affective stimuli have been presented
for 500 ms or less, vigilance for negative stimuli has not been observed among
participants with depression (Bradley et al., 1997; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews et al.,
1996; Mogg et al., 1995). Whereas anxious individuals show a negative bias upon
minimal (500 ms or less) exposure to negative stimuli (Bradley et al., 1997; Mathews et
al., 1996), depressed participants’ response bias to words becomes distinctly apparent
when exposure time is longer (Bradley et al., 1997; Mogg et al., 1995). The tendency to
avoid happy faces as dysphoria increases even during short exposure intervals (500 ms)
may be because affective pictures/images are easier to process than affective words
(Gotlib et al., 2004). These findings have led researchers to conclude that anxiety and
depression are related to impairment in attention at different stages. Whereas anxious
individuals have a negative bias in initial orienting to stimuli, depressed individuals have
impaired maintenance of attention, in which they have difficulty disengaging from
negative stimuli (Bradley et al., 1997).
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The last paradigm used by Wexler, Levenson, Warrenburgh, and Price (1994) to
study emotion-related attention in depression was the dichotic listening task. In this task
two words are simultaneously presented, one to each ear. The words are identical except
for the first consonant, so the participant consciously hears only one word. In this
particular study, one word was considered neutral whereas the other word was either
positive or negative. All words were matched for frequency of use. The participant
selected which word was heard from a list of four choices which included both words
heard and two foils. Depressed participants heard fewer emotion-related words, both
positive and negative, than controls. The authors suggested that depression may be
related to an emotional hyposensitivity.
Deficits in emotional processing in depression are most consistently found in
memory. For example, previous studies have found that depressed participants recall
fewer pleasant words but do not differ in recall of unpleasant words (Blaney, 1986),
which is consistent with their pattern of emotional responding. This finding was
replicated by Sloan, Strauss, and Wisner (2001) in a study that measured emotional
responsiveness and incidental recall of pleasant and unpleasant words. Review papers on
memory bias (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Matt et al., 1992) in depression consistently
report a mood-congruent memory bias in depression. Mood-congruent memory bias
refers to enhanced memory of material that is affectively similar to one’s currently
experienced affect. Accordingly, depressed people tend to recall negative material more
than do nondepressed people. This effect has been demonstrated to a great extent with
retrieval of autobiographical events and to a lesser extent with stimuli provided by the
researcher. It has also been found to occur when depressed mood is induced, indicating
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the retrieval processes are affected by mood-congruency effects. However, moodcongruency effects likely also occur during encoding, as there is especially enhanced
recall for events that induced a negative mood state at that time.
Relation of Emotion Processing to General Processing
The emotion processing deficits observed in depression may reflect general cognitive
deficits. A review of the literature on cognitive processing in depression by Hartlage,
Alloy, Vázquez, and Dykman (1993) showed that depression has a negative impact on
intellectual functioning, problem solving, general learning, effortful encoding, reading,
and speed of performance, all of which diminish with severity of depression. A general
pattern of deficits in effortful processes (as opposed to automatic processes) are found in
people with depression, with deficits increasing with the degree of effortfulness of the
task (Hartlage, Alloy, Vázquez, & Dykman, 1993) The differential impact of depression
on effortful processing is likely due to the fact that effortful processing requires attention
which relies on the limited capacity of cognitive resources, whereas automatic processing
does not. There are two predominant explanations for this effect that can be differentiated
by either its effect on capacity or its effect on attention. The cognitive-capacity-reduction
hypothesis implicates the influence of depression on limited cognitive resources.
According to this theory, depression reduces the cognitive capacity, thereby reducing
effortful cognitive processing. The narrowing-of-attentional-focus hypothesis implicates
attention as the source of depression’s impact on effortful processing. According to this
theory, depression reduces one’s ability to attend to neutral or positive stimuli, thereby
decreasing effortful processing.
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Difficulties with emotion response and perception and general regulation may
contribute to the symptoms of depression. For example, the flattening of emotional
responsiveness and diminished emotional perception may be related to common reports
of feelings of emptiness reported by people with depression (Wexler, Levenson,
Warrenburg, & Price, 1994) and is consistent with the experience of anhedonia during
depression (Sloan et al., 1997).
Emotions in Depression
Emotional theorists have proposed a number of different organizational structures for
emotion. These organizational structures range from the view that emotions vary along a
single continuum to those that strictly see emotion as categorical. The leading continuous
theory of emotion arranges various emotions along a continuous scale of positive to
negative affect (Watson & Clark, 1992). There are a variety of categorical theories of
emotion which identify the basic emotions from which complex emotions can be derived.
Complex emotions are intensity variations of basic emotions. Some researchers further
define complex emotions which include components of more than one basic emotion
(Power, 2006). Researchers disagree on which emotions should be considered basic. For
example, a list may include anger, sadness, surprise, disgust, happiness, anxiety, and
contempt (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), whereas another may add guilt, interest,
and shame (Izard, 1971). Attempts have been made to integrate the two concepts of
dimensionality and categorical emotions. For example, Plutchik’s model of emotion
arranges the basic emotions around a circle and places complex emotions along a third
dimension based on intensity (Plutchik, 1962; Plutchik, 1990).
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While research on emotion and depression has largely focused on examination of the
information processing of emotional stimuli, there is research on the presence and
absence of particular emotions in depression. Empirical studies using confirmatory
analyses to categorize emotions have shown support for the five basic emotions of
sadness, anger, disgust, fear, and happiness (Power, 2006; Power & Tarsia, 2007), which
are also acknowledged to be interrelated. Although not agreed upon by all researchers
who have defined basic emotions, these five appear on almost all listings (Power, 2006)
and have been supported by extensive linguistic analysis of emotion conducted by
Johnson-Laird and Oatley (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Most research on the
experience of emotion in depression is focused on these emotions, particularly anger, as
well as two disgust-related complex emotions, guilt and shame.
Studies on depression and emotion use self-report rating scales of emotional terms
(Chaplin, 2006; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006; Power & Tarsia, 2007; Scott, Ingram,
& Shadel, 2003; Seidlitz, Fujita, & Duberstein, 2000; Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006) or
questionnaires with emotion scales (Alexander, Brewin, Vearnals, Wolff, & Leff, 1999;
Andrews, 1995; Ashby, Rice, & Martin, 2006; Brody, Haaga, Kirk, & Solomon, 1999;
Brown, Schwartz, & Sweeney, 1978; Cheung, Gilbert, & Irons, 2004; Cox, Stabb, &
Hulgus, 2000; Ghatavi, Nicolson, MacDonald, Osher, & Levitt, 2002; Gilbert, Gilbert, &
Irons, 2004; Goldman & Haaga, 1995; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; Jarrett &
Weissenburger, 1990; Kashani, Dahlmeier, Borduin, & Soltys, 1995; Koh, Kim, & Park,
2002; Mook, Van der Ploeg, & Kleijn, 1990; Moreno, Fuhriman, & Selby, 1993;
O'Connor, Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002; Pasquini, Picardi, Biondi, Gaetano, &
Morosini, 2004; Pine, Cohen, & Brook, 2001; Riley, Treiber, & Woods, 1989; Tangney,
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Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Troisi & D'Argenio, 2004; Winkler, Pjrek, & Kasper, 2005).
Participants rate their experience at the present moment (Moreno et al., 1993), over the
last day (Brown et al., 1978; Seidlitz et al., 2000), week (Power & Tarsia, 2007), month
(Chaplin, 2006), year (Brody et al., 1999; Pine et al., 2001), 3 years (Brody et al., 1999),
and/or in general (Alexander et al., 1999; Andrews, 1995; Ashby et al., 2006; Cheung et
al., 2004; Cox et al., 2000; Ghatavi et al., 2002; Gilbert et al., 2004; Goldman & Haaga,
1995; Harder et al., 1992; Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990; Kashani et al., 1995; Koh et al.,
2002; Mook et al., 1990; Moreno et al., 1993; O'Connor et al., 2002; Orth et al., 2006;
Power & Tarsia, 2007; Riley et al., 1989; Scott et al., 2003; Tangney et al., 1992; Troisi
& D'Argenio, 2004; Winkler et al., 2005). Studies may include observer ratings in
addition to self-reports (Brown et al., 1978; Chaplin, 2006; Seidlitz et al., 2000) or be
solely based on professional ratings (Pasquini et al., 2004; Picardi, Morosini, Gaetano,
Pasquini, & Biondi, 2004). Sometimes questionnaires are based on participants’
emotional reactions to hypothetical (Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990; Tangney et al., 1992;
Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006) and real life dilemmas (Orth et al., 2006; Thompson &
Berenbaum, 2006) or to a target person (Chaplin, 2006; Finman & Berkowitz, 1989).
Lastly, four review papers have been written on anger and anger attacks in depression
(Fava & Rosenbaum, 1999; Luutonen, 2007; Painuly, Sharan, & Mattoo, 2005; Winkler,
Pjrek, & Kasper, 2006).
Sadness
Whereas sadness is a central aspect of depression, very little attention has been paid
to sadness in depression (Seidlitz et al., 2000) outside of the reviewed literature on
emotion processing. Research has shown that depressed participants report higher levels
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of sadness than do control participants (Power & Tarsia, 2007; Seidlitz et al., 2000).
Also, daily ratings of sadness correlate with daily depressive symptoms (Seidlitz et al.,
2000). Interestingly, Seidlitz, Fujita, and Duberstein (2000) found that although
depression was related to four emotions, the relationship of guilt, fear, and anger to
depression when sadness was controlled for became insignificant. This finding lends
support to the central role of sadness in depression.
Scott, Ingram, and Shadel (2003) compared two types of dysphoric participants: those
who were predominately sad and those who were predominately hostile. They found
differences in attributional profiles of these two groups of participants. Sad-dysphoric
participants tended to make attributions that were more self-blaming, stable, and global.
Unfortunately, there was disagreement among independent judges’ characterization of the
causal factors for the negative life event, thus making it unclear whether the attributions
were realistic or biased.
Anger
The experience of anger and related phenomena such as hostility, aggression, and
irritability has consistently been shown to be related to depression (Finman & Berkowitz,
1989; Luutonen, 2007; Painuly et al., 2005; Riley et al., 1989). For example, depressed
participants tend to experience more anger than do controls (Power & Tarsia, 2007) and
other patient populations (Koh et al., 2002; Picardi et al., 2004). In addition, the
experience of increased irritability during depressive episodes have been reported in 75%
of participants with depression (Winkler et al., 2005; Winkler et al., 2006). There is also
support for a relationship between trait-anger and depression (Mook et al., 1990).
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However, differences in anger based on which depression diagnosis a person has, major
depression or dysthymia, have not been found (Koh et al., 2002).
The most prominent theoretical support for the relationship between anger and
depression comes from psychodynamic theory. According to this theory, depression is
anger toward inward. Accordingly, this theory predicts that people with depression have
high levels of anger experience but tend to suppress their anger and display low levels of
anger expression (Chaplin, 2006). Whereas evidence that a relationship exists between
depression and anger is strong, evidence for this explanation has been inconsistent
(Painuly et al., 2005). Support for the theory has been provided by Chaplin (2006), who
had participants self-report on their anger experiences over the previous month. These
participants then engaged in a frustrating task with a friend, and their expression of anger
was observed. She found that higher levels of anger experience and lower levels of anger
expression predicted depressive symptoms. These findings are particularly interesting in
light of other findings that observation may produce higher levels of anger expression
than do self reports that came from a study on interactions between depressed participants
and their spouses (Goldman & Haaga, 1995). However, other studies’ results show only
partial support for the anger-turned-inward conceptualization. For example, one study
Brody et al. (1999) found that recovered-depressed participants experienced more anger
suppression and fear of anger than never-depressed participants, consistent with the
anger-turned-inward theory. Furthermore, recovered-depressed participants showed
higher levels of self-silencing in their intimate relationships. On the other hand, the two
groups did not differ on anger expression, which is inconsistent with the theory. The
theory also lacks support among children, as depressed children and psychiatric controls

36

did not differ in anger expression or anger suppression. However, this may have been
because both samples were from an inpatient population (Kashani et al., 1995).
Researchers have begun to investigate how anger in depression develops. Family
variables such as cohesion and adaptability have been potential targets because these
variables are related to childhood depression as well as to expression of negative feelings.
Contrary to the study’s hypotheses, family variables of cohesion and adaptability did not
mediate the relationship between depression and anger control among depressed child
inpatients (Kashani et al., 1995). The authors speculated that depression may interfere
with the child’s ability to learn adaptive anger expression even if the general level of
family functioning is good. Along similar lines, other investigators have targeted
attachment style as a potential source of anger development (Troisi & D'Argenio, 2004).
According to attachment theory, insecure attachment is related to difficulty with affect
regulation. Troisi and D’Argenio (2004) predicted that insecure attachment would be
related to increased anger. Consistent with their hypotheses, the sample of young men
with depressive symptoms showed that anxious or avoidant (insecure) attachment styles
predicted anger experience, even when controlling for level of depression. Anger in
depression has also been explained by the evolutionary theory of depression, which
indicates dysfunction of the flight/fight mechanisms (Gilbert et al., 2004). Dysfunction
of these systems is based on findings that depressed people often feel trapped in their
situations, which can be interpreted as disruption of the flight mechanism and depressed
people also often report anger suppression, a disruption of the fight mechanism. In
accordance with this theory, Gilbert, Gilbert, and Irons (2002) found that 88% of
depressed participants reported a desire, but inability, to escape their current
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circumstances. Also, fantasies of escape were common. Depressed participants also
reported anger suppression at a high rate of 82%.
Another anger-related phenomenon that has been observed in depression is anger
attacks (Fava & Rosenbaum, 1999; Painuly et al., 2005). An anger attack is similar to a
panic attack and consists of palpitations, chest tightness, flush, vertigo, sweating,
paresthesia, tremor, anxiety, and/or feelings of loss of control (Winkler et al., 2005;
Winkler et al., 2006). Anger attacks occur more frequently in people with depression than
in other patient populations such as those with anxiety disorders or somatoform disorders
(Koh et al., 2002; Picardi et al., 2004). They also occur more frequently in recovereddepressed participants than in never-depressed participants, and seem to be related to fear
of anger expression (Brody et al., 1999). Given that feeling out of control is an aspect of
anger control, it is interesting that depressed children have been shown to have more
difficulty controlling their anger cognitively than do psychiatric controls (Kashani et al.,
1995). Perhaps this difficulty is a precursor to later inability to control anger in anger
attacks.
Research on anger attacks and other increased anger experiences in some individuals
with depression have led researchers to believe that anger may be a distinguishable
feature of a subtype of depression. Picardi et al. (2004) reported three dimensions of
unipolar depression: a depressive dimension, an anxious dimension, and an “activation”
dimension. The activation depression consisted of anger, irritability, aggressiveness,
hostility, and psychomotor activation. Depressed individuals experiencing high levels of
anger, irritability, aggressiveness, and hostility may be experiencing a distinct subtype of
depression sometimes referred to as activated depression (Pasquini et al., 2004). Anger
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attacks are thought to be a product of serotonergic dysregulation, and people with this
type of depression tend to respond well to treatment with SSRIs (Fava & Rosenbaum,
1999). Further support that angry depressed individuals may constitute a subgroup of
depressed people is provided by studies that have found differences between participants
with and without anger. For example, dysphoric-hostile participants have been shown to
be other-blaming whereas dysphoric-sad participants were more self-blaming (Scott et
al., 2003). These findings are particularly interesting because dysphoric-hostile
participants made other-blaming attributions despite independent judges’ view that the
real negative life event was self induced.
Anger attacks have also been specifically considered to be a marker of another
distinct presentation of depression, referred to as “male depressive syndrome,” because
anger attacks occur twice as frequently in depressed men compared to depressed women
(Winkler et al., 2006). Based on other observations on the differences between depressed
men and women, male depressive syndrome consists of anger, aggressiveness, irritability,
and anger attacks as well as low impulse control, low stress tolerance, risk-taking,
substance abuse, other-blame, and elevated suicide risk (Winkler et al., 2005; Winkler et
al., 2006).
Although some studies on anger attacks have shown marked gender differences, other
studies have failed to find consistent gender differences in anger experience and
expression in depression. For example, Chaplin (2006) found that although females had
more depressive symptoms than did males, levels of anger experience or expression did
not differ by gender. Although differences in anger variables by gender have been
observed in a study with children (Cox et al., 2000), in which girls scored higher than
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boys on anger-control and anger-in, whereas boys scored higher on anger-out, regardless
of age, girls were not more prone to depression than boys. However, this finding may be
attributable to differences in ethnicity and emotion expression as the sample was
predominately African American (41.6%) and these girls showed higher levels of selfesteem than girls from other racial groups.
Disgust
Whereas one study has shown that depressed individuals experience more disgust
than did nondepressed individuals (Power & Tarsia, 2007), the majority of disgust-related
depression research is on the experience of guilt and shame. The experience of excessive
guilt is included in the diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994); however, many have argued that shame is more relevant
to psychopathology, including depression, than is guilt (Orth et al., 2006; Tangney et al.,
1992). While guilt and shame are both considered self-conscious emotions, they are
largely differentiated by the target of negative evaluation (Alexander et al., 1999; Orth et
al., 2006). Shame refers to negative evaluation of the entire self, whereas guilt relates to
negative evaluation of one’s own particular aspects. Given this differentiation, shame,
due to its global negative view, is considered to be more harmful to the core self.
Although negative evaluation in guilt causes discomfort, the self is able to remain intact.
Guilt and shame are also differentiated by their experiences. Shame promotes feelings of
worthlessness and a desire to hide from others, whereas guilt promotes a sense of remorse
and a desire for remediating action (Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006). While the
emphasis on shame over guilt in depression has been theoretically supported and is
largely based on psychodynamic theory (Lewis, 1986), empirical evidence has been
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limited (Tangney et al., 1992). Orth, Berking, and Buckhardt’s (2006) review of studies
found that typically the relationship between depression and guilt disappears when shame
is controlled for. However, there are many inconsistencies among studies.
One of the earliest studies on guilt in depression (Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990)
found that depressed outpatients reported more guilt in guilt-provoking situations than
did nondepressed participants. Also, guilt increased as depression scores increased
across all participants, but guilt showed no relation to other severity indicators such as
length of illness, age of onset, or number of lifetime episodes. A family history of
depression was associated with increased reports of guilt. Unfortunately, shame was not
measured in this study, and the authors stated that it was unclear if the scale they used
measured guilt or self-reproach. Although Siedlitz, Fujita, and Duberstein (2000) found
that guilt was related to depression severity, their results were based on participants’
ratings of emotion terms, and it is unlikely that participants were fully aware of the
psychological definition of guilt. Furthermore, the relationship between guilt and
depression disappeared when sadness was controlled for.
Based on these studies, appropriate measurement that shows divergent validity of
shame and guilt seems to be a necessary facet of studies on these emotions in depression;
this has generally been lacking (Orth et al., 2006). For example, Orth et al. (2006)
criticized the measure used in a study that found that guilt, but not shame, was related to
depression severity (Alexander et al., 1999). Alexander et al. (1999) explained that their
results were due to their sample consisting entirely of moderately to severely depressed
participants which caused a ceiling effect for shame. These results indicated that shame
may correlate with depressive symptoms in non-clinical or sub-clinical populations but
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guilt is useful in differentiating among people with higher levels of depression. This is
potentially an important point to consider because most studies on shame and guilt in
depression have only sampled from student (Ashby et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2004;
Harder et al., 1992; Seidlitz et al., 2000; Tangney et al., 1992; Thompson & Berenbaum,
2006) or other non-clinical populations (Orth et al., 2006). In comparison, few studies
have used patient populations consisting of depressed inpatients (O'Connor et al., 2002),
depressed outpatients (Ghatavi et al., 2002; Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990), or people atrisk for depression (Andrews, 1995).
Researchers have suggested that fusion of shame and guilt, referred to as “insoluble
guilt,” has been observed in clinical populations (Alexander et al., 1999) and may
account for studies that have found an association between guilt and depression. For
example, depressed participants have shown increased survivor guilt and omnipotent
responsibility compared to controls (O'Connor et al., 2002). Survivor guilt refers to guilt
resulting from surviving the death of a loved one or from being better off than others. It
is the unreasonable belief that by pursuing normal goals one is harming others.
Omnipotent responsibility refers to excessive feelings of responsibility toward others.
These definitions indicate the presence of a shame component, because shame infers a
violation of social standards that the self is not meeting, whereas guilt refers solely to
violation of moral standards and the self remains intact (Orth et al., 2006). Interestingly,
depressed participants in this study also showed elevated empathic distress. The authors
speculated that people with depression may not act empathically because they define
themselves as being harmful to others, but may actually have heightened empathy.
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Although there is some support that guilt found in depression may be a fused
shame/guilt, at least one study has directly examined “shame-free” guilt and found no
difference in prominence of shame and shame-free-guilt in depression (Ghatavi et al.,
2002). This study also found that people with depression, both currently and in the past,
had more state and trait guilt than did healthy controls and participants with chronic
cardiac illness. This indicates that guilt in depression is not merely due to the presence of
a serious, chronic illness. Furthermore, trait depression did not differentiate participants
who were currently depressed from those that had a history of depression but were
currently euthymic. However, these two groups did differ on state-guilt, with currently
depressed participants reporting more state-guilt. These findings led authors to conclude
that guilt is both a stable and fluctuating characteristic of depression.
Whereas the role of guilt in depression has been contended, research relating shame
to depression has been more consistent. Quite a few studies have shown that shame, but
not guilt, is related to depression (Harder et al., 1992; Orth et al., 2006; Tangney et al.,
1992; Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006), or supported the relationship between shame and
depression without examining guilt (Andrews, 1995; Ashby et al., 2006; Cheung et al.,
2004). Both currently and previously depressed participants have reported more shame
in response to scenarios (Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006). External shame, thinking
others look down on you, has also been associated with depression (Cheung et al., 2004).
Shame has been shown to mediate partially the relationship between perfectionism and
depression in both men and women (Ashby et al., 2006). Also, bodily shame was found
to mediate the relationship between early abuse and depression (Andrews, 1995).
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The relationship between shame and depression is likely complex (Tangney et al.,
1992). Studies have shown that shame and depression may be mediated by rumination
(Cheung et al., 2004; Orth et al., 2006). However, shame also uniquely contributed to
depression aside from its relation to rumination (Cheung et al., 2004). The mediation of
shame and depression by rumination appears to be influenced by gender. Cheung,
Gilbert, and Irons (2004) found that among people with low levels of shame, women
ruminated more, whereas at high levels of shame, men ruminated more. Gender
differences in the relationship between shame and depression are supported by Ashby,
Rice, and Martin’s (2006) finding of an apparent direct relationship between shame and
depression in men but shame in women seemed to contribute to low self-esteem and
feelings of inadequacy, which may increase vulnerability to depression (Ashby et al.,
2006).
Researchers have been interested in the direction of the relationship between shame
and depression. Using latent variable modeling, Orth, Berking, and Buckhardt (2006)
found statistical support for shame causing rumination and depression more so than the
inverse relationship. However, only one longitudinal study has been conducted
(Andrews, 1995). Whereas this study supported the causal role of shame toward
depression, it was criticized because they did not test for reverse causality (Orth et al.,
2006). Researchers have proposed mechanisms by which shame may contribute to
psychopathology in general (Tangney et al., 1992). Shame may cause disruptions in selffunctioning and increase feelings of hopelessness, concepts which are relevant to
depression. Shame may compound during psychopathology as patients experience shame
about their psychological symptoms. Lastly, shame and psychopathology may share
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common etiologies. Particular to depression, shame may activate schemas of the flawedself within an individual and may also lead to withdrawals thereby increasing depression
(Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006). Shame has also been associated with attributional
styles which include global negative self evaluation and stable attributions of negative
outcomes (Alexander et al., 1999) which may contribute to psychopathology, including
depression (Tangney et al., 1992). There is still much work to be done to unravel
discrepancies in the existing literature and for understanding the intricacies of
depression’s relation to shame and guilt. This will likely have important implications for
understanding depression and applying appropriate treatments (Epstein, 2001).
Fear
Despite the high comorbidity of depression and anxiety disorders (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994), the experience of fear in depression has received little
attention in research. Depressed participants report experiencing more fear than do
nondepressed participants (Power & Tarsia, 2007). Whereas overall fear ratings are
positively correlated with overall depressive symptoms, daily fear levels are not related to
daily depressive symptoms (Seidlitz et al., 2000). However, in this study fear covaried
with other negative emotions, and its relationship to depression became insignificant
when sadness was controlled for.
Other fear-related research in depression has not focused on particular experiences of
fear, but rather has attempted to identify the nature of fear in depression. For example,
fear of negative evaluations and fear of envy are associated with depression (O'Connor et
al., 2002). Furthermore, adolescent fear of the dark, as well as overall level of fear, have
been shown to predict adult major depression (Pine et al., 2001).
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Happiness
Although anhedonia, impairment in the ability to experience positive affect or
pleasure, is a core characteristic of depression (American Psychiatric Association, 1994),
there is limited research on happiness and related emotions in depression. Depressed
patients have reported experiencing less joy and interest than do control participants
(Brown et al., 1978). Interestingly, on another measure in this study of inpatients,
depressed participants reported experiencing more pleasure than did control participants
even though observer reports found that depressed participants engaged in fewer
pleasurable activities and expressed less pleasure. Disconnection between self-report and
observed behavior was also found in a study with adolescents (Chaplin, 2006). In this
study, depression was associated with low reported levels of happiness but high levels of
observed happiness while engaging in a frustrating task. In addition, this study found that
happiness was more related to depression than anger. The authors speculated that
depressed adolescents may feel they need to be cheerful and tend to inhibit, rather than
regulate, negative affect. This process could limit one’s sense of autonomy, thereby
contributing to depression.
Description of Feelings
Studies that have examined the experience of emotions in depression have typically
focused on how frequently particular feelings are experienced. These studies typically
have one of several purposes. Some of the studies seek to explain why a particular
feeling occurs more often than others through psychological theories such as
psychodynamic theory, attachment theory, or attributional theory. Other studies attempt
to associate the experience of feelings with other psychological phenomena such as
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rumination. The feeling’s role in the development or maintenance of depression has also
been the target of study as well as attempts to classify subtypes of depression based on
particular feelings. Lastly, some studies have been interested in determining the types of
events that will elicit particular feelings.
Whereas these purposes explain some aspects of feelings in depression, none of them
have sought to accurately describe emotion experience in depression. Characteristics of
feelings, such as their intensity, location, or accompanying physical sensations are not
mentioned in the literature on emotions in depression. It seems that there is an
assumption that everyone experiences a particular feeling in the same way.
Unfortunately, this assumption has not been empirically supported by literature on
feelings in depression. The lack of an understanding of the actual experience of emotion
in depression leaves a significant void in our knowledge of this important condition.
Experience-Based Studies of Depression
Research that has focused on examining experience during episodes of depression has
provided some insight into the emotion experience of people with depression. These
studies range in method from personal accounts to systematic investigation and attempt to
unravel the complexity of emotional experience during depression. Whereas some of
these types of studies were directly aimed at investigating emotion experience in
depression (Robbins & Tanck, 1997), the majority were not aimed at emotion experience.
Memoirs and a Psychobiographical Account
Many memoirs have been written about personal struggles with depression. These
emotional portraits provide rich accounts of living with depression. They include An
Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Mood and Madness (Jamison, 2005), Darkness Visible: A
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Memoir of Madness (Styron, 1990), The Noonday Demons: An Atlas of Depression
(Solomon, 2001), The Beast: A Journey through Depression (Thompson, 1995),
Undercurrents: A Life Beneath the Surface (Manning, 1994), and Willow Weep for Me: A
Black Woman’s Journey through Depression (Danquah, 1998). In addition, journalists
and writers have pieced together personal accounts of depression in writing Unholy
Ghost: Writers on Depression (Casey, 2001), Speaking of Sadness: Depression,
Disconnection, and the Meaning of Illness (Karp, 1996), On the Edge of Darkness:
America’s Most Celebrated Actors, Journalists, and Politicians Chronicle Their Most
Arduous Journey (Cronkite, 1994), and The Deepest Blue: How Women Face and
Overcome Depression (Dockett & McKay, 2001). Along similar lines, a
psychobiographical account of depression was developed after the family of a woman
who had committed suicide donated her personal memoir and letters to a university
(Kramer, 2002). Analysis of these materials uncovered a personal history of unresolved
grief, disruptions in her sense of self, and frequent experiences of fatigue and a sense of
futility. Other emotions that she frequently experienced were worthlessness, despair,
loneliness, alienation, emptiness, and a sense of failure. There were also periods of
empowerment and confidence and an enduring undercurrent of hope. Lastly, she
recorded the contrast between her inner turmoil and her outward appearance.
Diary Studies
Diary studies of depression consist of structured questionnaires which are completed
at the end of the day for a span of 7 (Hopko, Armento, Cantu, Chambers, & Lejuez,
2003), 10 (Robbins & Tanck, 1984; Robbins & Tanck, 1987; Robbins & Tanck, 1997), or
35 days (Hankin, Fraley, & Abela, 2005). The diaries include ratings of emotion
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adjectives (Hopko et al., 2003; Robbins & Tanck, 1997), ratings of depressive symptoms
(Hankin et al., 2005), attriubtional ratings for a daily negative event (Hankin et al., 2005),
recording and ratings of daily activities (Hopko et al., 2003), and ratings of mood during
different periods of the day (Robbins & Tanck, 1987). In addition, several of the studies
also used a questionnaire with items that correspond to daily experience of physical
complaints, interpersonal stress, depression-isolation, and positive social relationships
(Robbins & Tanck, 1984; Robbins & Tanck, 1987; Robbins & Tanck, 1997). All diary
studies of depression havae been conducted with students, and only two of the studies
(Hopko et al., 2003; Robbins & Tanck, 1987) reported how many of the students scored
above the cut off for depression. One of the study’s sample of 37 students included 14
mildly depressed participants (Hopko et al., 2003) and the other study’s sample of 105
students consisted of 16% mildly depressed, 6% moderately depressed, and 2% severely
depressed participants (Robbins & Tanck, 1987).
Only one study’s primary findings were related to emotion (Robbins & Tanck, 1997).
This study found that daily depression correlated with daily felt anger. However, anger
was also related to increased tension on these days, indicating an overall dysphoric
reaction when anger is experienced that may not be particular to depression. There was
less support that anger is generally experienced more by people who experience
depression. Only one index of depression, depression isolation, which was derived by
diary questions, correlated with total number of days in which anger was felt. Tendencies
to inhibit anger and increases in self-directed anger were found to be enduring
characteristics of depression. In addition, daily experience of self-directed anger
corresponded with daily reports of tension.

49

The other diary studies reported secondary findings related to emotion. For example,
Robbins and Tanck (1984) found that depression scores correlated with self-reports of
feeling trapped, lonely, depressed, tense, and defeated, as well as with decreased pleasure
in social interactions. Other self-reported experiences that also correlated with
depression scores included nausea, dizziness, weakness, having to defend oneself, being
given a hard time, having unresolved problems, and seeking help. The authors noted that
depressed persons may have difficulty relating to others and find themselves in
confrontational social situations. Although they may want to interact with others, they
may react defensively. Lastly, this study highlighted similarities in the depressive
experience between males and females. Similar findings were found in another study
(Hopko et al., 2003) in which positive affect was negatively correlated with depression
scores whereas negative affect showed a positive correlation. In addition, depressed
participants had higher negative affect scores than nondepressed participants. These
findings were related to the primary purpose of this study, which was to investigate the
influence of engagement in pleasurable activities. Depressed participants found daily
activities less rewarding than did nondepressed participants.
Hankin, Fraley, and Abela (2005) suggested that a depressive attributional style with
stressful events results in the experience of “strong and enduring emotions” (p. 673),
however this was not directly tested. However, they did find that daily depressive
symptoms, including feelings of sadness, were predicted by depressogenic cognitive
style, neuroticism, and daily negative cognitions about stressors. Depressogenic
cognitive style consisted of stable and global attributions for negative events and a
tendency to believe that negative events will lead to other negative events. This pattern
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of reacting to negative events also included negative self-evaluation in response to the
negative event.
The final diary-based study of depression investigated how depressed mood fluctuates
throughout the day (Robbins & Tanck, 1987). This study found that an increasingly
depressed mood through the course of the day was the most common diurnal pattern of
depressed mood. This pattern consisted of the least depressed mood in the morning and
the most depressed mood in the evening. Furthermore, changes in depressed mood were
more common than consistent depressed mood throughout the day. This differed from
previous studies with hospitalized patients, indicating that diurnal patterns may be useful
for differentiating depression severities. Further support for the uniqueness of consistent
depressed mood throughout the day was offered by its relationship to frequency (number
of days depressed mood is experienced) and intensity of the depressed mood.
Participants that experienced a consistent depressed mood throughout the day also had
more physical complaints and experienced less pleasure in social relationships, even
though they spent as much time with other people as participants with other diurnal
patterns of depressed mood (e.g., depressed more in the evening than the morning).
Interviews
Interview studies have been conducted to explore qualitatively the experience of
depression. Both semi-structured (Heifner, 1997; Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard,
1999) and open-ended in-depth (Daughtry & Kunkel, 1993; Jackson, 1998) interviews
have been conducted. The transcripts of these interviews have been analyzed using either
combination of grounded theory and discourse analysis (Heifner, 1997; Lewis, 1995;
Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999; Schreiber, 2001) or a similar phenomenological approach
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(Daughtry & Kunkel, 1993; Jackson, 1998) in which the participants’ statements were
distilled into meaning units and analyzed for common themes. Concept mapping was
also used in one study (Daughtry & Kunkel, 1993) in which the meaning units derived
from interviews were used to create 81 qualitative descriptors of depression which were
then organized by participants. Interviews have been conducted with a variety of
populations including women (Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999; Schreiber,
2001), men (Heifner, 1997; Lewis, 1995), gifted adolescents(Jackson, 1998), and college
students (Daughtry & Kunkel, 1993). They have included participants that defined
themselves as depressed (Jackson, 1998; Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999)
and/or were diagnosed with depression (Heifner, 1997; Lewis, 1995). It should be noted
that one study specifically mentioned that the experience of depression was highly
variable from one participant to the next (Lewis, 1995).
Whereas these studies provided rich accounts of personal experience and
interpretations of depression, the primary purpose of these studies was to identify themes
of depression rather than to describe emotional experience. However, knowledge of
emotion in depression could be derived from some of the findings. For example, the
concept map created by Daughtry and Kunkel (1993) was largely organized around
emotion-related clusters. The clusters that were identified were: (1) Helpless/Hopeless
(e.g., sad, incomplete, empty); (2) Burdened (e.g., loss of motivation, scared of future);
(3) Internal Chaos (e.g., confused, betrayed, guilty); (4) Estrangement (e.g., alone,
worthless, outcast); (5) Personal Inefficacy (e.g., self-pity, unable to compete, ugly); (6)
Vegetative (e.g., tired, bored, stupid); and (7) Interpersonally Hostile (e.g., frustrated,
bitter, irritable).
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Although understanding depression in women has been the primary focus of some
studies (Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999; Schreiber, 2001), and depression in men (Heifner,
1997) has been the focus of another, these studies showed remarkable similarities in the
experience of depression in men and women. These studies found that depression was
related to feeling that one had to live up to his/her respective gender roles and societal
standards. Their perceived inability to live up to such expectations, as well as frequent
experiences of emotional violence (Schreiber, 2001), seem to contribute to estrangement
from one’s true self, resulting in feelings of loneliness, inadequacy, abandonment, and
isolation (Heifner, 1997; Jackson, 1998; Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999;
Schreiber, 2001). Other emotions that were expressed by participants included panic,
fear, powerlessness, and emotionality, a term which referred to crying spells (Heifner,
1997; Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999). More specific to men are Heifner’s
(1997) findings that men fear losing themselves through the process of therapy and that
they are comfortable expressing anger, but not other emotions.
Communication and meaning were frequently discussed themes across studies
(Heifner, 1997; Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999; Schreiber, 2001). Participants
described an inability to communicate depression and feeling pressure to not express their
thoughts and emotions (Heifner, 1997; Jackson, 1998; Lewis, 1995). For some
participants coping with depression meant ignoring or distracting themselves from their
distressing emotional experiences (Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999). However, they also
described a sense of relief and necessity of expressing their depressive experiences and
emotion with others, even though doing so was painful or uncomfortable at the time
(Heifner, 1997; Jackson, 1998; Lewis, 1995; Scattolon & Stoppard, 1999). Participants
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also described a drive to find meaning for and explanations of their depression (Jackson,
1998; Lewis, 1995; Schreiber, 2001).
Momentary Sampling
Think aloud and thought sampling. Two methods of accessing the experience of
depression are thought sampling and the think aloud method. Thought sampling studies
of depression have asked participants to report their thoughts at the time of an external
signal (Josephson, Rose, & Singer, 2000) or when they notice a change in their mood
(Blackburn & Eunson, 1989; Kumari & Blackburn, 1992). During think aloud studies,
participants speak their thoughts aloud as they occur. One variant of the think aloud
method is articulated thoughts in simulated situations (ATSS; Davison, Robins, &
Johnson, 1983; Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995; White, Davison, Haaga, & White,
1992). ATSS involves participants reporting their thoughts as they occur under
controlled circumstances that involve the participant’s imagining living through a
researcher-created scenario (Davison et al., 1983; Davison et al., 1995). Think aloud and
thought sampling of depression has been conducted during an interpersonal problemsolving task (Mayo & Tanaka-Matsumi, 1996), while retrieving autobiographical
memories (Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer, Kleinpaß, & Nikesch, 2002), following
performance feedback (Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991), after presentation of
affective stimuli (Josephson et al., 2000; White et al., 1992), or in naturalistic settings
(Blackburn & Eunson, 1989; Kumari & Blackburn, 1992). Some studies have used
psychiatric patients with depression (Barnhofer et al., 2002; Blackburn & Eunson, 1989;
White et al., 1992) while others have used student samples that included dysphoric
participants (Conway et al., 1991; Josephson et al., 2000; Mayo & Tanaka-Matsumi,
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1996). Although primarily focused on thoughts in depression, emotion-related findings
can be gleaned from these studies.
White, Davison, and Haaga (1992) presented participants with scenarios that were
positive, negative and neutral and found that cognitive biases (arbitrary inferences,
selective abstractions, overgeneralizations, magnifications, personalizations, and
dichotomous thinking) following negative scenarios were exhibited more by depressed
than by nondepressed participants. Although cognitive biases have been proposed to
influence affective experience (Beck et al., 1979), this study did not directly examine
reports of emotional experience. Another study (Josephson et al., 2000) failed to find a
difference in affectivity of thoughts (positive, negative, or neutral) following sad film
clips compared to neutral film clips. However, this study found that depressed
participants’ thoughts were more negative than those of controls regardless of the stimuli.
Depression may be related to other cognitive styles that potentially interfere with
effective functioning. For example, during interpersonal problem solving, dysphoric
participants used more emotion-focused coping, including disengagement, and less
problem-focused coping self-statements (Mayo & Tanaka-Matsumi, 1996). They also
generated more emotion-focused solutions and less problem-focused solutions than did
non-dysphoric participants. Dysphoric participants also reported feeling that they did not
have the power to solve the conflict, which may have promoted engagement in emotionfocused, rather than problem-focused, coping. Emotion-focused strategies are typically
less effective than other strategies for problem solving, so it is not surprising that
dysphoric participants viewed themselves as less effective problem solvers than nondysphoric participants.
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Another potential cognitive impairment related to depression is an increase in
negative unwanted thoughts. Conway, Howell, and Giannopoulos (1991) found that
dysphoric participants had more intrusive thoughts than did non-dysphoric participants
following failure feedback, but fewer intrusive thoughts following success feedback.
This finding supported the mood-congruent hypothesis in which depressed individuals
are thought to have increased accessibility to negative material and use negative
distracters; therefore they have more difficulty suppressing negative material than
positive material. However, this study also found that during the final minute of the five
minute think aloud task, dysphoric participants had more intrusions than did nondysphoric participants regardless of whether they received failure feedback, success
feedback, or were told not to think of the neutral target “white bear.” This finding
supported the cognitive effort-hypothesis, in which people with depression are thought to
have a limited ability to suppress unwanted thoughts. The authors concluded that “their
unwanted thoughts are likely to be unpleasant and consequently worsen their mood” (p.
164), but the relationship between negative thoughts and transient mood was not directly
examined.
The think aloud task has also uncovered emotion-related memory findings. During
the think aloud task participants were provided positive (happy, safe) and negative (sad,
lonely) cue words and instructed to remember autobiographical events (Barnhofer et al.,
2002). Depressed participants recalled more categorical memories and less specific
memories than did control participants. This type of retrieval is likely related to
ruminative processes and is explained by the theory that depressed persons attempt to
avoid specific negative autobiographical memories. To avoid specific memories, they
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overgeneralize and retrieve categorical memories. Although an interaction of valence
(positive, negative) x group (depressed, nondepressed) was found, further analyses were
based on memory type and did not include reports of how depressed and nondepressed
participants’ retrieval were influenced by cue valence.
Thought sampling has shed some light on the thoughts of depressed individuals
during their day to day lives. Nondepressed (Kumari & Blackburn, 1992) and depressed
(Blackburn & Eunson, 1989) participants completed the Daily Record of Dysfunctional
Thoughts form when their mood changed over a period of 2 weeks. The recorded
thoughts were then rated on five dimensions, including emotions. However, the
information on emotional experience was limited because all reported emotions were
distilled into 3 categories; depression, anxiety, and anger. The accuracy of their
classification of emotions is also questionable. For example, ‘sick in the stomach’ was
categorized as a depressed emotion. They found that depressed participants reported
experiencing depression and anxiety most frequently, whereas nondepressed participants’
most frequently experienced emotions were anxiety and anger. In addition, depressed
participants indicated higher degrees of belief (95.5%) in automatic thoughts than did
nondepressed participants (66.2%). Lastly, depressed participants endorsed themes of
self-depreciation, hopelessness, rejection, and illness whereas nondepressed participants
endorsed hostile world. This finding may be further indication of differences in internal
versus external attributional styles between depressed and nondepressed participants,
respectively.
Experience sampling. Some researchers have used momentary sampling to
investigate the experience of depression. The most frequently used method of
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momentary experience sampling is the Experience Sampling Method (Csikszentmihalyi
& Larson, 1987; deVries, 1992). During the ESM procedure, participants wear a device
(wristwatch or pager) that emits a signal at quasi-random intervals as they engage in their
normal daily lives. The signal indicates to the participant to report on his/her experience
at that moment by completing an experience sampling form. Typically participants
report on their current location, current context, and perceptions of that context. They
may also answer questions or complete rating scales based upon the focus of the
particular study. This method has several advantages over other experience-based studies
in that it simultaneously promotes ecological validity, reduces potential memory bias, and
allows for both idiographic and nomothetic data analysis, and is therefore useful for
capturing variability within individuals and observing changes over time (BargeSchaapveld, Nicolson, van der Hoop, & DeVries, 1995; Husky, Mazure, Maciejewski, &
Swendsen, 2007; Swendsen, 1998). These characteristics of ESM may be particularly
advantageous for the study of depression. Ecologically valid methods may provide new
insights into phenomena, such as depression, that have been extensively studied using
other methods (Peeters et al., 2006). Depression has also been directly related to specific
memory bias which ambulatory methods such as ESM likely reduce (Barge-Schaapveld
et al., 1995). Lastly, ESM is more likely to capture minor and/or transient symptoms of
depression that questionnaire-based methods miss (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995).
Overall, ESM has demonstrated its validity and reliability in the investigation of naturally
occurring mood, behaviors, and cognitions (Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, &
deVries, 2003; Swendsen, 1997).
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ESM studies on depression have varied slightly in methodology. For example, some
studies have signaled participants with a wristwatch (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995;
Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, &
Berkhof, 2003a; Peeters, Nicolson et al., 2003; Peeters et al., 2006; Silk, Steinberg, &
Morris, 2003; Swendsen & Compagnone, 2000; Swendsen, 1998) whereas others have
used a pager (Mokros, 1993; Swendsen, 1997) or handheld computer (Husky et al.,
2007). Some studies have signaled participants 10 times per day for six consecutive days
(Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995; Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999; Myin-Germeys et al.,
2003; Peeters, Nicholson, & Berkhof, 2003a; Peeters, Nicolson et al., 2003; Peeters et al.,
2006) or five times per day for seven consecutive days (Husky et al., 2007; Silk et al.,
2003; Swendsen & Compagnone, 2000; Swendsen, 1997; Swendsen, 1998), although one
study used eight signals per day (Mokros, 1993). Whereas one study had signals
presented randomly throughout the entire day (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003), most studies
quasi-randomly signal participants once during intervals of 90 minutes (Peeters,
Nicholson, & Berkhof, 2003b; Peeters, Nicolson et al., 2003; Peeters et al., 2006), two
hours (Mokros, 1993), or three hours (Husky et al., 2007; Swendsen & Compagnone,
2000; Swendsen, 1997; Swendsen, 1998). ESM studies of depression have been used to
study adults with depression (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995; Barge-Schaapveld et al.,
1999; Mokros, 1993; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, & Berkhof, 2003a;
Peeters, Nicolson et al., 2003; Peeters et al., 2006) or have observed mood fluctuation in
non-clinical student samples (Husky et al., 2007; Silk et al., 2003; Swendsen &
Compagnone, 2000; Swendsen, 1997; Swendsen, 1998). Studies on depression have
focused on participants who are receiving psychopharmacological treatment (Barge-
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Schaapveld et al., 1995) and those who are not (Peeters et al., 2006). ESM has also been
conducted with both clinical (Mokros, 1993) and non-clinical (Silk et al., 2003)
adolescent samples. ESM studies typically use multilevel regression analysis (BargeSchaapveld et al., 1995; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, & Berkhof,
2003a; Peeters, Nicolson et al., 2003; Peeters et al., 2006) and/or hierarchical linear
modeling (Husky et al., 2007; Peeters, Nicolson et al., 2003; Silk et al., 2003; Swendsen
& Compagnone, 2000; Swendsen, 1997; Swendsen, 1998) to analyze both within-subject
and between-subject effects simultaneously.
Mood states have been compared between depressed and nondepressed individuals
(Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995; Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999; Mokros, 1993; MyinGermeys et al., 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, & Berkhof et al., 2003b; Peeters, Nicolson et
al., 2003; Peeters et al., 2006) and between antidepressant responders and non-responders
(Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995) using ESM. These studies included current mood
adjectives that were rated on a 7-point scale (1=not at all, 7=very) on the experience
sampling form completed by participants at each signaled moment. Mood adjectives that
these studies included in their various definitions of positive affect included energetic,
enthusiastic, happy, cheerful, talkative, strong, satisfied, alert, relaxed, calm, and self
assured. Negative affect included hostile, depressed, down, lonely, insecure, anxious,
irritated, restless, tense, guilty, irritable, angry, easily distracted, harried, and agitated.
The analysis of one of the studies (Mokros, 1993) was solely based on the presence or
absence of sadness, irritability, and anhedonia which was derived from the participants’
momentary ratings.
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Momentary sampling of general mood states has indicated that depressed participants
exhibit higher levels of negative affect and lower levels of positive affect than do healthy
controls (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters et al., 2006)
and other patient populations in remission (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). Depressed
participants also showed less enjoyment of their current activities than nondepressed
participants (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999). Similarly, participants that responded to
antidepressant medication showed increases in positive affect and decreases in negative
affect during all types of activities (chores, active leisure, and social) except for passive
leisure compared to non-responders (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995).
Depressed participants showed greater moment-to-moment variation in negative
affect than did healthy controls, which was even more pronounced among severely
depressed participants (Peeters et al., 2006). These depressed participants also had
diurnal patterns of negative and positive affect that differed from healthy participants.
The typical diurnal pattern of mood among participants with depression was depressionrelated mood being most prevalent early in the day and decreasing through the day. This
is the reverse of the diurnal pattern found in the diary study by Robbins and Tanck
(1987). This is likely due to differences in severity of depression of participants in these
two studies. Decreasing levels of depression throughout the day seem to be related to
severe depression, whereas increasing levels throughout the day are associated with less
severe depression. Furthermore, the pattern of decreasing depression throughout the day
is consistent with diagnostic criteria associated with melancholic/endogenous type
depression (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). However, another ESM study
questions the accuracy of information reported in a diagnostic clinical interview as actual
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experience. Mokros (1999) found that different profiles emerged from ESM data
compared to a clinical interview. For example, ESM data revealed that three of the seven
depressed adolescents did not report more sadness than healthy adolescents and one
depressed adolescent’s level of sadness was less than half of average sadness in healthy
participants. Both irritability and anhedonia were also found less often in the ESM
reports than were reported in clinical interviews for some depressed adolescents. Overall
agreement between presence of symptoms from the clinical interview and ESM reports
were 57% for sadness, 29% for irritability, and 43% for anhedonia.
Momentary sampling studies of mood states in response to negative events, which are
reported as frequently by nondepressed participants as depressed participants (Peeters,
Nicolson et al., 2003), have been somewhat inconsistent. For example, one study (MyinGermeys et al., 2003) revealed greater increases in negative affect following stressful
events in depressed participants than nondepressed participants. Another study (Peeters,
Nicolson et al., 2003) found that depressed participants responded to negative events with
less positive affect and less negative affect, an overall blunted emotional response.
However, this study also found that negative affect lasted longer after the event in
depressed participants. Additionally, negative affect in response to negative events was
associated with a family history of depression and a longer duration of the current
depressive episode. This was the only study that also examined depressed individuals’
responses to positive events. Interestingly, depressed participants showed greater
increases in positive affect and greater decreases in negative affect than healthy controls
following positive events. However, depressed participants reported experiencing fewer
positive events.
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Reactions to negative events are largely tied to the ability to regulate one’s emotions.
One ESM study (Silk et al., 2003) directly examined emotion regulation in depressed
adolescents and found that both internalizing (e.g., depression) and externalizing
disorders were related to problems with emotional regulation. In particular, depression
was associated with two ineffective emotion regulation strategies: disengagement (e.g.,
denial) and involuntary engagement (e.g., rumination).
ESM studies that included saliva sampling at times of experience sampling reports
have also found that nondepressed participants, but not depressed participants, react to
negative events with increased cortisol levels (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995; Peeters,
Nicholson, & Berkhof, 2003a). This indicates that depressed persons have blunted
responsiveness from the neuroendorine system that responds to stress (i.e., hypothalamicpituitary-adrenocortical axis) to negative events.
Some ESM studies’ findings are relevant to overall quality of life and its associations
in depression. Depressed participants have been found to have lower momentary ratings
of quality of life than have nondepressed participants (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999).
Consistent with findings on the variability of negative affect, depressed participants also
show greater moment-to-moment variation in quality of life ratings than do healthy
controls (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1999). In addition, depressed participants report more
physical complaints, activity-related stress, and social stress (Barge-Schaapveld et al.,
1999; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). Lastly, depression may be related to differential
allocation of time to particular activities. For example, depressed individuals who
responded to medication increased the time they spent on chores and decreased the time
they spent on passive leisure relative to non-responders (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995).
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Another ESM study (Wang et al., 2004) that specifically examined depressions’ impact
on work performance also found decreases in productivity as well as difficulty with task
focus associated with depression.
Several ESM studies have examined attributional style in depression (Husky et al.,
2007; Swendsen & Compagnone, 2000; Swendsen, 1997; Swendsen, 1998). When
signaled, participants in these studies reported an event that they were most affected by
since the last sample. Follow-up questions were used to obtain ratings of the degree to
which the cause of the event was global, stable, and internal. These studies showed that
overall attributional style predicted the type of causal attributions that were made for
specific negative events. In addition, the specific causal attributions of negative events as
global, stable, and internal predicted immediate depressed mood. However, overall
attributional style’s ability to explain fluctuations in either immediate or enduring
depressed mood has not been supported. These findings have been cross-culturally
replicated in samples of French students (Swendsen & Compagnone, 2000). Analysis of
perception of control of negative events has shown a pattern of findings that is very
similar to that of attributional style (Swendsen, 1998).
These findings were used to support Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy’s (1989)
helplessness-hopelessness theory of depression (Husky et al., 2007; Swendsen, 1998).
The helplessness-hopelessness theory was developed in part to explain the frequent cooccurrence of depression and anxiety. According to this theory, individuals who
experience frequent negative events that are unpredictable and uncontrollable begin to
develop a sense of helplessness, which is related to anxiety. Over time, some individuals
begin to develop attributions of negative events that are global, stable, and internal,
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resulting in a sense of hopelessness, which is related to the development of depression
(Husky et al., 2007). The unique relationship of these types of causal attributions to
depression was further supported by ESM findings that failed to find a relationship
between anxious moods, lending further support to the helplessness-hopelessness theory
(Swendsen, 1998). Comparison of the helplessness-hopelessness theory of depression to
the sociotropy-autonomy theory of depression using ESM data provided more support for
the helplessness-hopelessness theory in explaining depressed mood overall (Husky et al.,
2007). However, reactions to particular types of situations can be better accounted for by
personality dimensions in accordance with the sociotropy-autonomy aspect of Beck’s
cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1987). According to this theory, people who are
high on sociotropy will experience a greater impact from a negative interpersonal event
than from other types of events. People who are more autonomous will experience a
greater impact from negative achievement related events. Consistent with this theory,
sociotropy explained more variance in depressed mood following interpersonal negative
events than was explained by attributional style. However, inconsistent with the
sociotropy-autonomy theory, autonomy did not explain a significant amount of variance
in depressed mood following an achievement related negative event.
Description of Emotions
Although one might expect that experience-based studies would provide insight into
how particular emotions are actually experienced, this literature has added very little in
the realm of describing emotion experience. In accordance with studies that have focused
on emotions in depression, the purpose of experience-based studies on depression are
often frequency based, seek to determine the types of events that lead to particular
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feelings, and seek to explain how the occurrence of various feelings related to other
psychological constructs such as attributional style. Despite the use of qualitative
methods in some of the experience based studies, little is offered on the qualitative
experience of feelings in depression.
Descriptive Experience Sampling
Descriptive Experience Sampling (Hurlburt, 1990; Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt, 1997;
Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) is a method specifically designed to explore inner experience.
During the DES procedure, participants carry a small signaling device and wear an
attached earpiece. The device is programmed to emit a random signal within intervals of
one hour. When the participant receives the signal, he or she is to recall his/her
experience just before the moment of the beep. Unlike most other experience-based
methods, DES is concerned only with observing the participant’s ongoing inner
experience at a precise moment (i.e., fraction of a second) before the signal. The target of
interest is the experience at the last moment of awareness before the participant was
disturbed by the beep. The participant collects six of these moments of experience and is
interviewed by a trained DES interviewer within 24 hours of sampling. Guidelines for
the appropriate execution of the method have been extensively addressed in various
publications (Hurlburt, 1997; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). The
primary goal of a DES expositional interviewer is for the interviewer to gain high-fidelity
apprehension of what was in the participant’s awareness during the target moment. A
great deal of effort is spent developing the participant’s ability to recall the moment, and
the interviewer works hard to avoid including experience that is based on the
participant’s ideas of him or herself and what they believe typically occurs in his or her
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inner experience. Instead, the interview aims solely on the content of inner experience at
the moment of the beep, without preconceived notions on what that experience should or
should not be like.
There are several advantages that DES shares with other sampling methods in
comparison to traditional cross-sectional designs. Primarily, DES acknowledges severe
limitations on memory. Like other ambulatory techniques, DES seeks to reduce memory
errors by having participants report on their experience as it is occurring. DES improves
upon other ambulatory designs by restricting its target of interest to the smallest practical
moment of time. Other ambulatory methods range in their target of recall. For example,
diary studies have participants reflect on their entire day. This scope of diary methods
has been criticized by proponents of ESM (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995). However,
although the time frame of focus on ESM studies covers less than a day and is therefore
an improvement on diary studies, ESM still often requires participants to report on an
event or events that have occurred since their last sampling. Given intervals of three
hours in some cases, this may be a sufficient amount of time to be influenced by memory
errors. Even if intervals are much shorter, there is still the requirement of retrospection
which is allows for the possibility of memory bias. DES attempts to reduce the target of
recall to a split second before a participant is asked to observe his/her inner experience,
thereby requiring the least amount of retrospection as possible and subsequently reducing
the likelihood of contamination of reports due to memory bias. This issue is particularly
important in the study of depression, as the reviewed literature has indicated that
depression is strongly associated with mood-congruency effects (Dalgleish & Watts,
1990; Matt et al., 1992).
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Another advantage that DES shares with other ambulatory methods is increased
ecological validity compared to cross-sectional designs (Husky et al., 2007). Participants
observe their inner experience as they go about their typical daily activities, rather than in
contrived laboratory settings. In addition, the interview process of DES trains
participants to be accurate observers and reporters of their inner experience. Better
preparation of participants reporting their inner experience has been endorsed by
proponents of thought sampling techniques (Josephson et al., 2000). The aim of DES is
always to push the participants to the limits of what they are able to report on their inner
experiences, while recognizing those limits. This approach increases the integrity of the
participants’ reports.
Another consideration of DES is reduction of response bias. During a DES
expositional interview, questioning is very open-ended and the interview is largely led by
the participants’ experiences. For example, the interview for each sampled moment
typically begins by the interviewer’s asking, “What was in your experience at the
moment of the beep?” If the participant lists several aspects of their experience, the
interviewer might ask the participant which of them were most present and begin
discussing those aspects first. DES interviews are trained to limit their expectations and
assumptions about what may or may not be in someone’s experience and are
continuously monitoring themselves to limit demand characteristics and the potential
influence of presuppositions on the interview. Other methods using questionnaires, target
driven questioning, adjectives checklists, etc. have been criticized because they may
inadvertently influence the participants’ response, thereby degrading the truthfulness of
their response (Josephson et al., 2000; White et al., 1992). DES minimizes this potential
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problem. Methods such ESM have claimed their ability simultaneously to measure
mood, cognitions, and behaviors as an advantage over other methods (Peeters, Nicolson
et al., 2003). Given that the DES interview is guided by experience itself rather than from
presumed targets of study, it is likely that DES’s ability to capture these various aspects
of consciousness is equal to and perhaps better than ESM.
DES can be used simultaneously as an idiographic and nomothetic measure, a
strength has been used to support the ESM method (Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995). DES
allows access into an individual’s inner world. Over repeated sampling, a portrait of the
person typically develops. In this way, variability that may exist within a group of
people, as well as within a particular person, can be examined. The relevance of this has
been demonstrated in DES studies that highlighted the extensive variations of experience
that can occur among people that would typically be grouped together in a study. For
example, Lefforge (2007) found that the three participants who had initiated
antidepressant treatment differed significantly in symptom profile, the nature of their
inner experience, and the pattern of change in experience over the course of treatment.
This study also showed that fluctuations in experience within an individual can be
observed across time. Despite DES’s conception as a primarily idiographic method, DES
has been successfully used to compare experience across groups (Hurlburt, Koch, &
Heavey, 2002). However, these types of studies are limited because the extensive
amount of time dedicated to each participant makes collection of data from large samples
difficult.
The interoberver reliability of DES has been established by a study that had two
interviewers separately interview participants about the same moments (Hurlburt &
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Heavey, 2002). Each interviewer then coded each moment for the absence or presence of
16 forms of inner experience. Analysis of five of the most frequently occurring forms of
inner experience (images, inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory
awareness) indicated consistency between raters. Percentage of agreement ranged from
83% for sensory awareness to 97% for images. The raters’ percentage agreement for the
presence of feelings was 92%.
The validity of DES is supported by a study that linked DES findings to observable
external behavior (Hurlburt et al., 2002). The inner experience of individuals with fast
speech rates was compared to those with normal speech rates. Individuals who were
observed to speak fast were found to have more complex inner experience, including for
example, fewer instances of simple inner speech. The investigators interpreted that the
fast speech was related to the necessity of communicating more information than people
with simpler inner experience.
Whereas DES is a promising method for obtaining accurate reports of inner
experience, some of its limitations should be kept in mind. While ecological validity is
increased by having participants observe their experience in naturalistic settings, lack of
control over when the participant chooses to collect their samples may cause problems.
For example, some participants may choose to wear the beeper only at particular times or
during particular activities. This is limiting in two ways: 1) the portrait produced by DES
samples may not accurately represent that participant’s typical experience, but rather
illustrates their experience in particular situations or at particular times, and 2)
comparison of that participant to another participant who collects beeps at different times
or in different situations may not be accurate. However, instructing the participant on
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when to wear the beeper to standardize the procedure across participants may also
produce inaccurate profiles. In addition, this may increase the strain on the participant to
perform an already time demanding task, potentially decreasing participant and
compliance.
DES is also limited in its ability to ensure that participants are reporting on all
sampled moments at the time that they are sampled. Some ESM studies have used
handheld computers which record the latency between sampling and report of experience.
However, the DES beepers are not designed to do this and replacement of the beepers
with handheld computers would be costly. During the orientation to DES, the participant
is told that they are free to withhold talking about sampled moment. However, a
participant’s presenting a sampled moment that he or she does not wish to discuss
happens very infrequently. Although this may be evidence that such moments are
infrequent, it is also possible that participants simply skip observing such moments and
replace them with other sampled moments or avoid engaging in sampling during
activities that they anticipate not wanting to openly discuss.
To promote accuracy, the target of DES interviews is only the experience that was in
the participant’s awareness at the moment of the beep. This may be a limited approach in
that there is evidence that people process aspects of experience outside of awareness. For
example, it is not infrequent to have participants report on their experience while driving
but say that seeing the road or other cars was not in their awareness at the moment of the
beep. The fact that these participants are able to drive safely indicates that visual aspects
of driving are present. While aspects such as seeing the road may be inconsequential in
understanding a person, it is possible that some processes have more impact on overall
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experience than DES is able to capture. For example, sometimes participants will report
that an emotion was experienced until the beep signaled them to observe their inner
experience. Once signaled, the participant may report with confidence that the emotion
had been present but was not experienced. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which
such experiences occur and are relevant and important in understanding inner experience.
The purpose of DES’s focus on very small intervals of time is to reduce retrospective
bias. However, the focus on such short moments of awareness may miss other more
important events in one’s awareness. It is likely that important aspects of inner
experience are repeated frequently, and therefore are more likely to be captured by
random sampling. However, important but infrequent events in inner experience are
likely to be missed by DES.
The final limitation of DES, found in all studies that seek to understand human
experience, is the limitation of communication. DES interviewers are trained to
recognize that many words may be used with an inaccurate assumption of shared
meaning. They attempt to handle this by asking the participant what he or she personally
means when they say things like “I was saying to myself…” or “I was feeling
confused….” However, the shared understanding of one’s experience must ultimately be
communicated through language which has limitations.
Feelings in Depression Related Findings
Several studies have been conducted on depression using DES (See Table 1 for a
summary). The first study to examine depression with DES was conducted by Hurlburt
(1993) with four participants who ranged from dysphoric to mildly depressed to deeply
depressed. Each participant was sampled during times of dysphoric/depressed mood and
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times of euthymic mood. Hurlburt examined their collected moments of experience for
commonalities of experience that occurred during depressed moods within a particular
individual and for similarities in experience during depressed mood between participants.
The primary findings of this study were not directly related to the experience of feelings,
but were marked instead by a lack of symbolization in inner experience during depressed
moods. For example, participants experienced less images and inner speech during
depression. Instead, depressed mood was associated with an increase in unsymbolized
thought. The participants had a harder time observing and communicating the
characteristics of their inner experience during their depressed periods. During periods of
depression, even when their experience was presented in symbolized thoughts such as
words or images, they had difficulty describing characteristics of them.
Perlotto (2001) reported differences in emotional experience between depressed and
nondepressed participants. Depressed participants experienced a higher frequency of
feelings as well as a higher ratio of negative to positive feelings (4:1) compared to
nondepressed participants (1:1). In addition to feelings, depressed participants also
frequently experienced sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking. Lastly, depressed
participants experienced fewer images, but more multiple experiences during a single
moment than did nondepressed participants. The findings of this study were limited by a
small sample size of three depressed and five nondepressed participants.
Depression’s association with negative experiences was replicated by Cavenagh
(2003), whose study included two participants at risk for depression. Consistent with
Perlotto (2001), participants at risk for depression experienced more feelings than did less
depressed participants. These two participants were also found to have a tendency for
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negative-valence experiences. The primary purpose of this study, however, was to
examine cognitive styles in depression. Although questionnaire data supported the
relationships among depression, attributional style, and rumination, DES results did not
support the relationship between depression and negative attributional style or the
negative cognitive triad. Again, this study was limited by a small sample size of six
participants.
Increased frequency of feelings was replicated by again by Gunter (2007). This study
also found that depressed participants had a higher ratio of negative experiences to
positive experiences than nondepressed participants, in accordance with previous findings
by Perlotto (2001). Gunter (2007) also contributed new information on feelings in
depression. Depressed participants tended to experience feeling sad, hopeless,
despondent, dread, or disappointment most frequently. They also tended to have
moments that were affective, either positive or negative, in contrast to the neutral
moments experienced by nondepressed participants. Perhaps the most descriptive finding
of emotion in depression was also provided by this study. Depressed participants
experienced a higher rate of negative physical sensations than did nondepressed
participants and these unpleasant sensations were often accompanied by an emotion.
This may indicate that part of emotional experience in depression is accompanying
physical sensations. This finding is consistent with somatic complaints which are
common in depression (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Lefforge (2007) studied the inner experience of three participants with depression that
had initiated antidepressant treatment. The most noteworthy result of this study was that
the profile of each participant greatly differed from the others. Elevated frequency of
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feelings was found in only one of the three participants. However, the results were
consistent with the other studies that found a high ratio of negative feelings compared to
positive feelings, as this occurred in all three participants. Interestingly, participants were
asked to indicate their current level of depression on an analog scale at each sampled
moment. After the first week, participants no longer endorsed momentary awareness of
depression. Lefforge (2007) posited several possible reasons for this; 1) anxiety was a
more salient feature of the individuals included in the study than depression, 2)
depression is a diffuse experience that is not experienced in momentary awareness, 3) the
training participants received on observing their inner experience changed what they
reported as in their awareness, and 4) antidepressants had an immediate effect on
treatment. The second and third speculations will be important to consider in
interpretations of the findings of the present study.
Potential for Describing Feelings
No previous study has used DES to specifically examine the experience of feelings in
depression. However, DES has been used to provide a rough estimate of the frequency of
emotion experiences in normal populations (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). This study found
that feelings occurred in approximately one quarter of sampled moments. More
importantly, this study found that emotion experience, as well as other inner phenomena
varied greatly among participants. Thus studies that assume that experiences of
particular feelings are the same for everyone are likely missing important details of the
subjective experience. Knowing that there is variation in the experience of depression
among nondepressed individuals highlights the importance of conducting an investigation
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Table 1
Depression Related DES Findings
Population

Frequency of Feelings

Negative vs. Positive
Feelings

Hurlburt (1993)

Dysphoric vs.

Not reported.

Not reported.

Depressed> Nondepressed

Depressed had higher ratio

euthymic mood
Perlotta (2001)

Depressed vs.
Nondepressed

of negative: positive
feelings

Cavenagh

At-risk for

(2003)

depression vs. less

negative-valence

depressed

experiences

Gunter (2007)

Major Depression

Depression-risk> Less depressed

Depressed > Nondepressed

vs. Nondepressed

Depressed tended to have

Depressed had higher ratio
of negative: positive
feelings

Lefforge (2007)

Depressed &

1 out of 3 participants had

All 3 showed high ratio of

initiating

increased higher than average

negative to positive feelings

treatment with

frequency of feelings

antidepressants

of the experience of feelings among individuals with depression. Although DES studies
have provided some information on the experience of feelings in depressed and normal
populations, the method has the potential to provide much richer descriptions of feelings
in depression than are currently available.
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Present Study
Most research on emotion during depression has been generated from an informationprocessing perspective. Experience-based investigations of depression have observed the
frequency of various emotions or have focused on aspects of depression that are
minimally related to emotion, such as attributions. Very little research has been
conducted that directly examines the actual experience of emotion. Other than memoirs
describing personal experiences with emotion, there are no careful studies of how
feelings are experienced during depression and whether or not they differ from typical
feelings. Therefore, the primary purpose of the current study was to describe emotion
experiences in depression and examine the extent to feelings during depression differ
from normal feelings.
Using the Descriptive Experience Sampling method I examined the inner experience
of 5 depressed and 4 nondepressed participants. Accordingly, participants wore a random
signal generator (beeper) during their typical daily activities that signaled them to observe
their inner experience. Participants were instructed to collect six samples of inner
experience on each of four days. They participated in an expositional interview in
accordance with Descriptive Experience Sampling guidelines following each day of
sampling so that the interviewer gained an understanding of the participants’ inner
experience during the sampled moments. The first day was considered a training day and
data was not included in the final analyses. The characteristics of naturally-occurring
feelings, such as valence, intensity, accompanying physical sensations, as well as any
other salient features, were observed. Feelings were compared between depressed and
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nondepressed participants for similarities and differences. In addition, within group
variability of emotion experience was explored.
Consistent with previous DES studies (Cavenagh, 2003; Gunter, 2007; Perlotto,
2001), I predicted that depressed individuals would experience feelings more frequently
than would nondepressed participants. Also, previous experience-based studies on
feelings in depression have found that depressed participants experience more negative
feelings and fewer positive feelings than nondepressed participants, which I expected to
find in the current study.
This study adds to existing experience-based studies by investigating previously
unaddressed aspects of emotion experience. Due to the fact that this aspect of the study
was largely exploratory, moments with feelings were generally examined for patterns that
occurred within and across participants. These patterns are presented in terms of effect
sizes (Cohen’s d) as exploratory pointers due to the small sample size resulting in low
power. In addition, depressive content, which is largely feeling based, was examined for
all moments. Feelings and depressive content also were evaluated in terms of their
relationships with questionnaire data. As part of the exploratory process, other aspects of
experience (form, content, time orientation) were also analyzed.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This study consisted of four phases; a screening phase, a qualification phase, an
experience sampling phase, and a controlled sampling phase. During the screening
phase, I identified suitable candidates for participation in the study. During the
qualification, I ensured that participants met the criteria for the depressed or
nondepressed group. During the experience sampling phase, I used the Descriptive
Experience Sampling (DES) method to explore the inner experience of participants in
their naturalistic situations. During the controlled experience sampling phase, I used the
same interviewing technique to explore inner experience in response to several
emotionally evocative and neutral film clips.
Phase I: Screening
Participants
Participants included 224 students who were currently enrolled in an introductory
psychology course at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Students under the age of 18
were excluded from participation. Students who completed the screening phase of the
study were awarded research credits for a course requirement.
Measures
Demographic Form. The demographic form was created for this study and included
basic participant information. This information consisted of participants’ name, address,
phone number age, race, marital status, educational level, and current employment status.
CES-D. The Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale (CESD-D;
(Radloff, 1977) is a 20-item self-report measure of depression that is intended for
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research with general populations. Items on the measure address various aspects of
depression (depressed affect, positive affect, psychomotor retardation, and interpersonal
disturbance), but are primarily focused on depressed affect. In addition, it measures
current (i.e., within the last week) depressive symptoms. Scores on the CES-D range
from 0 to 60, with higher scores indicating higher levels of depressive symptomatology.
Cut off scores are not provided, as the measure is not intended for diagnostic use.
However, the use of an arbitrary cut off score of 16 chosen by Radloff was shown to
discriminate fairly well between patient and non-patient populations, as 70% of patients
but only 21% of non-patients scored above 16. This measure has been shown to have
good internal consistency (alpha = .85) and acceptable test-retest reliability (correlations
vary from .67 to .51 for retesting at 2, 4, 6, and 8 weeks). Test-retest reliability may be
lower than typically desired because the measure was created to measure current level of
depression, which is susceptible to change over time. The CES-D’s sensitivity to change
has been demonstrated by findings that CES-D scores change substantially following
major life events and decrease during treatment (Radloff, 1977). The validity of the
CES-D has been demonstrated by its correlations with other self-report measures, clinical
ratings, and depression-related variables (e.g., negative life events; Radloff, 1977).
Procedure
Investigators solicited instructors of introductory psychology courses to allow entry
of an investigator into their classes. Students were invited to remain after class to
complete a brief survey. At this time, the investigator obtained informed consent from
those who wished to proceed. The investigator administered participants a demographic
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questionnaire and the CES-D. Students who completed any of these forms were awarded
research credit.
Phase II: Qualification
Participants
Participants were selected for the qualification phase based on their scores on the
CES-D. Participants who scored high on the CES-D (scored above 29 or scored between
20 and 29 with a 2 or 3 on Item 6: “I felt depressed”) and those who scored very low on
the CES-D (6 and lower) were contacted to participate in this phase. Thirty-three high
scorers were contacted; 24completed the qualification, 3 declined participation, and 6
never responded to requests to participate. Twenty-two low scorers were contacted; 11
completed the qualification, 4 declined participation, and 7 never responded to requests to
participate. Of the 24 high-scoring participants who completed the qualification phase, 14
did not meet criteria for Phase III and 1 declined further participation. Nine high-scoring
participants met criteria for the depressed group and were advanced to Phase III. All of
the11 low-scoring participants who completed the qualification phase met criteria for
Phase III; 2 declined further participation. Nine of the lowest-scoring participants met
criteria for the nondepressed group and were advanced to Phase III.
Measures
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (First, Gibbon,
Spitzer, & Williams, 1997) is a semi-structured interview intended for psychiatric
diagnosis by researchers and trained interviewers. This measure is largely considered to
be the standard for diagnosing axis I disorders such as depression (Zanarini &
Frankenburg, 2001). It contains ten modules which correspond to DSM-IV diagnoses.
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The mood disorders module and the psychotic screening module were used in this study.
The mood disorders module covers diagnosis of major depressive episode, manic
episode, hypomanic episode, dysthymic disorder, mood disorder due to a general medical
condition, and substance-induced mood disorder. The psychotic screening module was
used to establish presence of psychotic symptoms. The full version of the SCID-I can
take up to two hours for someone with psychiatric diagnosis and between 30 and 90
minutes for someone who does not. The administration time for the selected modules is
typically between 30 and 60 minutes.
Procedure
Participants selected for the qualification phase were contacted by phone and/or email
to schedule a one-hour meeting with a graduate-level investigator. At this meeting, the
investigator obtained informed consent from participants and administered the mood
disorders module and the psychotic screening module of the SCID-I. The mood disorders
module of the SCID-I was used to determine if the participant was experiencing
symptoms of depression. The psychotic screening module was used to exclude
participants who were experiencing psychosis. Participants who met diagnostic criteria
for depression (major depressive episode and/or dysthymia) and were not currently
experiencing psychotic symptoms or other mood disorders (manic episode, hypomanic
episode, mood disorder due to a general medical condition, and substance-induced mood
disorder) were invited to continue in the depressed group of Phase III. Participants who
did not endorse non-somatic symptoms of depression, were not experiencing psychotic
symptoms, and were not experiencing other mood disorders were invited to continue in
the nondepressed group of Phase III. Participants who were selected and wished to
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continue began Phase III minutes after the interview. Participants that met diagnostic
criteria for depression or appeared to be at-risk for mood disorders were referred to the
university counseling center for free services.
Phase III: Experience Sampling
Participants
Of the nine depressed participants, five were included in this study while the other
four participants were interviewed by a colleague for inclusion in another study. Of the
11 nondepressed participants, four were included in this study while the other five were
interviewed by a colleague for inclusion in another study. The final sample for this study
included five depressed participants and four nondepressed participants; their
demographic information is presented in the next section. The nondepressed participants
consisted of individuals who reported the lowest levels of depressive symptomotology on
the CES-D. The depressed group consisted of five participants who met the diagnostic
criteria for depression and were not experiencing psychotic symptoms during Phase II.
The nondepressed group consisted of four participants who did not endorse non-somatic
symptoms of depression or psychotic symptoms during Phase II. All participants who
began Phase III completed four sampling days. Participants’ demographic information is
summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Participants were awarded research credit for each
sampling interview they completed.
Measures
Symptom Checklist 90-R. The Symptom Checklist 90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis,
1994) was used to obtain an overall measure of general psychopathology type and
severity. It is a 90-item measure in which participants rate the severity of a variety of
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Table 2
Demographics of Participants By Condition
Depressed (N = 5)

Age

Nondepressed (N = 4)

Range

Mean

Range

Mean

18 – 30 years

20.8 years

18 – 27 years

21.8 years

(SD = 5.17)

(SD = 4.50)

n

Percentage

n

Percentage

Female

3

60%

1

25%

Male

2

40%

3

75%

White

1

20%

3

75%

Hispanic

2

40%

1

25%

Asian

1

20%

0

0%

Biracial

1

20%

0

0%

Freshman

3

60%

2

50%

Sophomore

1

20%

0

0%

Senior

0

0%

1

25%

Unknown

1

20%

1

25%

2

40%

2

50%

Never Married

4

80%

3

75%

Married

0

0%

1

25%

Divorced

1

20%

0

0%

Gender

Ethnicity

Year in School

Employed
Marital Status
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Table 3
Depression Related Information of Depressed Participants (N=5)
n

Percentage

Major Depressive Disorder

4

80%

Dysthymia

1

20%

Have received psychotherapy

3

60%

Currently taking psychotropic medication

0

0%

1

2

40%

2

1

20%

7

1

20%

20

1

20%

Diagnosis from Phase II

Number of previous episodes of depression

psychological symptoms that have been experienced during the previous week on a scale
from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). This measure produces a Global Severity Index score
which indicates the general level of distress currently experienced by participant. It also
includes nine symptom dimensions (Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal
Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and
Psychoticism) which indicate the types of psychological symptoms that are being
experienced. The SCL-90-R has demonstrated good reliability, with internal consistency
of symptom dimensions ranging from .79 to .90, with Depression having an internal
consistency of .90 with both psychiatric outpatients and non-clinical populations. Test-
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retest reliability of the symptom dimensions has ranged between .78 and .90 over a one
week period and between .68 and .83 over a 10 week period. The validity of the SCL-90R has been supported through demonstrations of its convergence with the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the General Health Questionnaire, and the Beck
Depression Inventory. It has also demonstrated divergent validity with other expected
measures and has been shown to be a sensitive and specific measure of various disorders
(Groth-Marnat, 2003).
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule –
Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) consists of 60 mood-related
adjectives which are rated on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Scales indicating mood valence of positive affect and negative affect are each derived
from ratings of 10 items. The measure can also be used to assess specific emotion states
from other subscales (Fear, Sadness, Guilt, Hostility, Shyness, Fatigue, Surprise,
Joviality, Self-Assurance, Attentiveness, and Serenity). The instructions of the PANASX can be varied depending on the time interval of interest. Time intervals of interest
have included: at the moment, today, during the past few days, during the past week,
during the past few weeks, during the past month, during the past year, or in general.
Consistent with the other measures being used (CES-D and SCL-90-R), the current study
focused on the past week. The Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales have shown
high internal consistency reliabilities which range between .83 and .90. Most of the
specific emotion state subscales also show good internal reliability with median alpha
reliabilities which range between .83 and .93, with the exception of the less reliable
scales of Attentiveness (.78), Serenity (.76), and Surprise (.77). The convergent validity
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of the PANAS-X as a state measure of mood as well as its ability to measure change
across time have been demonstrated (Watson & Clark, 1994).
CES-D. Described in Phase I above.
Descriptive Experience Sampling Codebook Manual of Terminology. Hurlburt and
Heavey’s (2006) Descriptive Experience Sampling Codebook Manual of Terminology
describes Inner Speech (IS), Partially Worded Speech (PWS), Unworded Speech (UWS),
Worded Thinking (W), Image (I), Imageless Seeing (XI), Unsymbolized Thinking (U),
Inner Hearing (IH), Feeling (F), Sensory Awareness (SA), Just Doing (JD), Just Talking
(JT), Just Listening (JL), Just Reading (JR), Just Watching TV (JW), and Multiple
Awareness (M). In addition, Perceptual Awareness (PA) has been coded and in more
recent work, the experience originally called Imagse is now referred to as “Inner Seeing”.
The most frequently occurring forms of inner experience are inner seeing, inner speech,
unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
Inner speech is when one experiences him or herself speaking internally. The inner
spoken words are not actually spoken out loud but often have similar characteristics of
outer speech. Unsymbolized thinking is the experience of thinking that is not represented
by visual imagery, words, auditorily, or other symbolization. A thought is experienced,
but not in any symbolized form. Feelings are the experience of an emotion and may
include the experience of physical sensations related to emotion. Sensory awareness is
the focus on the sensory aspect of something either internal (e.g., experiencing the
pressure of a pin as the finger pushed on it) or external (e.g., visually noticing the
pinkness of a sweater) without concern for or attention to the meaning or significance of
the sensory experience (reference to Sensory Awareness paper). For more detailed
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description of each type of code and methods for discriminating among codes, the reader
is referred to the codebook. Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) demonstrated high
interobserver reliability for the most frequent codes.
Equipment
Random signal generator. Each participant was given a random signal generator
(beeper; Hurlburt, 2010) and an earpiece. The beeper is programmed to emit a 700Hz
tone at a random point within a one-hour interval. On average, a tone is emitted every 30
minutes. The beeper is small enough to be worn on the waist or in one’s pocket. The
volume level is adjustable, allowing participants to determine an appropriate tone volume
for their current surrounding noise levels.
Notebook. Each participant was provided with a 3 x 5 inch notebook. The
participants were able to jot notes concerning their momentary experience in this
notebook. The notebooks were not collected from participants; they were only used for
their personal reference.
Procedure
After a participant completed the SCID-IV and had been qualified for the current
phase, the investigator continued the meeting by obtaining informed consent for Phase
III: Experience Sampling, administering questionnaires (CES-D, PANAS-X, SCL-R-90),
and explained the sampling phase in detail. The investigator scheduled the next interview
meeting with the participant, allowing time for the participants to collect six moments of
experience during the 24 hour period preceding the scheduled interview.
The participants wore the random-signal beeper as they engaged in their daily
activities. Participants were instructed to wear the beepers at any time of their choosing,
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as long as it was within the 24 hours preceding the interview. The participants were
randomly signaled by the sound of a tone to observe their inner experience in the brief
(i.e., fractions of second) moment before they were disturbed by the sound. At these
moments, participants jotted down notes about their experience to facilitate recall of the
moment during the interview. Participants were instructed to collect six of these
moments of experience.
On the first interview day the investigator conducted an expositional interview with
the participant in which participants were questioned about their inner experience at each
of the sampled moments according to the Descriptive Experience Sampling method.
These interviews lasted up to 60 minutes. The purpose of the interview was iteratively
(Hurlburt, 2009) to train participants to apprehend experience as it was ongoing at the
moment of the beep. The moment of the beep was considered to be the last undisturbed
moment before the tone sounded. The investigators had been trained to bracket
presuppositions, reduce demand characteristics, and accurately identify experience that
was and was not present precisely at the moment of the beep. Within a day following the
interview the investigator wrote summaries of each moment of experience discussed
during the expositional interview. The first day of sampling was considered a training
day and collected data was excluded from analysis. This process was repeated for three
subsequent sampling days. For each of these days, participants were again asked to
collect six moments of experience and these moments were discussed during the
expositional interview. On several occasions participants collected fewer than six
moments of experience. Thus, the final analysis included 186 sampled moments.
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Participants were asked to complete the CES-D at the beginning of each expositional
interview.
Following DES interviews, I wrote descriptions of each moment which summarized
the participant’s inner experience at the moment of the beep. I then coded each beep
according to the DES codebook for forms of inner experience. When feelings were
coded as present, I also judged whether or not the feeling was positive, negative, or
neutral based as outlined by the PANAS-X positive versus negative subscales. Then I
conducted additional coding to determine whether or not features related to depression
were present in the beep description. These determinations were based upon DSM-IV
(APA, 2000) diagnostic criteria for major depressive episodes. Primary symptoms were
considered the critical diagnostic criteria of depression (i.e., depressed mood and/or loss
of pleasure). Secondary symptoms referred to the other symptoms of depression (e.g.,
changes in sleep or appetite, guilt). Lastly, other features associated with depression in
common presentations of the illness were considered correlates of depression (e.g.,
anxiety). Lastly, I provided coding of time orientation. If awareness was focused only
on the aspects of the present moment, the moment was considered present-focused. If
any aspect of the beep included awareness of the future, it was coded future-focused.
Likewise, if any aspect of the beep included awareness of the past, it was coded pastfocused. Details are provided throughout the results to provide an adequate portrayal of
the types of experience that were included within each coding.
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Phase IV: Controlled Experience Sampling
Participants
The participants were the same as in Phase III: Experience Sampling. They were
given course 1 research credit for completion of this phase.
Materials
A DVD containing four brief video clips was made for use in this study. The video
clips were selected for their ability to evoke emotion or their neutrality based on the work
of Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007). Each clip was approximately two minutes long
and contained at the end the same tone that was emitted by our random signaling devices
as a cue that the participant was to capture and record his or her experience. At the sound
of the tone, the screen turned black.
The video clip selected to elicit negative emotion, particularly sadness, is from the
popular movie, The Champ, a scene in which a boy is told his father has died. The video
clip selected to elicit positive emotion, particularly amusement and/or happiness, is a
scene from the popular film, When Harry Met Sally. During this scene Meg Ryan shows
that she can fake having an orgasm. The neutral clips are from a screen saver that shows
colorful lines appearing and disappearing across the screen.
Procedure
Each participant watched two affective video clips and two neutral clips in the order
of negative, neutral, positive, neutral. Each video clip was interrupted by a tone identical
to that produced by the beeper and the screen became blank. The participants were
provided an opportunity to jot down notes about their inner experience at this sampled
moment. The investigator interviewed the participants at the end of each film clip in the
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same manner as previous interviews regarding their momentary experience just before
the tone. The procedure was repeated for each of the four video clips, in which the
participants viewed the first video clip, was interviewed regarding that sampled moment,
then watched the next video clip, was interviewed regarding the second sampled moment,
and so on. Again, the investigator wrote summaries of these moments within a day of
collection. These written descriptions were coded and rated in the same manner as the
previous phase. In addition, each experience was also rated as related or unrelated to the
preceding negative or positive stimuli.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
A total of 36 sampling days and 9 controlled sampling days were conducted. The
number of moments collected by each participant is shown in Table 4 and summarized in
Table 5.

Table 4
Number of Moments Sampled per Participant
Depressed1
Edward

Paul

Sam.

Violet

Elissa

Sampling Day 1

4

5

6

6

5

Sampling Day 2

5

6

6

5

3

Sampling Day 3

5

5

6

6

5

Sampling Day 4

5

6

6

5

6

Controlled

4

4

4

4

4

15

17

18

16

14

1

Total

Nondepressed
Carlos

Vicki

Jason

Triston

Sampling Day 1

6

6

6

6

Sampling Day 2

6

6

6

6

Sampling Day 3

6

5

6

6

Sampling Day 4

6

6

6

6

Controlled

4

4

4

4

18

17

18

18

2

Total

Note. 1Depressed Participants are ordered by highest to lowest average CES-D Score.
2

Total excluding first sampling day and controlled sampling.
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Table 5
Number of Moments Sampled By Group
Depressed

Nondepressed

Total

Sampling1

80

71

151

Controlled Sampling

20

16

36

All Samples1

100

87

187

Note. 1Total excluding first sampling day

Manipulation Check
The grouping of participants as depressed or nondepressed was supported by
between-group differences in CES-D scores throughout the study. A repeated measures
ANOVA test of between subject effects found that the CES-D scores of nondepressed
participants (M = 2.62, SE = 1.088) were significantly lower than those of depressed
participants (M = 22.9, SE = .973), F(1,7) = 193.44, p < .001. Furthermore, a significant
interaction of testing day by condition (depressed or nondepressed) was significant, F(5,
35) = 4.815, p <.001. Depressed participants’ CES-D scores showed significant change
over the course of the study, F(5, 20) = 8.576, p < .001, whereas nondepressed
participants’ CES-D scores did not change, F(1.778, 5.334) = 1.878, p = .240. Depressed
participants’ CES-D scores significantly decreased from screening (M = 32.6, SD = 3.78)
to the last day of sampling (M = 13.4, SD = 2.97), Mean Difference = 19.2, SE = 1.93, p
= .009. Average CES-D scores for depressed and nondepressed participants are shown in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1

Average CES-D Scores by Group
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Day 1
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Depressed Participant Profiles
Edward
Edward was a 30 year old, bi-racial (Caucasian and African American), heavy set
male. He identified as gay. He was divorced from a heterosexual marriage. He was
experiencing a major depressive episode at the time of qualification. He reported having
numerous (approximately 20) previous depressive episodes. He had previously been in
psychotherapy but was not receiving treatment at the time of qualification. He attributed
his depressive symptoms in part as a reaction to the death of his father. At the
qualification interview he was casually dressed. He was polite, humorous, and somewhat
emotionally labile. His tone of voice was somewhat dramatic. He admitted that he was
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often apprehensive about attending sampling interviews because it he felt that he would
have to discuss difficult topics while describing his inner experience, such as the loss of
his father. There were several times during the interviewing in which he became teary.
CES-D. Edward’s CES-D scores were indicative of clinically significant depression
throughout the study with the exception of his last sampling day. On his last sampling
day, his CES-D score of 15 was just below the value of 16 which typically discriminates
patient from nonpatient populations. However, this cutoff score is somewhat arbitrary.
Edward’s level of depression as measured by the CES-D shifted between the first and
second sampling days. Prior to this shift, Edward’s CES-D scores were particularly
elevated at 31 (screening), 37 (qualification), and 35 (first sampling). Then his scores
dropped to 22, 20, and 15 for the second, third, and fourth sampling days respectively.
Overall Edward showed the largest range within his scores with a maximum score of 37
and a minimum score of 15. Edwards’s CES-D scores over the course of the study are
shown in Figure 2.
Feelings in momentary inner experience. Edward frequently experienced feelings as
they were present in 14 (93%) of his samples. Of these 14 feelings, seven (50%) were
positive-valence and six (43%) were negative-valence. In addition he had one experience
of feeling sympathy which is not clearly positive-valence or negative-valence, but likely
is an integration of both (the positive-valence portion consisting of feeling connected to
another and the negative-valence for feeling badly for the other). The positive-valence
feelings Edward experienced were “horniness,” two experiences of humor, missing his
boyfriend (which he stated had a positive-valence), excitement, amazement, and
happiness/euphoria. The negative-valence feelings he experienced were
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sadness/hopelessness, sadness, irritation/aggravation, exhaustion, nervousness/anxiety,
and anxiety. There were four feelings (29% of his feelings) which were experienced
without sensations in awareness. These moments included feelings of
sadness/hopelessness, missing his boyfriend, sympathy, and happiness/euphoria. During
these moments, the feeling was clearly in his awareness but there were no reportable
characteristics of the feeling beyond its presence. He had two experiences of humor with
laughter and he had an experience of sadness with his eyes tearing up (which was only in
his awareness after the beep.
Excluding these moments of laughter and tearing up, Edward experienced feelings
with bodily sensations with seven of his 14 feelings (50%). He had three moments in
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which he experienced bubbling in his abdomen area. Repeated efforts to clarify the
sensation of bubbling were unsuccessful, so the amount of detail provided in these
descriptions is indicative of his limit reached in this regard. One of the experiences
occurred while he was feeling “horniness.” During this moment he experienced a mild
bubbling in the center of his abdomen. The two other sensations of bubbling in his
abdomen occurred with anxiety. For anxiety in particular, the intensity of the sensation
seemed to correspond with the intensity of his anxiety, which had increased from one
sampled moment to the subsequent sampled moment. During the first of these moments
he experienced nervousness/anxiety. He experienced “bubble guts,” a sensation of
warmth and turning in his stomach area. During the next moment he was experiencing
anxiety as intense “bubble guts,” an exploding sensation of heat all over his body and
intense turning and warmth in his stomach area. He experienced the one moment of
irritation/aggravation as a spreading sensation of warmth throughout his body and the one
moment of exhaustion as cloudiness in his head. Edward experienced the one moment of
excitement as a burst of energy throughout his body with particular bubbliness and
tingling in his arms. His experience of amazement included a sensation of warmth
through his body.
Three of Edward’s 14 feelings (21%) included a mental component. He characterized
his experience of happiness/euphoria as a mental feeling. His experience of
irritation/aggravation and his feeling of amazement were experienced as a feeling fused
with a thought.
Depression in momentary inner experience. There was some depressive content
captured by Edward’s sampling. Of the 15 sampled moments, a primary depressive
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symptom (depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure) was distinctly present during
two (13%) samples. He experienced a feeling of sadness and of sadness/hopeless during
these two moments. Secondary depressive symptoms (e.g., exhaustion, irritability) were
present in two (13%) samples. Lastly, a correlate of depression (anxiety) was present in
two (13%) samples. Both primary depressive experiences occurred on the second
sampling day, both secondary depressive experiences occurred on the third sampling day,
and both moments of anxiety occurred on the fourth sampling day.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Edward experienced unsymbolized thought
during five (33%) samples. The content of his unsymbolized thoughts ranged from fairly
simple concepts (Anderson Cooper is hot/has gorgeous eyes, I’m going to take off this
beeper), to more elaborate (Hoping he would not get in trouble as he passed a police car
on the way to court to deal with a speeding ticket; while watching a commercial that
referred to the recession, he was thinking I’m sick and tired of hearing about the
recession/of these commercials advertising to recession; while listening to the song,
Sober, he was thinking it’s one hell of a coincidence that the song was playing/that I’d
gotten the meaning around the same time I decided to be sober). These elaborate
thoughts were experienced in the form of an integrated thought and feeling.
There were three forms of Edward’s inner experience in which his thought process
was symbolized. These three forms were inner seeing (27%), inner speaking (20%), and
talking to himself (20%). It was very common for Edward’s symbolization to represent
only a fragment of a much larger/more complex underlying thought. For example, in
terms of inner seeing, there was one moment when he was innerly seeing his upcoming
art show as he imagined it would look like. He could see the wall where his pieces would
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be hanging in the show. He could clearly see the large middle picture, the focal point of
his inner seeing, and he could just see representations of the surrounding pictures. This
inner seeing represented his thinking about how he was really accomplishing something
with the art show. He was thinking about all the negative things that he had gotten
through and how he had made it so far.
An example of symbolized thought in the form of inner speaking occurred as he was
watching Frasier. He was innerly saying, “Poor Frasier.” He was thinking about how
Frasier lived with his father longer than any other relationship in his life and he was
relating Frasier’s experience to his own experience with his roommates; that he was
typically associated as related to his roommates rather than anyone he has been in a
relationship with. Lastly, an example in terms of talking occurred during a moment in
which he was saying out loud to himself, “Oh God, I’m so gay.” He was thinking about
how he was going to have to report his previous beep (thinking that Anderson Cooper
was hot) in the following sampling meeting and how he would be embarrassed talking
about Anderson Cooper.
Another aspect of Edward’s symbolized thought was a moment of multiple inner
seeing. During this moment he was thinking about his stepmom. (He had found out a
couple days before that she had died about 8 months ago). He was innerly seeing a
collage or rapid cycling of images related to his stepmom. He had difficulty articulating
which images were present, which seemed to be related to both them quickly coming in
and out of awareness and the presence of multiple images at once. The images were
related to various ideas of his stepmom; that he wasn’t going to have another chance to
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talk to her; remembering laying on the couch watching TV with her; putting flowers on
her grave when he goes to visit his family. At the same time, he innerly smelled her.
Edward also experienced some other forms of inner experience. He was reading
during one (7%) moment and doing in another (7%; pulling up the covers and reaching to
turn the dial on the beeper). As just mentioned, he had one (7%) moment of inner
smelling. Lastly, he experienced laughter during two (13%) moments.
Edward experienced perceptual awareness moderately frequently; it was captured in
four (27%) of his samples. He experienced perceptual awareness of seeing a police car
and watching Anderson Cooper, particularly seeing his eyes to define them as gorgeous,
on television. Lastly, he had two experiences of perceptual awareness which occurred at
a lower level of awareness than other forms of experience. They included holding a dish
and visually scanning a parking garage for suspicious activity. Along with perceptual
awareness, Edward’s awareness included watching television during three (20%)
samples. (Family Guy, TV commercial, Frasier).
Content of momentary inner experience. There were several content descriptors that
appeared more than once in Edward’s inner experience. Self-reflection was an apparent
theme that included moments of him thinking that he would not have a chance to talk
with his stepmother again, comparing his lack of relationships to Frasier’s, thinking about
how his relationship with his boyfriend would have to come to an end, hoping he would
not get into trouble, reflecting on his choice to pursue sobriety, and thinking about the
negative things in life he had to overcome. There were two moments which captured
self-commentary on his being gay. During one moment he was innerly saying, “Oh God,
I’m so gay” and during another he was innerly saying, “Oh God, I’m such a fag.” When
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he communicated both of these inner sayings, he used an inflection of humor rather than
self criticism. Humor and/or laughter were also captured in two additional moments.
Time orientation in inner experience. Edward’s time orientation was primarily
present focused (53%) or future focused (47%). Past orientation (13%) was also
represented in his samples. However, it should be noted that the two moments which
included aspects of both past and future focus. Present focused moments tended to
consist of Edward thinking about some aspect of his environments. For example,
thinking Anderson Cooper was hot/had gorgeous eyes, reading a joke texted by his
boyfriend and having a related thought, or comparing himself to Frasier as he watched
the show. Sometimes he was just experiencing something in his environment, as in a
moment when he was just experiencing the humor of Family Guy. Edward’s future
moments included his thinking about how he would be embarrassed discussing his inner
experience the next day, his thinking about how his relationship would eventually have to
stop, his wondering how he could convince a judge not to give him a ticket, and his
thinking about stopping in Chicago on his way to Detroit during the following week’s
spring break trip. He was thinking about his stepmom who he had recently found out had
died eight months previously during a moment that contained both past and future focus.
It was past focused in the sense that he was having various memories of her and future
focused in the sense that he was thinking about how he would never have a chance to talk
with her. The other combined moment occurred as he was thinking about his art show.
The moment’s past focus content included reflection on the negative things he had
overcome to get to this point and the moment’s future focus included an inner seeing of
how he imagined his art would look on the wall in the art show.
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Relationship between questionnaire data and inner experience. Edward’s CES-D
scores decreased with each sampling day. This pattern corresponded to presence of
depressive content. Primary depressive symptoms were captured only on the second
sampling day, when his CES-D score was the highest. On the third sampling day, as his
CES-D score decreased, only secondary depressive symptoms were captured. Finally, on
the fourth sampling day, corresponding to his lowest CES-D score, only correlates of
depression were captured.
Forms of inner experience did not tend to follow a pattern coinciding with his CES-D
scores with the possible exception of experiencing feelings. There was only one day in
which Edward had a moment not containing a feeling, which occurred on the fourth
sampling day, when his CES-D score was the lowest. However, given the high frequency
of feelings for Edward, it is difficult to determine if there is a true relationship.
Paul
Paul was an 18 year old, Filipino-American male. He participated in the study from
late January to early March of 2009. He met criteria for experiencing a major depressive
episode at the time of his participation in the qualification phase. He reported seven
previous episodes of major depression episodes, but he had never received psychological
treatment. In addition to attending university, he worked a part-time job. At the
qualification meeting he was dressed casually and presented with flat affect, but was
well-groomed. He attributed his depressed mood to recently losing driving privileges and
related conflict with his parents. Throughout the study he seemed somewhat restrained
and, at times, somewhat disinterested during interviews.
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CES-D. Paul’s CES-D scores were indicative of clinically significant depression
from screening to the third sampling day. However, his CES-D score of 13 on the last
sampling day is below the value of 16 which typically discriminates patient from
nonpatient populations. Paul’s CES-D scores were most elevated at screening (29),
qualification (30), and on sampling day three (28). Although in the clinically significant
range, Paul’s CES-D scores on sampling days one and two were relatively low at 21 and
20 respectively. Paul’s CES-D scores over the course of the study are shown in Figure 3.
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Feelings in momentary inner experience. Paul experienced three moments out of
(18%) that contained feelings, all which occurred on the fourth sampling day. All the
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feelings that Paul experienced had a negative-valence. They included feeling tired,
hurried, and annoyed. He experienced tiredness and annoyance without any experiential
details. A component of his experience of feeling hurried was warmth throughout his
torso and legs and his heart beating faster. Feeling hurried was experienced as a mixture
of a feeling and inner speaking (i.e., feeling hurried integrated with innerly saying “I need
to hurry up”).
Depression in momentary inner experience. Depressive content was not prominent in
Paul’s momentary experience. Of the 17 sampled moments, primary depressive
symptoms (depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure) were never present (0%), and
a secondary depressive symptoms (fatigue) was present in only 1 moment (6%).
Potentially relevant to depression, Paul’s inner experience did often seem self-evaluative
and there was evidence of rumination.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Paul’s inner experience most frequently
included moments in which he was innerly speaking, present in 47% of his sampled
moments. Most often, he was innerly speaking as a commentary on what he was doing
(“I’ll let myself win, ha ha ha” while playing a videogame with a friend; “I suck at
cooking” while playing a cooking videogame; “How am I supposed to look for this
answer?” while studying for an exam; and “I need to hurry up” while leaving for school)
or contemplating what he should do (“Should I let her win?”; “Should I call her?”;
“Should I be aggressive with this endeavor?”). The wording of his inner speaking,
“Should I be aggressive with this endeavor?” was atypically stilted. He innerly spoke in
an other-focused way during one experience (“I wonder what she’s doing”). During each
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of these moments he was innerly speaking in his own voice as though he would say it out
loud.
Unsymbolized thinking was also relatively common in Paul’s inner experience,
occurring in 29% of his sampled moments. Similar to his moments of inner speaking,
Paul’s unsymbolized thinking was typically commentary on what he was doing or should
be doing. For example, during one moment he was thinking that he should call his
friend, in another he was thinking that he would let his friend come to him instead of
pursuing her, and in another he was thinking that he was not going to call his friend (the
friend in all of these moments was the same person). Paul also had a moment while
exercising in which he was thinking he would do one more set. Lastly, he had a moment
in which he was reaching for the remote control and thinking that he needed to change
the channel. Experiential details other than the content of unsymbolized thinking were
absent except for one moment when he was physically experiencing the thought in the
back of his head.
Paul also experienced other forms of inner experience. Paul was talking during three
(18%) sampled moments. In each of these moments, he was talking to himself rather
than to another person. He also experienced one (6%) moment each of inner hearing and
just doing. Additionally, Paul experienced sensory awareness during one (6%) moment
on the third sampling day. He was experiencing the sensation of urinating. Paul’s
awareness included watching television during one (6%) moment.
Paul’s moments contained experience that is not typically coded into DES forms.
Paul’s inner experience also frequently contained perceptual awareness, present in 35%
of sampled moments. All of these moments were experienced visually. For example, he
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was in one moment he was looking for a word and in others he was seeing the phone, the
remote control, the clock, and his leg. During one moment he was perceptually aware of
playing a videogame which he had difficulty describing but seemed to have a visual
component. He described one (6%) moment which contained a sense of agreeing with
himself. During this moment he was thinking that he would let his friend come to him
instead of pursuing her. There was a sense that he was agreeing with himself, that he was
making a good decision. He did not experience this as a thought, but it was in his
awareness. He was also nodding his head, but he was unsure if nodding his head was in
his awareness. Another moment seemed to contain an element of rumination. He had
been debating whether or not to call his friend. At the moment of the beep he was
thinking that he was not going to call her, but there seemed to be a lingering of the debate
still in his awareness. Lastly, he experienced a moment of hunger.
Content of momentary inner experience. The most prominent theme in Paul’s
awareness seemed to be related to a friend he was considering pursuing romantically.
His awareness was on this friend during nine sampled moments (53%). During eight of
these moments Paul was evaluating what he was doing or should be doing regarding the
status of their relationship. During the ninth moment he was just wondering how she was
doing. Paul’s activities captured by sampling included playing videogames, studying,
exercising, watching television, driving, and cleaning.
Time orientation in inner experience. Paul’s momentary experiences were primarily
present-focused (57%), which often contained inner commentary on what he was doing.
In some instances the inner commentary was symbolized, as innerly speaking, and at
others it was unsymbolized thought. Future-focus was also prevalent in Paul’s inner
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experience (38%). These moments typically contained consideration of what he would or
should do and were also often present as either inner speech or unsymbolized thought.
Paul had one past oriented moment. The past oriented moment occurred as Paul was
leaving a class that he had rushed to campus to catch. The class had ended early. At the
moment of the beep, he was innerly saying, “Why did I go to class” and feeling annoyed.
Relationship between questionnaire data and inner experience. Paul’s questionnaire
data showed the greatest elevation on the third sampling day. This coincided with Paul’s
only experience of sensory awareness and his fewest experiences of innerly speaking
during any of the sampling days. In addition, a moment that seemed to contain
rumination was captured on this day. Paul’s questionnaire indicated the lowest level of
depression on the fourth sampling day. This was also the only sampling day during
which Paul experienced feelings. These feelings were all negative-valence.
Samantha
Samantha was an 18 year old, Hispanic female who met criteria for dysthymic
disorder at the time of qualification. She participated in the study from mid-February to
late March of 2009. She reported previously experiencing one major depressive episode
and she had received psychological treatment. She was attending the university full time
during her participation. At the qualification meeting, she was dressed casually and
somewhat trendy, was well kempt and was cooperative but reserved. She was also
particularly inquisitive about her participation in the study.
CES-D. Samantha’s CES-D scores were indicative of clinically significant
depression at screening, qualification, and sampling days one through three. However,
her CES-D score of 9 on the last sampling day was below the value of 16 which, although
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somewhat arbitrary, typically discriminates patient from nonpatient populations. Her
scores fluctuated among the days of her participation with an overall trend of lessening
depression scores. Samantha’s CES-D scores over the course of the study are shown in
Figure 4.
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Feelings in momentary inner experience. Samantha experienced feelings in 10 of 18
or 56% of her sampled moment, making feelings her most frequent form of inner
experience. She reported the experience of 12 distinct feelings in 10 of her 18 samples
(there were two samples that contained two distinct feelings).
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Her feelings were simultaneously positive-valence and negative-valence. For
example, she had one sample in which she was experienced a feeling she called a
“buzzing neutral state.” During this moment she was innerly seeing two potential
emotional reactions she could have in response to finding her lost wallet. She was
imagining one scenario in which she was throwing the wallet, representing anger and
frustration. She was also imagining another scenario in which she was putting her wallet
away which represented relief. She was feeling a “buzzing neutral state” in which she
was experiencing with a sensation of buzzing tension on the surface of her forearms and
in her chest.
Another simultaneously negative and positive moment occurred when she
experienced what she described as a “aww-poor-me-type-pouty-sadness.” She had been
listening to a song whose title contains her sister’s name. Prior to the beep she had noted
that there are not songs that contain her own name. Prior to the beep she explained that
she had been feeling genuinely sad, but at the moment of the beep she was experiencing a
more playful-type sadness.
There was one more example of Samantha’s tendency to simultaneously experience
one distinct positive-valence feeling and one distinct negative-valence feeling. She was
experiencing both excitement and anxiety. Her dad and brother had just gotten home.She
was feeling excitement related to them arriving which she experienced in the tone of her
inner speaking, “They’re here!” She was also experiencing a feeling of anxiety related to
knowing that her brother was sick and she would have to avoid being near him so she
wouldn’t get sick.
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She was also simultaneously surprised and bothered in one moment but these feelings
seemed related. During this moment, she had heard her mom on the phone gossiping
about work. And realized her mother was perpetuating workplace gossip, that she liked it
and stays involved with it, thereby continuing it and causing herself stress. She was
bothered by this realization which was experienced as part of the thought. To a lesser
degree, she was also feeling surprised.
She did have one entirely positive-valence feeling in which she was experiencing
happiness. She had four entirely negative-valence feeling samples in which she
experienced fatigue, worry, guilt, and nervousness.
There was evidence of an emotional process ongoing but no feeling in experience
during four of Samantha’s 18 samples (22%). For example, there were three moments
where the tone of Samantha’s inner speaking conveyed affect. In particular, she had a
moment of inner speaking in which the tone of her inner speech was self-reprimanding
tone and another in which the tone was self-critical tone. These moments are particularly
interesting because there emotion was present but a feeling was not. The third moment
was previously described (her excitement in the tone of innerly speaking, “They’re
here!”). There was also a moment in which Samantha experienced laughter that had an
ironic nature.
Depression in momentary inner experience. Sampling did not capture any primary
symptoms of depression (depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure). She did
experience sadness during one moment, but it was more of a playful-type sadness. Of the
18 sampled moments, secondary depressive symptoms were potentially present in 6
moments (33%). During one such moment she was bothered, which may be related to

111

the depressive symptom of irritability. During two others she was experiencing
exhaustion and a lack of energy. She also experienced a moment of worry and another of
guilt. She also exhibited slowed inner seeing and slowed inner hearing which may be
evidence of psychomotor retardation. Potentially relevant to depression, Samantha’s
sampling did capture her feeling anxious and nervous. In addition, she experienced
emotional states of being self-critical and self-reprimanding that were not directly felt.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Samantha’s most commonly experienced
form of inner experience was feelings, present in 56% of her sampled moments. Her
experience of feelings is described further in a later section.
Samantha innerly spoke frequently, in 50% of her sampled moments. Her inner
speaking typically occurred with a particular tone. For example, during particular
moments she innerly spoke with purposeful, reprimanding, dramatic, excited, and firm
tones.
Samantha experienced inner seeing in 33% of her sampled moments and included
some particularly noteworthy characteristics. These moments frequently consisted of
Samantha’s innerly seeing herself from a third-person perspective. These experiences
included innerly seeing herself on MySpace typing to her sister, innerly seeing herself put
nail polish on her desk, and innerly seeing herself pushing grocery cart while looking
tired. She also simultaneously was innerly seeing herself putting away her wallet and
throwing her wallet (previously described with the feeling of a “buzzing neutral state”).
During one moment the lessened opacity/partial translucence of the inner seeing
represented that she was just starting to have a thought. She had the sense that if the beep
had caught this thought later it would have been more opaque. This may be evidence of a
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slowed inner seeing process relevant to psychomotor retardation. In this moment she was
innerly seeing her sister on the phone. Lastly, during one moment she was innerly seeing
the words that she was also innerly saying. She was innerly seeing the words a few
inches in front of her and they were rainbow colored, particularly reds, yellows, and
blues. She was innerly seeing the words close together and blurred around the edges.
Unsymbolized thinking was present in 22% of Samantha’s sampled moments.
Several of her moments of unsymbolized thinking seemed related to things that she
needed to do or should do. For example, she was thinking that her writing was awful and
she should sit at her desk, that she needed to find her phone before falling asleep, and that
she did not have enough energy to go shopping. During another moment she knew that
her friend, who normally sends one text message at a time, had sent her multiple text
messages.
There were several forms of inner experience which Samantha experienced
infrequently. Samantha experienced two moments of sensory awareness (11%). During
one moment she was experiencing the tactile sensation of the stickiness of hair gel on her
fingers. During the other moment she was experiencing a sharp, burning pain in a small
area of her middle finger. Samantha had two moments of inner hearing. One of the
moments consisted of partially formed thoughts or “half ideas” of her thought that her
friend was too young to be getting a job. She experienced hearing herself say, “I wasn’t
like that” and “he’s only 16.” This form of thought may be further evidence of
psychomotor retardation.
In terms of forms phenomenon outside of the DES coding, perceptual awareness was
also common, present in 50% of her sampled moments. Eight perceptual awareness
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experiences were visual, seeing some aspect of her environment and one was auditory.
Samantha always experienced another form of inner experience with perceptual
awareness. She also had a moment of laughing. She was laughing ironically when she
was logging into a computer account she had not logged into for several days despite
logging into her other accounts. Lastly, during a moment when she was trying to
remember where she had put her nail polish she was moving her arm slightly which was
experienced as a physical memory of putting the nail polish on her desk.
Content of momentary inner experience. There did not appear to be a theme in the
content of Samantha’s inner experience. Sometimes her experience was related to what
she was doing, such as chatting online or via text messaging, washing her hands, and
thinking of a question to ask in class. Other experiences were related to awareness of
things that she needed to do, such as feed her rabbit, go grocery shopping, and find her
phone before taking a nap. Other times she was imagining something happening, such as
chatting with her sister, reacting to finding her lost wallet, and putting away her nail
polish. Other moments captured her thinking about others, such as considering her friend
was too young to get a job, considering her mother’s role in perpetuating gossip, knowing
her brother was sick and had just gotten home, and wondering why her sister was not
responding to her text messages.
Time orientation in inner experience. Present-focus was most prominent in
Samantha’s awareness with 66% of her sampled moments being exclusively presentfocused. Future-focus was represented in 22% of Samantha’s inner experience. During
these four moments she was considering how she would react to finding her lost wallet,
considering if she had enough energy to go grocery shopping, telling herself to cut up
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carrots for her rabbit later, and considering when would be a good time to go to an
aquarium. Past-focus was represented in only two sampled moments (11%). In one of
these moments she was thinking about how she was when she was her friend’s age, and
in another she was trying to remember where she had placed her nail polish.
Relationship between questionnaire data and inner experience. Samantha’s inner
experience did not seem to coordinate with her questionnaire data in recognizable ways.
Contrary to expectations, she experienced exclusively negative-valence feelings on her
last sampling day, the day that she had the lowest score on her CES-D.
Violet
Violet was a 19 year old, Caucasian female. She participated in this study during
March of 2009. At the time of qualification, she was experiencing a major depressive
episode. She reported experiencing one previous depressive episode and she had been in
psychotherapy prior to participation in the study. At the time of qualification, she was
not receiving psychiatric treatment. Violet’s dress was trendy and youthful. Her affect
was surprisingly cheerful. She reported having a wonderful relationship with her parents
and knowing that she had a wonderful life but experienced depression inexplicably.
CES-D. Violet’s CES-D scores were indicative of clinically significant depression
from screening through the third sampling day. However, her CES-D score on the last
sampling day (13) is below the value of 16 which typically discriminates patient from
nonpatient populations. However, it should be noted that this cutoff score is somewhat
arbitrary. Violet’s CES-D score was highest on the screening day (30) and seemed to
gradually decline over the course of the four days of sampling from 26 to 23 to 20 to 13
respectively. Violet’s CES-D scores over the course of the study are shown in Figure 5.
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Feelings in momentary inner experience. Violet experienced four (25%) samples
which each contained one feeling. Three of these experiences were of happiness and one
was of sadness. She was unable to provide experiential details of her experiences of
happiness. Happiness occurred along with smiling in one moment and laughing in
another. Her feeling of sadness was partially experienced as a physical sensation of
emptiness in her stomach.
Depression in momentary inner experience. Very few depression related experiences
were captured in Violet’s samples. Of the 16 sampled moments, a primary depressive
symptom (depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure) was distinctly present once
(6%) and potentially present once (6%; she was thinking she did not like what she was
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doing and did not want to be doing it). Lastly, a correlate of depression (thinking she was
bored) was present in one (6%) sample. Both primary depressive experiences and the
moment she was unable to report occurred on the third sampling day. She experienced
thinking she was bored on the second sampling day.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Inner seeing was captured in four (25%) of
Violet’s sampled moments. These moments contained inner seeing of 1) a slice of
pepperoni pizza, 2) Common (a rapper) singing a song, 3) her psychology exam
Scantron, and 4) her friend wearing a work uniform. She experienced the inner seeing of
the pepperoni pizza as having a location in her head. Each of her experiences of inner
seeing corresponded with another aspect of her inner experience. She was innerly seeing
the pepperoni pizza as she experienced hunger; she was innerly seeing Common seeing a
song as she was watching him sing the song in a commercial; she was innerly seeing the
Scantron as she was telling her parents that she had done well on the exam; and she was
innerly seeing her friend in a work uniform as she was telling her parents she would be
working with this friend.
Sensory awareness occurred in three (19%) of Violet’s sampled moments. All of
these moments were in the form of sensations. Two of them were sensed in her mouth
and consisted of 1) the physical sensation of brushing her teeth and 2) the smoothness,
butteryness, and warmth of mashed potatoes in her mouth. The third sensation was
experienced as feeling the softness of her dog’s fur against her hand as she petted the
dog.
Violet experienced unsymbolized thinking in three (19%) of her sampled moments.
Her unsymbolized thoughts seemed to contain inner commentary on some aspect of what
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she was doing: 1) while eating mashed potatoes, she was thinking that they were really
good, 2) while reading she was thinking that she did not want to be reading and was not
enjoying what she was doing, and 3) while petting her dog she was thinking her dog is
cute.
Violet experienced inner speaking during two (12%) of her sampled moments.
During one of these moments she was innerly saying, “I’m so bored,” and during the
other she was innerly saying, “I hope I don’t get any more cavities.”
Violet experienced some other forms of inner experience that are represented within
existing DES codes. She had two (12%) moments in which her awareness included
watching a movie and/or television. She had one (6%) moments each of reading, talking,
and doing. During the doing moment she was seeing a magazine picture and cutting it
out.
Violet also had a variety of experiences which were not represented within existing
DES codes. Violet frequently experienced perceptual awareness, present in five (31%) of
her sampled moments. Her experience included two moments of listening to a song.
During one of these moments she was also singing along with the song. During three
moments she was seeing 1) her mom, 2) her dog, and 3) a magazine picture she was
cutting out. These experiences included two moments each of hunger and experiencing a
sense of intention along with another form of inner experience (i.e., cutting out a picture
with the intention of doing so correctly or reading with the intention of processing the
information). She experienced one moment each of smiling and laughing. Lastly, she
experienced one moment that she was unable to report. She stated that a lot was going on
at that particular moment. She had been struggling to jot down notes to capture this
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moment when she was interrupted by a phone call. Therefore, she was never able to
capture or report the momentary experience.
Content of momentary inner experience. The most frequently occurring theme in the
content of Violet’s inner experience was that her awareness tended to include selfobservations and/or commentary. Some examples include her innerly saying, “I’m so
bored,” her innerly saying, “I hope I don’t get any more cavities,” and her thinking that
she did not like doing the task that she was engaged in. Although some of her awareness
was innerly focused, she also frequently had inner experience related to aspects of her
environment. Awareness related to her environments included moments in which she
was just having the experiencing something (watching a movie, laughing at a joke,
several moments of listening to music, cutting out a magazine picture) as well as
moments in which she was having an experience and thinking about it (eating mashed
potatoes, petting her dog, watching a commercial, and reading).
Time orientation in inner experience. Violet’s time orientation was clearly presentfocused. Of the 15 sampled moment for which time orientation could be determined
(excluding a moment she was unable to report on) her awareness was present-focused
during 13 (87%) moments. She experienced one moment of past focus when she was
thinking about how she had done well on her psychology exam and she experienced one
future-focused moment when she was talking about how she would work with a friend
when she started her new job.
Relationship between questionnaire data and inner experience. Violet’s CES-D
scores were similar on sampling days two and three and the lowest on the fourth
sampling day. The only form of her inner experience which coincided with this pattern
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was in her frequency of perceptual awareness. Violet experienced only one out of five
moments of perceptual awareness on the second day and two out of six moments of
perceptual awareness on the third sampling day. She showed an increase in frequency to
four out of five on the fourth sampling day which corresponds with her decreasing CESD score. There is some evidence of a relationship between depression in momentary
experience and CES-D scores for Violet. Signs of depression were found on the second
and third sampling days but not on the fourth. 1
Elissa
Elissa was a 19 year old, Hispanic female. She participated in the study from early
February to mid-March of 2009. At the time of her participation in the qualification
phase, she met criteria for experiencing a major depressive episode. She reported
previously experiencing two other major depressive episodes, but she had never received
psychological treatment. In addition to attending university, she worked a full-time job.
Her busy schedule seemed to cause frequent rescheduling of our meetings resulting in her
participation stretching over a longer period of time than the other participants. At the
qualification meeting, she was dressed casually, was somewhat unkempt and presented
with depressed affect. However, during the duration of the study, she came to meetings
professionally dressed, well-groomed, and with a cheery affect.
CES-D. Elissa’s CES-D scores were indicative of clinically significant depression at
screening, qualification, and on the first sampling day. However, her CES-D scores of 11
and 8 during sampling days 1 and 2 respectively are below the value of 16 which
typically discriminates patient from nonpatient populations. Her score returned to a

1

However, the overall low frequency of depression in momentary experiences warrants caution toward
establishing this relationship.
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clinically significant score of 17 on the last sampling day. Elissa’s CES-D scores over
the course of the study are shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6

Elissa's CES-D Scores
40
35

CES-D Scores

30
25
Elissa

20

Average Depressed

15

Average Nondepressed

10
5
0
Screening

SCID

Sampling Sampling Sampling Samping
Day 1
Day 2
Day 3
Day 4

Feelings. Feelings were present in three (21%) of Elissa’s samples. She
experienced only negative-valence feelings. She experienced worry during one moment
and she was tired in two others. Feeling worried occurred as a mixture of a feeling and
inner speaking. Other potentially affect-related experiences included the experience of an
unpleasant smell and a sense of being rushed, which occurred in separate moments on the
second sampling day, and smiling on the fourth sampling day. These feelings were
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clearly in her awareness but there were no reportable characteristics of the feelings
beyond their presence
Depression in momentary inner experience. Depressive content was not prominent in
Elissa’s momentary experience. Of the 15 sampled moments, primary depressive
symptoms (depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure) were never present (0%), a
secondary depressive symptom (fatigue; lack of concentration) was present in four
(29%), and a correlate of depression (worry) was present in one (7%). The secondary
depressive symptoms were all experienced in the fourth sampling day when she reported
again being in the depressed range on the CES-D. Fatigue was experienced the most, in
three sampled moments, and one moment indicated possible lack of concentration. The
correlate of depression experienced on the third sampling day was a sense of worry.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Sensory awareness was prevalent for Elissa,
occurring in 50% (7 of 14) of her sampled moments. Within these moments were 10
distinct sensory awareness experiences with three moments including two distinct
sensory awarenesses. Her sensory awareness typically involved a bodily sensation.
Bodily sensations were present in eight of her experiences of sensory awareness and
included the sensations of smiling, pressure on her forehead and mouth, hunger,
coughing, breathing, and heavy eyelids. She experienced three sensations of touch; the
pressure on her finger of a mouse as she clicked it, the feeling against her upper palms of
bumps on her steering wheel, and the feeling on her hand of the smoothness of the Wii
remote. Lastly, she had one olfactory awareness in which she smelled the unpleasant
scent of a Sharpie marker and one moment in which she was visually focused on the
pinkness of a submission box on her computer screen.
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Elissa was innerly speaking during seven of the 14 sampled moments, which
represented half of her sampled moments. Typically, inner speaking occurred as part of a
verbally-based task she engaged in at the sampled moment; she was innerly saying words
as she read them during four moments and she was innerly saying a letter she was about
to write at one moment. Two samples included inner speaking representing her thought
at the moment of the beep. In one of these moments, she was innerly saying, “I wonder if
I left it in there?” with a component of worry as she was looking at her purse to try to
remember where she had left her checkbook. In the other, she was innerly saying, “Wait,
what did that say?” after having seen a box of text flash on the TV screen. All of
moments of her innerly speaking were tied to some visual awareness. While reading, she
was seeing the words on the page as she innerly said them; while writing she was seeing
the paper as she innerly said the next letter; and when her thoughts were represented by
innerly speaking, it was connected with something she was looking at or had just seen.
Unsymbolized thoughts were somewhat common in Elissa’s experience, occurring in
four of 14 (29%) of her sampled moments. These moments were often integrated with
other aspects of her awareness. Similar to Elissa’s moments of innerly speaking, they
were most frequently integrated with some sort of sensory or perceptual experience. For
example, in one moment she was sensing the pressure of a marker against her lips and
simultaneously thinking that she needed to keep hold of the marker. Similarly, in another
moment she was sensing her cough and trying to keep her cough in her sleeve. The third
example that portrayed this relationship occurred when she was hearing a song and
thinking about where she knew the song from. The last unsymbolized thinking
experience was integrated with a feeling (she was feeling tired and knew that she was
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tired). Lastly, Elissa experienced just talking during one moment of sampling. During
this moment she was talking to her roommate about what she needed him to do while.
In addition to the DES codes of inner experience, Elissa’s momentary experiences
also included perceptual awareness. Perceptual awareness refers to awareness of some
sensory aspect of the internal or external environment in which the focus is its meaning
or significance rather than its sensory characteristics (e.g., looking at a green light as a
signal to go rather than being absorbed in its greenness). She experienced 19 distinct
experiences of perceptual awareness contained within 13 of her 14 sampled moments
(93%). Most commonly, these experiences were visual in nature. Her 12 visual
experiences included seeing her computer screen, seeing words on a screen or page, and
seeing other objects (i.e., purse, planner, book, and pen). She had seven experiences of
auditory awareness which all involved listening to songs. When auditory awareness was
present, it was not a central aspect of her awareness.
Content of momentary inner experience. Elissa’s experience typically related to an
activity she was engaged in and most often she was engaged in solitary activities. These
activities commonly included using a computer (36%) or video game console (7%) or
reading (29%). Other activities represented in her inner experience were working on a
sign for work, driving, coughing, looking for her checkbook, and talking with her
roommate. Her inner experience related to others on sampling days three (talking with
roommate) and four (two moments of instant messaging).
Time orientation in inner experience. Elissa’s momentary experiences were primarily
present-focused (13 of 14 samples; 93%). This is in accordance with her high prevalence
of sensory and perceptual experiences. She did have one future-focused moment (7%) on
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the third sampling day in which she was thinking about what she needed her roommate to
do the next day.
Relationship between questionnaire data and inner experience. Elissa only had a
clinically significant score on the depression scale on the last (fourth) sampling day. The
increased depression indicated by the questionnaire on the fourth sampling day coincided
with an increase in Elissa’s experience of feeling tired. Elissa’s inner experience on the
fourth sampling day did not appear markedly different from the previous sampling days
in any other discernable way.
Nondepressed Participant Profiles
Carlos
Carlos was a 19 year old, Hispanic male. He participated in this study during late
January to early February of 2009. At the qualification interview he was dressed casually
but trendy. He was tall and lanky. He seemed to have a laid-back disposition and was
pleasant. He had no psychiatric history.
CES-D. Carlos’s CES-D scores throughout the study were comparable to individuals
who are not experiencing depression. His scores were consistently very low. Carlos’s
first sampling day CES-D is considered missing data, but given the consistency among
his other CES-D scores it is likely it would have fallen in a similar range. Carlos’s CESD scores are displayed in Figure 7.
Feelings in momentary inner experience. Carlos experienced a thought/feeling of
stress and worry during one (6%) sample. He was walking to the library to work on
papers that were due an hour from then. His awareness at the moment of the beep
consisted of thinking about how it would be possible to get the papers done which was
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integrated with a sense of stress and worry. Carlos experienced one other affect related
moment. He was smiling. Smiling in this moment was experienced as an integration of
the sensing the smile on his face and knowing that he was smiling.
Depression in momentary inner experience. Carlos’ inner experience lacked
depressive content. Of the 18 sampled moments, primary depressive symptoms
(depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure) were never present (0%), secondary
depressive symptoms were never present (0%), and a correlate of depression (worry and
stress) was present in one (6%).
Forms of momentary inner experience. Carlos experienced just doing as his most
frequent form of inner experience. There were nine (50%) of his samples in which he
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was just doing an activity (e.g., writing, typing, taking out the trash) with no other
awareness.
The way that Carlos experienced most of his other forms of inner experience was
very similar to just doing in that he was typically just focused on the activity he was
engaged in. However, these experiences were better categorized as other forms of inner
experience (i.e., perceptual awareness, reading, smiling). There were two moments in
which Carlos was seeing the videogame he was playing and one in which he was just
listening to his friend. Carlos experienced two moments (11%) in which he was just
reading and one (6%) in which he was smiling. Lastly, Carlos experienced one moment
(6%) of videogame playing in which he was particularly seeing the colors of the bubbles
on the screen which was classified as a sensory awareness.
Engaging in an activity with the intention of doing it correctly/successfully was a
theme across forms of inner experience for Carlos. This intention was captured in
moments of just doing (cracking an egg), reading, and playing videogames.
Carlos experienced one moment (6%) of unsymbolized thinking. He had been
watching the weather forecast which had predicated rain the next day. He was thinking
about his girlfriend’s talking about going to dance and thinking it was unfortunate that it
would likely rain.
Content of momentary inner experience. Carlos’ inner experience often reflected
absorption in the task at hand. He was typically just engaged in the task that he was
doing. These tasks included playing a videogame (three moments), writing (three
moments), typing (three moments), reading (two moments), cracking an egg, taking out
the trash, and making sure his water bottle did not fall from between his legs while he
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was driving. Similarly, in other moments, he was just experiencing smiling and listening
to a friend. Thinking was captured in only two moments of Carlos’ inner experience.
During one of these moments he was experiencing a thought/feeling of worry and stress
and during the other he was thinking about his girlfriend talking about going to a dance
and thinking it was unfortunate that it would likely rain.
Time orientation in inner experience. In concordance with Carlos’ prevalence of just
doing and perceptual awareness, his time orientation was most often present-focused
(89%). He also experienced two moments which were future-focused. During one of
these moments he was thinking it was unfortunate that it would likely rain during a dance
his girlfriend wanted to attend and during another he was thinking about how he would
be able to complete his papers that were due in an hour.
Vicki
Vicki was a Caucasian female in her late teens. She had no history of depression or
psychiatric treatment. Vicki’s experience sampling occurred during February 2010.
Vicki presented as cheerful, pleasant, and well kempt at the qualification interview. She
also reported being religious.
CES-D. Vicki’s CES-D scores are consistent with individuals who are not
experiencing depressive symptoms. Throughout the study her scores were consistently in
at minimal levels (0 to 3 points). Vicki’s CES-D scores are displayed in Figure 8.
Feelings in momentary inner experience. Vicki directly experienced feelings in two
(12%) of her samples. One of these moments had a positive-valence and occurred after
she had gotten a good grade on an exam. During this moment she was experiencing
mostly shock as well as excitement and happiness. The other moment had a negative-
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valence and occurred while she was thinking about telling her mom she had received a
traffic ticket. During this moment she was experiencing a feeling of
worried/nervousness.
Vicki experienced several other moments that were related to affect. She sensed cold
wind during one moment, and coughing in another; both experiences had an unpleasant
characteristic. There was another moment in which she was in class and her professor
was preparing to show a video that she was uncomfortable with. Her experience at the
moment of the beep contained an aspect of anger/frustration/negative tone; however she
denied these feelings were directly in her awareness.
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Depression in momentary inner experience. Vicki’s 17 samples may have captured
one primary symptoms of depression (depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure).
During one moment she did not want to go to school which could be indicative of
anhedonia. Secondary depressive symptoms were not present in her samples. Potentially
relevant to depression symptomatology, Vicki’s sampling did capture her experiencing
unpleasantness on two occasions, somatic complaints on two occasions, worry on one
occasion, and angry during another occasion.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Vicki’s most common form of inner
experience was unsymbolized thinking which occurred in eight (47%) of her samples.
There were three moments in which Vicki experienced only unsymbolized thinking.
There was one moment each in which unsymbolized thinking was paired with sensory
awareness, perceptual awareness, talking, feeling, and reading. During most of these
moments her thought involved consideration of something she was going to be involved
in. These unsymbolized thoughts included: 1) thinking about where to get food, 2)
thinking that she did not want to go to school, 3) thinking about telling her mother she
had gotten a traffic ticket and it not going well, and 4) wondering which question her
professor would choose to ask the class. A couple moments were more reflective and
included thinking about how cold her hike the day before had been and thinking that she
had done better on exam than she had expected. Lastly, while she was doing her
homework she was thinking about solving a problem related to humidity.
Vicki experienced inner seeing during five (29%) of her samples. Vicki tended to
experience what she was innerly seeing as being located in front of her. Sometimes the
object she innerly saw was inanimate (a spray paint can and a lab booklet) and at other
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times she saw herself, either with a group of people (memory of a group trip abroad and
of her hiking with a group) or alone (herself eating). During one moment she was innerly
seeing her lab booklet and simultaneously but distinctly, she was innerly seeing her lab
instructor.
Sensory awareness was present in four (24%) of Vicki’s samples. During two of
these moments she was experiencing only sensory awareness. These samples included
her sensing cold wind on her face and sensing dryness in her throat as she coughed. She
had another moment of sensory awareness in which she experienced uncomfortable
throbbing in her right temple. Lastly, she has a moment in which she experienced
achiness in her stomach.
Vicki had several other forms of inner experience which were each represented only
once in her inner experience. These forms include: 1) just reading (her answer to a
question), 2) inner hearing (herself saying, “Am I going to be a stay-at-home-mom?” in
her own voice), and 3) just talking (saying to a friend, “Would she get mad if I left?” with
a tone of angry/frustrated/negativity). In terms of forms not represented by DES codes,
she had one perceptual awareness in which she was skimming a paper.
Content of momentary inner experience. Vicki’s inner experience was most
frequently related to her academics. Overall these academically related experiences
occurred in 8 moments (47%) and included awareness of 1) something related to a class
that she was attending at the moment of the beep, 2) doing homework, 3) reacting to a
grade on an exam or paper. Other minor themes included experiencing unpleasant
physical sensations (i.e. hunger, achiness, unpleasantness, pain, coughing) which was
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present in five (29%) of her sampled moments. Lastly, she was remembering or
anticipating trip she had/would take during three (18%) of her sampled moments.
Time orientation in inner experience. Future-focused time orientation was most
common for Vicki, present in 8 (47%) of her sampled moments. During these moments
she typically was focused on something that she intended to do (i.e., eat lunch, buy spray
paint, complete homework) or anticipating how something might happen (i.e., wondering
if she would be a stay-at-home mother, wondering how her professor would react if she
left class, imagining a hike she was planning for the weekend, how her mother would
react to her traffic ticket). Present-focus was also common for Vicki, occurring in six
(35%) of her samples. Her present-focused moments tended to consist of awareness in
the form of sensory or emotional experience and/or unsymbolized thoughts. Past-focus
was present in three (18%) of her samples. During these samples she was remembering
how cold it had been on a hike, remembering her trip abroad, and thinking that she
needed to eat a better lunch than the one she had the previous day.
Jason
Jason was a 24 year old, Caucasian male. During the course of the study he became
engaged to his girlfriend. He participated in the study during March of 2009. He was not
experiencing symptoms of depression nor did her have a history of psychiatric illness. In
addition to attending university, he worked in technical related customer service. At the
qualification meeting, he was polite and cooperative. He was dressed casually and wellgroomed.
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CES-D. Jason’s CES-D scores are consistent with individuals who are not
experiencing depressive symptoms. His scores were below five throughout the course of
the study. Jason’s CES-D scores are displayed in Figure 9.
Feelings in momentary inner experience. Jason experienced feelings or
thought/feelings during four (22%) of his samples. This included one experience of a
thought/feeling in which his experience of thinking he was lucky and feeling
appreciative/humble were intertwined. His other experiences of feelings were also of
positive-valence feelings. They included feeling happy and relieved (simultaneously)
and happy/joyful (blended together). He experienced only one negative-valence feeling
once, anger. In addition to directly experiencing a feeling, he had one other affect related
moment. He also experienced unsymbolized thinking with a skeptical tone.
Depression in momentary inner experience. Experience related to depression was not
captured in Jason’s inner experience. He did experience anger during one moment.
Forms of momentary inner experience. Sensory awareness was also highly prevalent,
occurring in 13 (72%) of Jason’s samples. During four of the moments Jason
experienced more than one distinguishable sensory awareness including one moment
when he experienced three. Altogether, there were 18 experiences of sensory awareness
in Jason’s experience. Most often (89%) these experiences were tactile sensations. Jason
had tactile sensations related to temperature (coldness, warmth, cool), pressure, texture
(rubbing), itchiness, and dryness. The other two experiences were taste sensations.
Overall Jason experienced separate sensations in 20 parts of his body (there were two
sensations which were experienced in/on multiple body regions). Jason most commonly
(40%) experienced sensations in/on his fingers/hands followed by his mouth/teeth (30%
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including tastes). He experienced two sensations each on his face and shoulders. Lastly,
he experienced one sensation on each of his eye, stomach, and back.
Other forms of inner experience occurred relatively infrequently. Jason experienced
unsymbolized thinking during five (28%) samples. The contents of these five moments
were: 1) his dreams are not interpretable and dreams in general may not be interpretable,
2) it feels good to have his eyes closed (in that moment it felt good), 3) he has a good
chance of getting the condo that he had put an offer on, 4) disagreeing with the pope’s
stance on condom use, that condoms are bad for America and would not help with
HIV/AIDS, and 5) the dent (that he was seeing) was particularly bad.
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Jason innerly spoke during three (17%) of his samples. All three of these moments
occurred on the last sampling day. Each of these moments seemed to capture an inner
commentary on observations of his surroundings. For example, as he was listening to an
alarm sound at his work, he was innerly saying, “Alarms are useless; when they go off no
one care.”
Jason experienced inner seeing during just one (6%) of his samples. During this
moment Jason was innerly seeing a crude, black and white sketch of a lion wearing a
sweater vest. This inner seeing was understood as an accurate recreation of a scene from
a television show.
Perceptual awareness was very common in Jason’s inner experience, present in 15
(84%) of his sampled moments. During six of these moments Jason was experiencing
more than one perceptual awareness (e.g., hearing the sound of the faucet and seeing his
coworker brushing his teeth). During two moments Jason simultaneously experienced
three perceptual awarenesses. All together Jason’s experience contained 23
distinguishable experiences of perceptual awareness. The majority (78%) of Jason’s
perceptual awareness occurred to a lesser degree of his awareness than some other aspect
of his awareness at that moment. Jason had 13 experiences of auditory awareness and 10
experiences of visual awareness. Other forms of inner experience also occurred
infrequently. Jason experienced reading during two (11%) of his samples. He was
reading a text message both times but could not remember the exact words. He had one
moment each of talking, movement (dancing around, nodding his head along with
moving his upper torso and tapping his feet along with the music), intention (an intention
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to scratch an itch), and effortful physical restriction (to restrict the range of his hand
gestures to keep a cup of water he was holding from spilling).
Content of momentary inner experience. Jason’s inner experience was often focused
on sensory or perceptual experiences, in line with his abundance of perceptual and
sensory awareness forms of inner experience. The predominant portion of Jason’s
awareness was often on tactile sensory experiences. Very often, a smaller portion of his
awareness included perceptual awareness (seeing or hearing). Concrete, observational
awareness was also reflected in other forms of inner experience, such as moments of
innerly speaking, which contained internal observations of external stimuli he was
encountering at the moment of the beep. There were a few moments in which he
experienced more abstract thought processes. In these moments he was thinking about
the interpretability of dreams, thinking he had a good chance of getting the condo he had
put a bid in on, reflecting on a quote about appreciating life, disagreeing with the Pope’s
view of condoms, and remembering a scene from a television show.
Time orientation in inner experience. Jason’s experience was typically focused on
the present. Exclusively present-focused awareness occurred in 15 (83%) of his samples.
This awareness was typified by perceptual and sensory awareness occurring in the
sampled moment. Jason experienced two (11%) past-focused moments. During one of
these moments he was remembering a television show he had watched and during the
other he was remembering a conversation he had with a friend regarding the parking at
the university. His only future-focused moment contained thinking that he had a good
chance to get the condo he had put an offer on.
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Triston
Triston was a 27 year old, Caucasian male. He was married and had an infant
daughter. In addition to attending the university full-time, he served in a branch of the
military on reserve. He participated in the study between late March and late April of
2009. At qualification he presented as well-groomed, respectful, pleasant, and polite. He
was notably mature and professional in a way that reflected his somewhat older age for a
college population and military experience. He had no history of depression or
psychiatric treatment.
CES-D. Triston’s CES-D scores throughout the study were comparable to individuals
who are not experiencing depression. His scores were typically very low, between zero
and four points. However on the first day of sampling, his score was relatively elevated
at nine, which is still well below the cut-off for depression of 16. Triston’s CES-D scores
are displayed in Figure 10.
Feelings in momentary inner experience. Triston experienced feelings in seven
(39%) of his samples. Of these moments, there were two which were experienced as
thought/feelings (motivated and discontent). One of his feelings was a blended feeling
(anxiety/excitement). Triston experienced both positive-valence and negative-valence
feelings. His positive-valence feelings were anxious/excited (he reported this as a
positive-valence feeling), relaxed, mildly excited, and motivated. Triston’s negativevalence feelings were frustrated, mildly annoyed, and discontent.
Only two of his feelings were experienced with physical sensations. One of these
physical sensation experiences was vague and occurred with the thought/feeling of
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motivation. He was experiencing a sense of being physically energized. During another
moment he was feeling relaxed with the sensation of butterflies in his stomach.
In addition to experiencing feelings, Triston has other moments that were related to
affect. In one of these moments Triston’s wife had asked him to change clothes. At the
moment of the beep, he was experiencing an unsymbolized thought that consisted of
thinking about why he could not wear what he wanted to and something that could be
represented by the word, “you’ve got to be kidding me.” Only the thought was in his
awareness but he described the thought having a tone of mild annoyance. Similarly, he
experienced an unsymbolized thought with a valence during another moment. He was
attempting to feed his daughter who was being fussy about eating. At the moment of the
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beep he was wondering why she was being difficult and trying to think of reasons she
might be difficult. He described this thought as having an overall negative-valence
undertone.
Depression in momentary inner experience. Triston’s experience that was most
relevant to depression occurred during one moment in which he felt discontent. Other
experiences that could be related to depression consisted of thinking that a mistake he had
made was “stupid,” lacking motivation, and feeling annoyed.
Forms of momentary inner experience. The most common form of inner experience
that Triston experienced was unsymbolized thinking which occurred during 10 (56%) of
his samples. Often his unsymbolized thinkings were related to homework and/or
studying he was engaged in at the time of the beep. These instances consisted of thinking
about the process of figuring out equation for an exam, factoring an equation for exam,
wanting to go downstairs but having to finish a practice problem, thinking it was stupid to
have made a mistake on a problem, thinking there was a reason to study harder,
considering whether an author was being overly liberal/one-sided, trying to remember
where he had seen a quote in his paper, and attempting to write a blog for a course in a
way that matched its title’s moderateness. Other thinkings indicated a response to
someone else. These instances included him questioning why he could not wear what he
wanted after his wife asked him to change, thinking about his father-in-law’s television
watching, and wondering why his daughter was being difficult. Lastly, sometimes his
thinking reflected some decision making process. During one moment he was
considering if it would be worth getting up to get water and during another he was
thinking about whether or not he wanted wheat crust pizza.
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Triston experienced inner seeing in five (28%) of his sampled moments. During three
of these moments Triston was only experiencing inner seeing. During the other two
moments inner seeing occurred along with other forms of inner experience. The content
of Triston’s inner seeing occurred in such a way that it seemed to expand on his
understanding of what was occurring at the moment of the beep. For example, as he was
trying to figure out the property of an equation he was working with, he was innerly
seeing a table in a book with blank spaces representing the values he needed to know to
figure it out but could not remember. Similar experiences consisted of innerly seeing a
scene from a book he was reading, innerly seeing the patio view in Hawaii that his fatherin-law was describing, and innerly seeing a university website to figure out his final exam
schedule.
Experiences of doing were also somewhat common in Triston’s experience, present in
three (17%) of his samples. These experiences always occurred along with another form
of inner experience, but some of his awareness was on doing some activity in these
moments. The three moments of doing included the activities of factoring an equation,
working on a problem, and stirring his daughter’s food. It is interesting to note that two
of these examples (factoring the equation and working on a problem) are somewhat
complex cognitive tasks. Yet Triston described engaging in these activities in a
somewhat automatic way.
The other two common forms of inner experience were each represented once in
Triston’s inner experience. He experienced sensory awareness when he sensed the
coldness of his drink in his hand. He innerly spoke during another moment when he was
innerly saying, “Why can’t you just do it?” In this moment, the inner speaking partially
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represented his wondering why his wife could not change their daughter’s diaper, that it
was going to be uncomfortable for him to do it (because he was sore), and that he was
tired and had not had much sleep. Other forms of inner experience only occurring once
in Triston’s sampled moments were reading, curiosity, doubt, and feeling hurried.
Perceptual awareness was present in six (33%) of Triston’s sampled moments.
During five of these moments Triston was experiencing the perceptual awareness at a
lower level of awareness than some other form of inner experience. During one moment
Triston was simultaneously experiencing two perceptual awarenesses (both seeing and
hearing). Half of Triston’s experiences of perceptual awareness were visual (seeing an
equation, seeing dark outside, seeing the baseball score, seeing the page turning) and the
other half were auditory (hearing the dialogue in a movie, hearing his wife talking on the
phone, hearing his father-in-law talking, and hearing static on baby monitor).
Content of momentary inner experience. Awareness related to academic activities
were frequent in Triston’s awareness, occurring in 61% of his samples. His awareness
included working on a math-related problem during four samples and working on an
online course related blog during three samples. Other examples of academic related
awareness included reading for class, considering his final exam schedule, attempting to
motivate himself to study, and reflecting on a “stupid” mistake he had made on a
problem. The second theme in Triston’s inner experience was related to his family, his
daughter, daughter, or father-in-law. Awareness of these family members occurred in
56% of his samples. Often his awareness was related to domestic affairs (planning what
to do with his daughter, figuring out what to wear to a family dinner, figuring out why his
daughter was being fussy about eating, etc.). In two samples, Triston was having a
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negative reaction to his wife and in two others he was hurrying his work so that he could
see his daughter.
Time orientation in inner experience. Triston’s time orientation was most commonly
present-focused, occurring in eight (44%) of his sampled moments. During these
moments his awareness was typically related to a task he was engaged in (e.g., solving a
math problem, feeding his daughter). Future-focus was also common for Triston,
occurring in six (33%) of his samples. Typically these moments included awareness of
something he wanted to do next (join his family for dinner) or was thinking about doing
at a later time (imagining visiting his father-in-law in Hawaii, arranging childcare around
final exam schedule, figuring out what to do with his daughter after her nap). Futurefocus also represented a decision he was considering for future action (whether or not he
wanted wheat crust pizza, whether or not it would be worth it to get up for water). Pastfocus was present in four (22%) of his samples. One of these moments contained
awareness of a very recent past event; during this moment he was reflecting on how a
mistake her had made in a math problem was “stupid.” During another moment he was
remembering failing an interview the previous week. Two moments of awareness
captured Triston’s reflection on historical events in the past. These moments included an
inner seeing representing his reading of the Battle of Dorchester Height and thinking
about someone else’s comment on the takeover of the Philippines during the SpanishAmerican War.
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Overview of Naturalistic Sampling
Feelings in Inner Experience
A summary of the participants’ experience of feelings is displayed in Table 6. As
expected, depressed participants had a greater percentage of moments containing feelings
than did nondepressed participants (Cohen’s d = 0.88). The two participants with the
greatest frequency of feelings were both in the depressed group and the two participants
with the least frequent feelings were both in the nondepressed group. However, it should

Table 6
Overview of Feelings in Inner Experience
% of Moments

% of Positive-

% Negative-

with Feelings

Valence Feelings

Valence Feelings

Edward

93%

50%

43%

Paul

18%

0%

100%

Samantha

56%

25%

50%

Violet

25%

75%

25%

Elissa

21%

0%

100%

Depressed Average

43%

30%

64%

Depressed SD

32.0

32.6

34.5

Carlos

6%

100%

0%

Vicki

12%

50%

50%

Jason

22%

75%

25%

Triston

39%

57%

43%

Nondepressed Average

20%

71%

30%

Nondepressed SD

14.4

22.3

22.3

Effect Size (d)

0.88

-1.41

1.14

Depressed

Nondepressed
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be noted that removing the depressed participant who experienced feelings most
frequently, Edward, reduces the average feeling frequency of the depressed group to
30%.
Of the total feelings experienced by each participant, depressed participants had a
lower percentage of positive-valence feelings than did nondepressed participants (d = 1.41) and a higher percentage of negative-valence feelings (d = 1.14). Two depressed
participants experienced exclusively negative-valence feelings and one nondepressed
participant experienced exclusively positive feelings. Even though CES-D scores of
depressed participants decreased over time, there was no decrease in negative feelings
across sampling days. Neither was there an increase in positive feelings across the
sampling days for depressed participants.
Depression and Time Orientation in Inner Experience
Table 7 provides an overview of the depressive content and time orientation in the
sampled moments of inner experience. The primary observation related to the frequency
of depressive content in inner experience was that there was little of it in either the
depressed or nondepressed group. There were only a few instances of primary depressive
symptoms evident in the sampled moments of the depressed participants and almost none
in the nondepressed participants. There was somewhat more evidence of secondary
depressive symptoms in the depressed participants and again almost none in the
nondepressed participants. The depressed and nondepressed participants had very similar
levels of evidence of the correlates of depression in their momentary experience. This
may suggest that casting too wide a net in looking for actual evidence of depression in
momentary experience results in finding experiences that are not specific to depression.
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Table 7
Overview of Depressive Content and Time Orientation of Sampling
Depressive Content
Primary

Secondary

Symptoms

Symptoms

Edward

13%

Paul

Time Orientation

Correlates

Past

Present

Future

13%

13%

27%a

47%

41%a

0%

6%

29%

6%

57%

38%

Samantha

0%

33%

22%

11%

66%

22%

Violet

12%

0%

6%

7%

87%

7%

Elissa

0%

29%

7%

0%

93%

7%

Depressed

5%

16%

15%

10%

70%

23%

Carlos

0%

0%

6%

0%

89%

11%

Vicki

6%

0%

35%

18%

35%

47%

Jason

0%

0%

6%

11%

83%

6%

Triston

0%

6%

22%

22%

44%

33%

Nondepressed

2%

2%

17%

13%

63%

24%

Depressed

Average
Nondepressed

Average
Note: aThese percentages add up to more than 100% because there were two moments which contained
aspects of both past and future orientation.

Depressed and nondepressed participants experienced very similar patterns of time
orientation. Most often, momentary awareness was related to the present. The lack of
between group differences on time orientation suggest that time orientation is not a
substantial component of depression’s influence on momentary experience.
Forms of Momentary Inner Experience
Each participant exhibited a unique profile in terms of forms of inner experience.
Their experiences are summarized in Table 8 along with the group averages and the
effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the differences between groups in the relative frequency of
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Table 8
Overview of Forms of Inner Experience
Sensory
Awareness

Inner
Speaking

Unsymbolized
Thinking

Inner Seeing

Edward

0%

20%

33%

27%

Paul

6%

47%

29%

0%

Samantha

11%

50%

22%

33%

Violet

19%

12%

19%

25%

Elissa

50%

50%

29%

0%

Average

17%

36%

26%

17%

SD

20%

18%

6%

16%

Carlos

6%

0%

11%

0%

Vicki

24%

0%

47%

29%

Jason

72%

17%

28%

6%

Triston

6%

6%

56%

28%

Average
SD

27%
31%

6%
8%

36%
20%

16%
15%

Effect Sizes
(Cohen’s d)

.40

2.0

.72

.06

Depressed

Nondepressed

these four forms of inner experience. There were large individual differences in the
frequency of sensory awareness with one depressed and one nondepressed participant
experiencing sensory awareness much more often than all of the other participants. There
was more within group consistency for inner speaking and a large between group
difference with depressed participants experiencing more frequent inner speaking. The
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lowest level of within subject variability occurred for unsymbolized thinking, and
although there was a moderate effect size for the difference between the groups, both
groups fell fairly close to the one-quarter-of-moments estimate for the relative frequency
of unsymbolized thinking found by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). There was some
variability in the frequency of inner seeing across individuals but no difference in the
relative frequency between the groups.
Feelings in Controlled Sampling
A summary of participants’ feelings in controlled sampling are provided in Table 9.
Feelings were experienced more frequently by depressed participants than by
nondepressed participants during controlled sampling. In particular, four of the five
depressed participants experienced sadness during the negative-emotion-eliciting film
clip, whereas none of the four nondepressed participants experienced any feeling during
this clip. A similar, those less striking finding occurred during the positive emotion
eliciting film clip in which three of the depressed participants experienced a feeling
compared to none of the nondepressed participants (with the possible exception of one
nondepressed participant who experienced smiling). This pattern was also somewhat
evident during the neutral film clips. During the first neutral film clip, two of the
depressed participants experienced a feeling compared to none of the nondepressed
participants. During the second neutral film clip, three of the depressed participants
experienced a feeling compared to one of the nondepressed participants. Feelings during
the neutral film clips represented both positive and negative valence emotions.
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Table 9
Overview of Feelings in Controlled Sampling
% of Moments

% of Positive-

% Negative-

with Feelings

Valence Feelings

Valence Feelings

Edward

25%

100%

0%

Paul

50%

0%

100%

Samantha

75%

0%

50%

Violet

75%

0%

50%

Elissa

50%

50%

50%

Depressed Average

55%

30%

50%

Depressed SD

20.9%

44.7%

34.5%

Carlos

0%

0%

0%

Vicki

0%

0%

0%

Jason

0%

0%

0%

Triston

25%

0%

100%

Nondepressed Average

6%

0%

25%

Nondepressed SD

12.5%

0%

50%

Effect Size (d)

2.74

0.89

0.59

Depressed

Nondepressed

Relationship Between Questionnaire and Sampling Data
The relationship between within subject variations in the relative frequency of the
presence of feelings in momentary experience and questionnaire data (PANAS-X
Positive Affect and Negative Affect and SCL-90-R Global Severity Index) was examined
using Pearson bivariate correlations. There was a significant relationship between feeling
presence frequency and the Global Severity Index in which more psychiatric symptoms
were related to more frequent feelings. There were also high, though not significant,
correlations in which Positive Affect was related to fewer feelings and Negative Affect
was related to more feelings. These correlations are shown in Table 15.
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Table 10
Correlations of Questionnaire Data and Feelings in Sampling
Total Feeling Frequency (df = 7)
r

p

SCL-R-90 Global Severity Index

0.73

.03

PANAS-X Positive Affect

-0.51

.16

PANAS-X Negative Affect

0.46

.21
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This study explored the momentary experience of feelings in depressed and
nondepressed participants as well as several other aspects of momentary inner
experience. The primary purpose of this study was to describe the experience of feelings
in depression and examine the extent to which experience of feelings during depression
differs from normal experiences of feelings. Descriptive Experience Sampling was used
to investigate inner experience in both naturalistic and controlled setting. The results of
this study suggest the following conclusions.
Conclusion #1: Robust Differences in Questionnaire Data were not Mirrored in
Sampling Data
Participants completed several self-report measures; 1) repeated CES-Ds, 2) SCL-R90, and 3) PANAS-X. Analyses revealed very robust differences between depressed and
nondepressed participants on these self-report measures. Even when the average CES-D
score of the depressed participants was closest to the nondepressed participants on the
last sampling day, there was still a large difference in their scores. These self-report
measures require participants to recall and summarize their perceived experience to
answer the items. The very large between group differences on these self-report
measures indicated that depressed participants reported very different perceptions of their
experiences over time compared to nondepressed participants. They tended to report on
questionnaires more depressive symptoms, more negative affect, more somatic
complaints, and more anxiety. In general, they reported on questionnaires much higher
levels of distressing experience in a variety of ways. This may turn out to be of central
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importance in the study of depression, suggesting that retrospective reports of experience
may actually dramatically overstate the presence of depression in actual momentary
experience.
Conclusion #2: Depressed Participants Experience More Feelings than Do
Nondepressed Participants
The findings of this study provide preliminary support for a possible relationship
between depression and the experience of feelings. When feelings were judged within a
wide scope (e.g., feelings included tired and exhausted) depressed participants
experienced feelings 43% of the time while nondepressed participants experienced
feelings 20% of the time. In addition, the participant with the greatest endorsement of
depressed symptomotology over the course of the study (as measured by the CES-D) had
the most experiences of feelings; feelings were present in 93% of his samples. The
participant who experienced considerably fewer feelings than the other participants, only
6%, was in the nondepressed group. The present findings are consistent with previous
DES studies (Cavanagh, 2003; Gunter, 2007; Lefforge, 2007, Perlotta, 2001) which have
consistently found that depressed participants experienced more feelings than
nondepressed participants.
The higher frequency of feelings experienced by depressed participants was also
found in the controlled sampling. This indicates that the difference in feeling frequency
found in the naturalistic sampling cannot be attributed only to the participants’ preference
for affective situations.
In addition, the relationship between the Global Severity Index of the SCL-90-R, a
general index of psychopathology, and feeling presence had a large magnitude and
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approached significance. This study contributes additional evidence that
psychopathology may be associated with increased frequency of feeling experiences.
The PANAS-X subscales also demonstrated high correlations with feeling frequency. As
negative affect increased, feeling frequency increased. As positive affect increased,
feeling frequency decreased.
Caution should be used when interpreting this finding. The depressed participants
experienced more feelings than did the nondepressed participants, but it is possible that
the nondepressed participants’ experience of frequency of feelings was unusually low.
This possibility’s likelihood is increased because the nondepressed group was selected
based on their uniquely low reporting of depressive symptoms on the CES-D during the
screening phase. These uniquely low CES-D scores persevered over the course of their
participation. Also, one participant with a particularly high frequency of feelings
accounted for much of the difference between the groups. However, this same
participant was also the most depressed. Nonetheless, three of the five depressed
participants’ feeling frequency was comparable to the average feeling frequency in the
normal population reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
Conclusion #3: Depressed Participants Experience a Higher Ratio of Negative to
Positive Feelings
Depressed participants experienced positive feelings during an average of 30% of
their samples and negative feelings during an average of 64% of their samples. The
pattern for the nondepressed participants was the opposite: positive feelings were
experienced during an average of 71% of samples whereas negative feelings were only
experienced during an average of 30% of samples. In addition, two depressed
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participants experienced only negative feelings and one nondepressed participant
experienced only positive feelings. This finding supports previous DES studies
(Cavanagh, 2003; Gunter, 2007; Lefforge, 2007, Perlotta, 2001) which have also found
that depressed participants experience a higher ration of negative to positive feelings.
However, one depressed participant experienced more positive than negative feelings and
one nondepressed participant experienced equal percentages of negative and positive
feelings; therefore this finding may not be applicable to everyone. It is also possible that
this resulted from sampling fluctuations given that each subject provided a limited
number of samples. Additionally, there were no relationships between within group
fluctuations in CES-D scores and corresponding momentary experience of negative
feelings or positive feelings for the depressed participants.
Conclusion #4: Depressed Participants had more Inner Speaking
Depressed participants’ inner experience included inner speaking more often than did
nondepressed participants. Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) found a frequency of 26% for
inner speaking in a normal population. The depressed participants’ frequency of 36% in
the present study is fairly consistent with this rate. However, the nondepressed
participant’s frequency of 6% seems unusually low. As previously discussed, the
nondepressed participants were selected based on their unusually low CES-D scores and
therefore may not be representative of the general population. More research will be
necessary to clarify this issue.
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Conclusion #5: Secondary Symptoms of Depression were Experienced More Frequently
by Depressed Participants than By Nondepressed Participants but Still Less Frequently
than They Report on Questionnaires
Depressed participants experienced more secondary symptoms of depression in their
sampled moments. There were a total of 13 experiences of secondary depressive
experiences in the depressed group but only one in the nondepressed group. Most often
the experienced symptom was related to lack of energy, with fatigue, exhaustion, and a
lack of energy occurring in a total of six samples. Irritability was found in two samples
and psychomotor retardation was found in two samples. There was one experience in
which impaired concentration was directly experienced. Lastly, there was one moment of
each of worry and guilt.
The between group differences were not suprising when considering how the groups
were selected. The nondepressed group was chosen from the lowest scoring 10% of the
screened participants who were not considered at high risk for depression. It is likely that
the nondepressed participants’ having infrequently occurring depressive symptoms
compared to the general population contributed to the observed between group
difference.
Although depressed participants experienced more secondary depressive symptoms
than did nondepressed participants, the individual depressed participants’ frequencies
ranged from 0% to 33% with an average of 16%. Compared to their rate of endorsement
of these symptoms on the self-report measures (i.e., repeated CES-Ds and SCL-90-R),
these frequencies were much less than would be expected.
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Conclusion #6: Depressed and Nondepresssed Participants were Similar in Primary
Depressive Symptoms and Time Orientation in Inner Experience
There were a number of facets of inner experience which were similar for the
depressed and nondepressed participants.

Most strikingly, there were minimal

differences in the depressive content of momentary experience between depressed and
nondepressed participants. Significant differences were not found in the experience of
primary depressive symptoms, and nondepressed participants actually experienced a
higher percentage of correlates of depression (e.g., anxiety) than nondepressed
participants on average. The only significant difference in terms of depressive content in
momentary experience was in secondary depressive symptoms. However, the average
amount of experience of secondary depressive symptoms was only 14% for the depressed
group. Combining all depressive experiences (primary, secondary, and correlates)
revealed that depressed participants experienced depressive content during an average of
34% of their samples. While this appears to be a significant proportion of experience, it
is important to keep in mind that nondepressed participants experienced depressive
content during an average of 21% of their samples. Although we must take these
findings as being highly tentative given the small size of the sample, the magnitude of
these differences appears to be smaller than expected
Depressed and nondepressed participants also were similar in terms of time
orientation, with present focus being most prevalent for both groups. This contradicts
early research that established depressed persons’ relative preoccupation with past events
(Wyrick & Wyrick, 1977). More recent research has examined past orientation more
closely, specifically by differentiating between past-positive and past-negative
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orientations. Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) have developed a self report measure, the
Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI) which rates participants degree of five time
orientations (past-negative, present-hedonistic, future, past-positive, and presentfatalistic). They have found that depression was highly correlated with past-negative
(.59) and present-fatalistic (.37) time perspectives. Depression was also significantly
correlated with present-hedonistic (.20) time perspective and negatively with future (.19). There was also a low, but statistically significant, negative correlation between
depression and past-positive (-.17) time perspective. I was able to examine the
momentary experience I collected for the time orientations of past-negative, past-positive,
and future. While statistical analyses of the time orientation were prevented in this study
due to the low frequency of non-present awareness, preliminary evaluation does not
support the relationships between time orientation and depression found by Zimbardo and
Boyd (1999). For example, future awareness showed relatively equal frequency and
distribution in the depressed and nondepressed groups. Participants were also similar in
terms of past awareness regardless of group. Even when valence of past awareness was
considered, depressed participants’ experience did not indicate past-negative tendencies.
In fact, past-negative moments were experienced by only two depressed participants one
time each, whereas a nondepressed participant, Triston, had two past-negative
experiences. Furthermore, the only past-positive moments (two total) were both
experienced by depressed participants. It is important to note that I conducted the coding
for time orientation in the present study while Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) results were
based on participants’ self-reports, which may explain our discrepant findings.
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Conclusion #7: Depressed Participants’ CES-D Scores Decreased Over the Course of
the Study
The depressed participants depression as measured by the CES-D decreased over
time. The overall decline was significant and the decreasing pattern was demonstrated by
all five of the depressed participants. There are several potential reasons for this
observed effect.
First, the DES procedure may have contributed to amelioration of depressive
symptoms. There are several characteristics of DES which align with psychotherapeutic
interventions that have empirical support for depression. 1) Cognitive therapy (Beck et
al., 1979) is the leading psychotherapeutic approach to treating depression with extensive
empirical support. The premise of cognitive therapy is that people with depression have
distorted ways of perceiving in a way such that they are prone to errors of inference,
recollection, and generalization. Cognitive therapy attempts to increase awareness of
depressogenic thoughts and assumptions so that patients increase accuracy thereby
decreasing depression. It is possible that an analogous process occurs with DES. Similar
to cognitive interventions such as mood monitoring, DES requires participants to observe
their inner experience over the course of time. As previously mentioned, the samples
often revealed an absence of depressive content which provide contradictory evidence for
faulty depressogenic recollections and generalizations. Perhaps participants increased
self awareness of their mood states over the course of study and corrected some cognitive
errors. 2) More recently psychotherapies that incorporate mindfulness have increased
and popularity and empirical support (Hayes, Masuda, Bissett, Luoma, & Guerrero,
2004). Mindfulness is paying attention purposefully to the present moment, without

157

judgment, thereby increasing awareness, clarity, and acceptance of present moment
reality (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). This definition parallels the process of DES in which the
participant is trained to purposefully observe inner experience and the goal is simply to
share understanding of those moments without judgment. It is possible that DES shares
enough commonality with mindfulness practices to have therapeutic effects. 3) Lastly,
DES shares characteristics with general aspects of psychotherapy also referred to as
common factors. Common factors, such as empathy, warmth, and acceptance, have been
estimated to account for 30% of the improvement in psychotherapy patients while
techniques of specific approaches account for only 15% (Lambert, 1992). This indicates
that common factors are substantial. Although not specifically intended to be therapeutic,
DES interviewers are trained to take a stance of openness, being attentive to the
participant and what they have to say, and acceptance of whatever phenomenon the
participant has experienced. Through the iterative process, the investigator typically
establishes rapport and gains a unique understanding of the inner experience of each
participant. Given the substantial influence of these types of factors, there is some
evidence that DES could be utilized as a therapeutic intervention.
Second, the alleviation of depression may simply have been due to the passage of
time. Most episodes of depression resolve within weeks or months (APA, 2000). Third,
there may have been an increased chance of natural resolution of depression in the
particular sample used as opposed to a psychiatric sample. All participants were a
relatively high functioning group of college students presumably pursuing research credit
through the subject pool. Functioning as a college student could indicate marked
difference from other populations where depression is found (e.g., inpatient or outpatient
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psychiatric populations) in terms of resiliency to chronic depression. Furthermore,
participation in this study required a substantial commitment of time and effort. The
study occurred over the course of several days and participants were asked to share their
experience during interviews. Although participants were compensated for their time
with research credit, the amount of research credit they earned in this study exceeded
their semester requirement. Therefore, participation in this study required substantial
motivation from the participants. Depression is characterized by symptoms which
impede motivation. Therefore, it is possible that the depressed participants who agreed to
participate and were able to follow through with the entire study were different from
those who were not included in this study. While they all qualified for diagnosis of
depression, their depression was not necessarily chronic or as severe as individuals who
self-selected out of the study. However, there is evidence to refute this point. A greater
percentage high CES-D scorers than low CES-D scorers completed the second phase of
the study and there were fewer participants who declined participation or did not respond
to requests to participate during this phase. After the qualification phase, only one
qualified depressed participant declined further participation compared to two
nondepressed participants.
Fourth, depressed participants may have received psychological intervention/s over
the course of the study. As mentioned, participants who met diagnostic criteria for
depression were referred to the student counseling center. Unfortunately, follow-up
questions were not asked regarding whether or not participants pursued treatment.
However, none of the depressed participants mentioned beginning treatment.
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Fifth, the decrease in CES-D scores of depressed participants may be a response to a
perceived expectancy effect. The participants were aware that they were experiencing
clinically significant levels of depression because they were given this feedback along
with a treatment referral in accordance with ethical principles during the qualification
phase. Following identification of their depressed status, participants went through a
series of interviews which may have been perceived as an intervention. Participants from
the subject pool include students enrolled in psychology classes, most commonly an
introduction course. It is possible that the procedure of this study closely resembles a
student’s concept of a treatment study. Therefore, participants may have perceived an
expectancy effect and conformed to the perceived expectancy of improvement. The
decreased pattern would not be observed in the nondepressed group because: 1) they
were likely aware of their control group status, and 2) a floor effect.
Conclusion #8: Data Supports Previously Described Characteristics of Feelings
Heavey, Hurlburt, and Lefforge (2010) articulated nine characteristics of feelings
based on accounts of inner experience gathered using DES. These characteristics were
derived from samples of normal populations. However, the present study indicates that
they also describe the experience of depressed populations.
This first characteristic of feelings is that feelings occur. In the present study feelings
occurred in between 38% and 43% (depending on the breadth of inclusion) of depressed
participants’ samples.
The second characteristic of feelings is that feelings often are not present. This was
evidenced by the remaining 62% to 57% of depressed participants’ moments which did
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not contain feelings. Similar to normal populations, individual differences in the
presence/absence of feelings varied among individuals with a range of 18% to 93%.
The third characteristic of feelings is that feelings range from vague to distinct. This
was present among depressed participants in this study. Here are examples to illustrate
this point:

Example of a vague feeling: “At the moment of the beep he was thinking that
he would let her come to him (that he would let her pursue him instead of
pursuing her). This thought was not in words or images. There was a sense of
agreeing with himself and that he was making a good decision. This was an
emotional tone to the thought. He was also nodding his head, but he was unsure if
nodding his head was in his awareness.”

Example of a clear feeling: “At the moment of the beep, he was innerly seeing
an accurate rendition of the Trump Tower in Chicago as seen from being on the
Chicago River. He was feeling excited which was experienced as a burst of
energy throughout his body with particular bubbliness and tingling in his arms.”

The fourth characteristic of feelings notes that sometimes feelings are accompanied
by bodily sensations. Depressed participants’ feelings were accompanied by bodily
sensations 35% of the time. The sixth characteristic notes that bodily sensations range
from vague to hyperclear. Here are examples that demonstrate both of these
characteristics:
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Example of a sensation that was somewhat vague: “At the moment of the
beep, she was hearing the song playing out loud, singing it out loud, and hearing
herself singing it. She was also feeling sad. The sadness was partially experienced
as a physical sensation of emptiness in her stomach area.”

Example of a sensation that was clear: “At the moment of the beep, most of
his awareness was seeing a police car and experiencing a feeling of anxiety. This
anxiety was experienced as intense “bubble guts,” an exploding sensation of heat
all over his body and an intense turning and warmth in his stomach area.”

The fifth characteristic of feelings is that sometimes feelings are not accompanied by
physical sensations. Experiences of feelings without bodily sensations were captured by
this study in 65% of depressed participants’ feelings. Here is an example of a feeling
without a bodily sensation.

Example of feeling without a bodily sensation: “At the moment of the beep,
she was innerly saying in her own voice, “They’re here!” She was experiencing a
feeling of excitement which was conveyed in the tone of her inner speech. She
was also experiencing a feeling of anxiety. This feeling was experienced as
related to knowing that her brother was sick and she would have to avoid being
near him so she wouldn’t get sick.”
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The seventh characteristic of feelings is that some people experience multiple
feelings. Simultaneous experience of more than one emotion was captured only once
among the depressed participants. In this moment she was both bothered and surprised in
a somewhat separate sense. Along similar lines, this participant also experienced
moments that simultaneously consisted of positive and negative affect. Here are the
examples:

Example of multiple feelings: “She had heard her mom on the phone
gossiping about work. At the moment of the beep she was innerly saying, “she’s a
part of its continuation.” This was the end of a train of inner speech in which she
had come to the conclusion that her mother was perpetuating workplace gossip,
that she liked it and stays involved with it, thereby continuing it and causing
herself stress. Her inner speech was characterized by a purposefulness,
intentionally clarifying for herself her new understanding of her mother’s
involvement in the gossip. She was bothered by this realization which was
experienced as part of the thought. To a lesser degree, she was also feeling
surprised.”

Example of simultaneous negative and positive affect: “She had just picked up
her wallet and was looking at it. She had lost the wallet and just found it after
tearing apart her room looking for it. At the moment of the beep, she was deciding
how she should feel about finding it. The deciding was present in her innerly
seeing two scenes. In front of her to her left was a scene that represented feeling
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relieved. She could see herself from above, putting her wallet in her backpack.
The scene to her right represented feeling angry/frustrated. She could see herself
from above throwing her wallet on the floor. She was feeling a “buzzing neutral
state” in which she was experiencing a buzzing tension on the surface of her
forearms and in her chest.”

The eighth characteristic of feelings, feelings are sometimes blended or mixed, was
also observed. Participants described their feeling at a particular time with mixed words,
in which none of the words alone clarified the exact feeling. For example:

Example of a blended feeling: “At the moment of the beep, he was saying out
loud with lower volume than he would use in a conversation, “Oh God, I miss (his
boyfriend).” He was thinking about how his relationship eventually has to stop
and that it is becoming pointless (because his boyfriend lives in another city). This
thought was not in images or words. He was feeling of sad/hopeless which he
experienced as related to the thought. There were no other experiential details of
the feeling.”

Ninth, feelings are usually but not always discriminated from other phenomena. This
final characteristic is evident in the examples that have been provided. Most of these
examples contain a feeling distinct from other aspects of awareness. However, some of
these examples contain a feeling that is closely related to a thought or tone of inner
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speech. Sometimes distinguishing feelings from other forms of inner experience is
complex.
Conclusion #9: Idiographic Approaches are Necessary to Capture Wide Ranges of
Within Group Inner Experiences
This study included in-depth profiles of each participant. This revealed five unique
presentations of inner experience among the participants with depression. Whereas these
participants appeared to be a largely homogenous group on self-report measures, closer
examination of each one across time revealed many individual differences. In fact, often
the within-group variability exceeded between group differences. These findings suggest
the importance of conducting idiographic research to understand unique presentations of
psychopathology, despite some of the limitations of such methods (e.g., small sample
sizes, lower efficiency). This importance may be underscored in the area of depression
because treatment of depression is particularly characterized by high rates of
nonresponse, partial response, and relapse despite treatment and current predictors of
nonresponse lack specificity and sensitivity (Kemp, Gordon, Rush, & Williams, 2008).
Limitations
One of the primary limitations of this study concerned the target of interest. In this
study, the target of interest was depression. However, the depressed participants’ level of
depression decreased substantially as the study progressed. Only the last three sampling
days were used in this analysis and by that time depression scores were substantially
lower than when the participants were initially recruited. On the last sampling day they
were below the typical cut-off for depression. It might be useful to study depression that
is more chronic and severe in nature, which would likely be found in a group that is lower
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functioning than a university subject pool would likely provide. For example, conducting
this study with psychiatric inpatient populations might yield different results.
Additionally, it would have been helpful to have a depressed control group who did not
undergo DES sampling. This would have allowed comparison to the depressed group
regarding self-report of depressive symptoms over time to determine if the DES
procedure contributed to reduction of reported symptoms.
This study was also limited by a small sample size of nine participants. The small
sample size prevented the application of statistical analyses to substantiate between group
differences. Therefore, the nature of this study is exploratory and the results should be
interpreted with some caution until further investigation with larger samples is conducted.
Furthermore, the nondepressed group was not selected in such a way to represent the
general population. They were chosen because they scored at the lowest level on the
CES-D during screening. Therefore, they may have reported fewer depressive symptoms
than the average nondepressed population. They may also differ from other people who
do not suffer from depression in other ways.
Another limitation is that I conducted the sampling alone. Therefore, there was only
one perspective on these experiences. I attempted to address this concern by applying my
training in the DES method and by receiving ongoing supervision. However, the
possibility still exists my application of the method contains blindness, exaggeration, or
other idiosyncrasies that could have influenced the results.
The results may also have been influenced if I had extended the sampling. This
study’s procedure specified four days of sampling as opposed to sampling to the point of
saturation. It is possible that the findings could have been enhanced if sampling with
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each participant was repeated until no novel characteristics of inner experience were
found. However, conducting in this study would have increased the burden of
participation which was undesirable as the procedure as-is was fairly demanding of
participant’s time.
Implications of Conclusions
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that whereas depressed
participants differ markedly from nondepressed participants on self-report measures,
these differences are not necessarily represented in differences in inner experience. This
finding is consistent with other research which indicates cognitive errors prevalent in
depression. DES reduces the effects of state-dependent memory, which may account for
why the depressed participants reported so much depression retrospectively but not
during sampling.
Another interesting finding was that depressed participants experienced more feelings
than non depressed participants. Despite their increased familiarity with emotion
experience, persons with depression are more prone to errors in emotion processing than
are nondepressed persons. One possible explanation for this phenomenon comes from
depressed individuals’ tendency to be self-focused (Larsen & Cowan, 1988) which
impairs ability to attend to and respond to others. Therefore, even though individuals are
more experienced with emotion, as indicated by their higher frequency of feelings, they
are less able to process and/or interpret the emotions of others.
The methodology of this study to unveil distorted perception may have clinical utility.
DES can point out the discrepancies in one’s perception of his/her experience and his/her
actual inner experience in a collaborative way. This collaboration allows for
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understanding of the true nature of another’s inner experience on the part of both the
participant and the investigator. Clinicians currently use tools with similar objectives
(e.g., thought records). DES methods have some potential to supplement these tools and
may even be preferred because accurate understanding of inner experience is understood
before change is attempted.
Future Directions
The current study was an exploratory examination of the experience of emotion
among individuals with depression, a topic that warrants further investigation. The
findings of this study contribute to divergent findings regarding emotional response in
depression. Consistent with experience-based studies, depressed participants tended to
react with emotion when presented with emotion-eliciting stimuli. This finding is
inconsistent with studies that have detected the emotion insensitivity effect in depression,
in which depressed individuals have less of a response to both positive and negative
affective stimuli. It is unlikely that response bias is entirely responsible for this
discrepancy, as emotion context insensitivity has been observed physiologically through
studies measuring electromyographical and neuron response. Further studies would be
necessary to understand the discrepancies that have arisen.
The current study included a non-orthodox approach to understanding the experience
of feelings. Dimensions of feelings, such as clarity and bodily sensations, are largely
overlooked in emotion research. However, to understand emotion, it is important to have
some understanding of the basic human experience of emotion. Therefore, the study of
emotion would benefit from regarding understanding of the subjective experience of
emotion as intrinsic to understanding emotion.

168

The most important unanswered question that remains from the current findings is an
understanding of what happens between lived experience and reporting of experience in
people with depression. The process of translating momentary experience into
generalizations about one’s experience is fraught with errors when a person is depressed.
While DES is tailored to capture the momentary experience and other methods have
captured depressed individuals generalization of their experience, the bridge connecting
these findings is a largely unexplored territory.
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